More on Imperialism
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Course: | HIST363: Global Perspectives on Industrialization |
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Date: | Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 11:27 PM |
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Read this article about the precipitating factors of European imperialism toward the rest of the world, including Africa. The export of violence would "come home to roost in 1914".
Imperialism
"Imperialism" in the context of modern history refers to global
empire-building by modern states – to distinguish it from the earlier
expansion of European states (e.g. the Spanish empire in the Americas),
it is sometimes referred to as "neo-imperialism". Specifically,
imperialism refers to the enormous growth of European empires in the
nineteenth century, culminating in the period before World War I in
which European powers controlled over 80% of the surface of the globe.
The aftershocks of this period of imperialism are still felt in the
present, with national borders and international conflicts alike tied to
patterns put in place by the imperialist powers over a century ago.
Modern
imperialism was a product of factors that had no direct parallel in
earlier centuries. For a brief period, Europe (joined by the United
States at the end of the century) enjoyed a monopoly on industrial
production and technology. The scientific advances described in the
last chapter lent themselves directly to European power as well, most
obviously in that modern medicine enabled European soldiers and
administrators to survive in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa that had
been deathtraps for them in the past because of the prevalence of
tropical diseases. In addition, ideological developments like the
emergence of Social Darwinism and the obsession with race inspired
Europeans to consider their conquests as morally justified, even
necessary. It was, in short, a "perfect storm" of technology and
ideology that enabled and justified Europe's global feeding frenzy.
While
Europeans tended to justify their conquests by citing a "civilizing
mission" that would bring the guiding lights of Christianity and Western
Civilization to supposedly benighted regions, one other factor was at
work that provided a much more tangible excuse for conquest: the rivalry
between European states. With the Congress System a dead letter in the
aftermath of the Crimean War, and with the wars of the Italian and
German unifications demonstrating the stakes of intra-European conflict,
all of the major European powers jockeyed for position on the world
stage during the second half of the century. Perhaps the most iconic
example was the personal obsession of the King of Belgium, Leopold II,
with the creation of a Belgian colony in Africa, which he thought would
elevate Belgium's status in Europe (and from which he could derive
enormous profits). In the end, his personal fiefdom – the Congo Free
State – would become the most horrendous demonstration of the mismatch
between the high-minded "civilizing mission" and the reality of carnage
and exploitation.
Source: Christopher Brooks, https://pressbooks.nscc.ca/worldhistory/chapter/chapter-6-imperialism/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 License.
Technology
Technology made the new imperialism possible. It
vastly increased the speed of communication, it armed European soldiers
with advanced weapons that overwhelmed resistance, and it protected
Europeans from tropical diseases. Simply put, technology explains how
European dominance grew from about 35% of the globe to over 80% over the
course of the nineteenth century. In hindsight, European technological
dominance was nothing more or less than a historical accident, the
circumstantial development of tools and techniques that originated with
the Industrial Revolution. At the time, however, most Europeans and
Americans considered their technology as proof of their "racial" and
cultural superiority.
For example, for the first time cities in
Europe acquired the means to communicate almost instantaneously (via
telegraph) with their colonies. Before telegraphs, it could take up to
two years for a message and reply to travel between England and India,
but after telegraph lines were constructed over the course of the middle
decades of the nineteenth century, a message and reply could make the
circuit in just two days. This, of course, vastly increased the
efficiency of governing in the context of global empires.
Europeans
were not just able to communicate with territories thousands of miles
away thanks to technology – they could survive there as well. Africa
had never been colonized by Europeans before the nineteenth century,
except for relatively small territories along the coasts. The continent
was largely impenetrable to Europeans thanks to its geography: there
were few harbors for ships, the interior of the continent had no rivers
that were navigable by sail, and most importantly, there were numerous
lethal diseases (especially a particularly virulent form of malaria) to
which Europeans had little resistance. Until the second half of the
century, Africa was sometimes referred to as the "white man's
graveyard," since Europeans who travelled there to trade or try to
conquer territory often died within a year.
