Leaving the Euro

Concluding remarks

Europe has moved forward by overcoming a succession of crises. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is proof of its success at overcoming major constitutional crises, such as Ireland's rejection of the Lisbon Treaty; there is nothing to suggest that it will not also rise to the challenges thrown up by the ongoing financial crisis, without losing either its sense of direction or any of its Members. The Irish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty on 4 October 2009, followed by the Polish and Czech Presidents' ratifications of the Treaty on 10 October and 3 November 2009, respectively, breathed new life into the European integration process, providing the EU with a fresh opportunity to deepen its integration with a greater sense of urgency and renewed energy. However, the importance of a workable consensus on the issues examined in this paper cannot be overstated if unconstructive ambiguities and prejudicial grey areas are to be avoided and if the measures intended to emphasise the voluntary nature of the Member States' commitment to EU's objectives are not to be an obstacle to them. One of the main conclusions of this analysis is that, precise meaning and its consequences should be thought through carefully if it is to bring more clarity to the possibility of and the conditions subject to which Member States may be able to walk away from the Union.

Finally, if changes to the EU's composition, whether by voluntary withdrawal or expulsion (or by the accession of new Member States), are not to lead to crises that are prejudicial to the EU's progress towards further integration, the treaty revision procedure in Article 48 TEU should be overhauled, despite the recent conclusion of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty. A simplified treaty revision procedure would do away with the need to introduce a separate exit clause or a right of collective expulsion from the EU and, equally importantly, with the need to overcome crises similar to those triggered by the non-ratification of Treaty amendments or by the vetoing of EU accession requests.