That started changing
even before the development of bacteriology. In 1841, British
expeditions discovered that daily doses of quinine, a medicine derived
from a South American plant, served as an effective preventative measure
against the contraction of malaria. Thus, since malaria had been the
most dangerous tropical disease, Europeans were able to survive in the
interior of Africa at much higher rates following the quinine
breakthrough. Once Pasteur's discoveries in bacteriology did occur, it
became viable for large numbers of European soldiers and officials to
take up permanent residence in the tropical regions of Africa and Asia.
Advances
in medicine were joined by those in transportation. The steamboat,
with its power to travel both with and against the flow of rivers,
enabled Europeans to push into the interior of Africa (and many parts of
Asia as well). Steamboats were soon armed with small cannons, giving
rise to the term "gunboat". In turn, when Europeans began steaming into
harbors from Hong Kong to the Congo and demanding territory and trading
privileges, the term "gunboat diplomacy" was invented, the
quintessential example of which was in the unwilling concession to
western contact and trade on the part of Japan, considered below.

A typical small and, in this case, unarmed steamship on the Congo River in Central Africa. "Steamers" as they were called varied greatly in size and armaments.
In addition, major advances in weapons technology resulted in an overwhelming advantage in the ability of Europeans to inflict violence in the regions they invaded. In the 1860s, the first breech-loading rifles were developed, first seeing widespread use in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 in which Prussian infantry utterly overwhelmed Austrian soldiers armed with older muskets. Breech-loaders were incredibly accurate and quick to reload compared to earlier muzzle-loading firearms. A European soldier armed with a modern rifle could fire accurately up to almost half a mile away in any weather, while the inhabitants of Africa and Asia were armed either with older firearms or hand weapons. Likewise, the first machine gun, the Maxim Gun, was invented in the 1880s. For a few decades, Europeans (and Americans) had a monopoly on this technology, and for that relatively brief period the advantage was decisive in numerous conquests. Smug British soldiers invented a saying that summarized that superiority: "whatever happens, we have got, the Maxim Gun, and they have not…"
A British soldier with a maxim gun in South Africa.
The Second Industrial Revolution
Technology thus enabled
imperialism. It also created a motive for imperialism, because of a
phenomenon referred to by historians as the "Second Industrial
Revolution". The Second Industrial Revolution consisted of the
development and spread of a new generation of technological innovation:
modern steel, invented in 1856, electrical generators in 1870 (leading
to electrical appliances and home wiring by 1900 in wealthy homes), and
both bicycles and automobiles by the 1890s. The American inventor
Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, and thousands of
phones, carrying millions of calls annually, were in operation already
by the early 1880s. These advances created a huge demand for the raw
materials – rubber, mineral ores, cotton – that were components of the
new technologies.
In the initial phases of the Industrial
Revolution, the raw materials necessary for production had been in
Europe itself: coal deposits and iron ore. The other raw material,
cotton, that played a key role in the Industrial Revolution was
available via slave labor in the American south and from weaker states
like Egypt (which seized virtual independence from the Ottoman Empire in
1833). The raw material of the Second Industrial Revolution, however,
was mostly located outside of the older areas under European control,
which meant that European business interests pressured their respective
governments to seize as much territory overseas as possible. For
example, when oil fields were discovered in Persia in 1908, European
interest in Middle Eastern imperialism reached a fever pitch, with
European powers cultivating contacts among Arab nationalist groups and
undermining the waning unity of the Ottoman Empire.
Mines and
plantations were crucial to this phase of imperialism in Africa and
Asia, as they had been to the early European exploitation of the
Americas. Mining in particular offered the prospect of huge profits.
There were Canadian nickel deposits for steel alloys, Chilean nitrates,
Australian copper and gold, and Malaysian tin, just to name a few
mineral resources coveted by Europeans (of course, in the case of
Canada, the people being colonized were Indigenous Canadians, and the
colonists were themselves of European descent). Thus, while the motives
behind imperialism were often strongly ideological, they were also tied
to straightforward economic interests, and many of the strongest
proponents of imperialism had ties to industry.
While the United
States was not one of the major imperial powers per se (although it did
seize control of the Philippines from Spain in 1898 and exercised
considerable power in Central America), it played a major role in
imperialism nonetheless. The US eclipsed Europe as the major
manufacturing power and the major source of exports in a shockingly
short period – from about 1870 into the early 1900s – driving Europeans
to sometimes-hysterical levels of fear of being rendered economically
obsolete. The response of European politicians and businessmen alike
was to focus on territorial acquisition overseas to counterbalance the
vast natural resources of the US, which had achieved its dominance
thanks to the enormity and richness of American territory (seized by
force from Native Americans). Thus, even though the US did not join in
the Scramble for Africa or assert direct control of East Asian
territories, fear of American economic strength was a major factor
driving European imperialism forward.

American resource production and industrial output vastly outpaced European production over time; already by the 1870s astute European observers correctly anticipated the rapid acceleration of American production.
The British Empire
The best known phrase associated with the
British Empire from the middle of the nineteenth century until the early
twentieth was that "the sun never set" over its dominions. That was,
quite literally, true. Roughly 25% of the surface of the globe was
directly or indirectly controlled by the British in the aftermath of
World War I (1918). Enormous bureaucracies of "natives" worked under
white British officials everywhere from the South Pacific to North
Africa. The ultimate expression of British imperialism was in India,
where just under 100,000 British officials governed a population of some
300,000,000 Indians.
Until 1857, India was governed by the
British East India Company (the EIC), the state-sponsored monopoly
established in the seventeenth century to profit from overseas trade and
which controlled a monopoly on Indian imports and exports. Through a
long, slow creep of territorial expansion and one-sided treaties with
Indian princes, the EIC governed almost all of the Indian subcontinent
by 1840. India produced huge quantities of precious commodities,
including cotton, spices, and narcotics. In fact, the EIC was the single
largest drug cartel in world history, with the explicit approval of the
British government. Most of those narcotics consisted of opium
exported to China.
By the 1830s, 40% of the total value of Indian
exports took the form of opium, which led to the outbreak of the first
major war between a European power, namely Britain, and the Chinese
Empire. In 1840, Chinese officials tried to stop the ongoing shipments
of opium from India and open war broke out between the EIC, supported by
the British navy, and China. A single British gunboat, the Nemesis,
arrived after inconclusive fighting had gone on for five months. In
short order, the Nemesis began an ongoing rout of the Chinese forces.
The Chinese navy and imperial fortresses were nearly helpless before
gunboats with cannons, and steamships were able to penetrate Chinese
rivers and the Chinese Grand Canal, often towing sailing vessels with
full cannon batteries behind them.

A British commemoration of victory in the Opium War. The Nemesis is in the background on the right.
In the end, the Royal Navy forced the Chinese state to re-open their ports to the Indian opium trade, and the British obtained Hong Kong in the bargain as part of the British Empire itself. In the aftermath of the Opium War, other European states secured the legal right to carry on trade in China, administer their own taxes and laws in designated port cities, and support Christian missionary work. The authority of the ruling Chinese dynasty, the Qing, was seriously undermined in the process. (A second Opium War occurred in the late 1850s, with the British joined by the French against China – this war, too, resulted in European victory).
Trouble for the British was brewing in India, however. In 1857, Indian soldiers in the employ of the EIC, known as sepoys, were issued new rifles whose bullet cartridges were, according to rumors that circulated among the sepoys, lubricated with both pig fat and cow fat. Since part of loading the gun was biting the cartridge open, this would entail coming into direct contact with the fat, which was totally forbidden in Islam and Hinduism (note that there is no evidence that the cartridges actually were greased with the fat of either animal – the rumors were enough). Simultaneously, European Christian missionaries were at work trying to convert both Muslims and Hindus to Christianity, sometimes very aggressively. This culminated in an explosion of anti-Christian and anti-British violence that temporarily plunged India into a civil war. The British responded to the uprising, which they dubbed "The Mutiny" by massacring whole villages, while sepoy rebels targeted any and all British they could find, including the families of British officials. Eventually, troops from Britain and loyal Sepoy forces routed the rebels and restored order.

A British depiction of the Sepoy Rebellion, attributing the uprising to greed rather than its actual causes. Note also the use of racial caricatures in depicting the sepoys.
After this Sepoy Rebellion (a term that has long since replaced "The Mutiny" among historians), the East India Company was disbanded by the British parliament and India placed under direct rule from London. India was henceforth referred to as the "British Raj," meaning British Rulership, and Queen Victoria became Empress of India in addition to Queen of Great Britain. She promised her Indian subjects that anyone could take the civil service examinations that entitled men to positions of authority in the Indian government, and elite Indians quickly enrolled their sons in British boarding schools.
The first Indian to pass the exam (in 1863) was
Satyendranath Tagore, but white officials consistently refused to take
orders from an Indian (even if that Indian happened to be more
intelligent and competent than they were). The result was that elite
Indians all too often hit a "glass ceiling" in the Raj, able to rise to
positions of importance but not real leadership. In turn, resentful
elite Indians became the first Indian nationalists, organizing what
later became the Indian independence movement.
Africa
While India was the most important, and lucrative, part of the British Empire, it was the conquest of Africa by the European powers that stands as the highpoint of the new imperialism as a whole. Africa represents about a quarter of the land area of the entire world, and as of the 1880s it had about one-fifth of the world's population. There were over 700 distinct societies and peoples across Africa, but Europeans knew so little about the African interior that maps generally displayed huge blank spots until well into the 1880s. Likewise, as of 1850 Europeans only controlled small territories on the coasts, many of them little more than trading posts.
The most
substantial European holdings consisted of Algeria, seized by France in
the 1830s, and South Africa, split between British control and two
territories held by the descendents of the first Dutch settlers, the
Boers. The rest of the continent was almost completely free of European
dominance (although the Portuguese did maintain sparsely populated
colonies in two areas).
That changed in the last few decades of
the nineteenth century because of the technological changes discussed
above. The results were dramatic: in 1876, roughly 10% of Africa was
under European control. By 1900, just over twenty years later, the
figure was roughly 90%. All of the factors discussed above, of the
search for profits, of raw materials, of the ongoing power struggle
between the great powers, and of the "civilizing mission," reached their
collective zenith in Africa. The sheer speed of the conquest is summed
up in the phrase used ever since to describe it: "the Scramble for
Africa". Even the word "imperialism" itself went from a neologism to an
everyday term over the course of the 1880s.
In 1884, Otto Von
Bismarck organized the Berlin Conference in order to determine what was
to be done with a huge territory in central Africa called the Congo,
already falling under the domination of Belgium at the time. At the
Congress, the representatives of the European states, joined by the
United States and the Ottoman Empire, divided up Africa into spheres of
influence and conquest. No Africans were present at the meeting.
Instead, the Europeans agreed on trade between their respective
territories and stipulated which (European) country was to get which
piece of Africa. The impetus behind the seizure of Africa had much more
to do with international tension than practical economics – there were
certainly profits to be had in Africa, but they were mostly theoretical
at this point since no European knew for sure what those resources were
or where they were to be found (again, fear of American economic power
was a major factor – Europeans thought it necessary to seize more
territory, regardless of what was actually in that territory). Thus, in
a collective land grab, European states emerged from the Conference
intent on taking over an entire continent.
The Berlin Conference
was the opening salvo of the Scramble for Africa itself, the explosion
of European land-grabs in the African continent. In some territories,
notably French North Africa and parts of British West Africa, while
colonial administrations were both racist and enormously secure in their
own cultural dominance, they usually did embark on building at least
some modern infrastructure and establishing educational institutions
open to the "natives" (although, as in the Raj, Europeans jealously
guarded their own authority everywhere). In others, however,
colonization was equivalent to genocide.
Among the worst cases
was that of Belgium. King Leopold II created a colony in the Congo in
1876 under the guise of exploration and philanthropy, claiming that his
purpose was to protect the people of the region from the ravages of the
slave trade. His acquisition was larger than England, France, Germany,
Spain, and Italy combined; it was eighty times larger than Belgium
itself. The Berlin Conference's official purpose was authorizing
Leopold's already-existing control of the Congo, and at the Conference
the European powers declared the territory to be the "Congo Free State,"
essentially a royal fiefdom ruled, and owned, by Leopold directly, not
by the government of Belgium.
Leopold's real purpose was personal
enrichment for himself and a handful of cronies, and his methods of
coercing African labor were atrocious: raids, floggings, hostages,
destruction of villages and fields, and murder and mutilation. (This is
the setting of Joseph Conrad's brilliant and disturbing novel, Heart of
Darkness). Belgian agents would enter a village and take women and
children hostage, ordering men to go into the jungle and harvest a
certain amount of rubber. If they failed to reach the rubber quota in
time, or sometimes even if they did, the agents would hack off the arms
of children, rape or murder the women, or sometimes simply murder
everyone in the village outright. No attempt was made to develop the
country in any way that did not bear directly on the business of
extracting ivory and rubber. In a period of 25 years, the population of
the region was cut in half. It took until 1908 for public outcry
(after decades of dangerous and incredibly brave work by a few
journalists who discovered what was happening) to prompt the Belgian
Parliament to strip Leopold of the colony – it then took over direct
administration.
A few of the millions of victims of Belgian imperialism in the Congo.
One
comparable example was the treatment of the Herero and Nama peoples of
Southwest Africa by the German army over the course of 1904 – 1905.
When the Herero resisted German takeover, they were systematically
rounded up and left in concentration camps to starve, with survivors
stalked across the desert by the German army, the Germans poisoning or
sealing wells and water holes as they went. When the Nama rose up
shortly afterwards, they too were exterminated. In the end, over
two-thirds of the Herero and Nama were murdered. This was the first,
but not the last, genocide carried out by German soldiers in the 20th century.
Effects
Almost without exception, the economics of
imperialism can be described as "plunder economies". This entailed
three tendencies. First, colonial regimes expropriated the land from
the people who lived there. This was accomplished through force, backed
by pseudo-legal means: unless a given person, or group, had a legal
title in the western sense to the land they lived on, they were liable
to have it seized. Likewise, traditional rights to hunt, gather
material, and migrate with herds were lost. Second, colonial regimes
expropriated raw materials like rubber, generally shipped back to Europe
to be turned into finished products. Third, colonial regimes exploited
native labor. This was sometimes in the form of outright slavery like
the Congo, the Portuguese African colonies, and forced labor in French
and German colonies. In other cases, it consisted of "semi-slavery" as
on the island of Java where the Dutch imposed quotas of coffee and
spices on villages. In other areas, like most of the territories
controlled by Britain, it was in the form of subsistence-level wages
paid to workers.
In addition to the forms of labor exploitation,
European powers imposed "borders" where none had existed, both splitting
up existing kingdoms, tribes, and cultures and lumping different ones
together arbitrarily. Sometimes European powers favored certain local
groups over others in order to better maintain control, such as the
British policy of using the Tutsi tribe ("tribe" in this case being
something of a misnomer – "class" is more accurate) to govern what would
later become Rwanda over the majority Hutus. Thus, the effects of
imperialism lasted long after former colonies achieved their
independence in the twentieth century, since almost all of them were
left with the borders originally created by the imperialists, often
along with starker ethnic divisions than would have existed otherwise.
In
a somewhat ironic twist, only certain specific forms and areas of
exploitation ever turned a profit for Europeans, especially for European
governments. Numerous private merchant companies founded to exploit
colonial areas went bankrupt. The entire French colonial edifice never
produced significant profits – one French politician quipped that the
only French industry to benefit from imperialism was catering for
banquets in Paris, since French colonial interests hosted so many
conferences. Since governments generally stepped in to declare
protectorates and colonies after merchant interests went under, the cost
of maintaining empire grew along with the territorial claims
themselves. Thus, while economic motives were always present, much of
the impetus behind imperialism boiled down to jockeying for position on
the world stage between the increasingly hostile great powers of Europe.
The Decline of the Ottoman Empire
While it is not always
considered as part of the history of European imperialism, not least
because the core of its empire was never conquered by European powers,
it is still appropriate to examine the decline of the Ottoman Empire
alongside more conventional expressions of European empire-building.
Simply put, while the Ottoman Empire suffered from its fair share of
internal problems, European imperialism played the single most
significant role in undermining its sovereignty and coherence until it
finally collapsed in World War I.
By the late nineteenth
century Europeans casually referred to the Ottoman Empire as the "sick
man of Europe" and debated "the eastern question," namely how Ottoman
territory should be divided between the great powers of Europe. That
attitude was a microcosm of the attitude of Europeans toward most of the
world at the time: foreign territories were prizes for the taking, the
identities of the people who lived there and the states that ruled them
of little consequence thanks to the (short-lived, as it turned out)
superiority of European arms and technology. The great irony in the
case of the Ottomans, however, was that the empire had been both a
European great power in its own right and had once dominated its
European rivals in war. How did it become so "sick" over time?
Some
of the reasons for Ottoman decline were external, most obviously the
growth in European power. The Ottomans were never able to make headway
against European powers in the Indian Ocean, and as European states
build their global trade empires the Ottoman economy remained largely
landlocked. Likewise, the European Scientific Revolution of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had no analog in Ottoman lands; it
took until 1727 for a state-approved printing house printing secular
works and there were no significant technological breakthroughs
originating in the later Ottoman Empire.
The state that proved
the greatest threat to Ottoman power was Russia. Russia went from a
backwards, politically fractured region to a powerful and increasingly
centralized state under its Tsar Peter the Great (whose reign is
described in the previous volume of this textbook). Peter launched the
first major Russo-Ottoman war and, while he did not achieve all of his
military objectives, he did demonstrate the growing strength of the
Russian military by seizing Ottoman territory. In 1744 the empress
Catherine the Great's army crushed Ottoman forces and captured the
Crimean Peninsula, securing the Russian dream of warm water (i.e. it did
not freeze during the winter) ports for its navy. Catherine also
forced the Ottomans to agree to the building of an Orthodox cathedral in
Constantinople and the "protection" of Orthodox Christians in Ottoman
lands – this was a massive intrusion into Ottoman sovereignty over its
own subjects.
Other issues that undermined Ottoman strength were
internal. Notably, the Janissaries (who had once been elite
slave-soldiers who had bested European forces during the height of
Ottoman power) that had played such a key role in Ottoman victories
under sultans like Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent were nothing
more than parasites living off the largess of the state by the
mid-eighteenth century, concentrating their time on enrichment through
commerce rather than military training. In 1793 a reforming sultan,
Selim III, created a "New Force" of soldiers trained in European tactics
and using up-to-date firearms, but it took until 1826 for the
Janissaries to be eliminated completely (they were slaughtered by
members of the New Force under the next sultan, Mahmud II).
Meanwhile,
the Ottoman economy was largely in the hands of Europeans by the turn
of the nineteenth century. "Capitulation Agreements" that had begun as
concessions to religious minorities had been extended to European
merchants over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the late
eighteenth century, both Europeans and their local (i.e. Ottoman) agents
were basically above the law in Ottoman territories and they also
enjoyed freedom from most forms of taxation. The state was helpless to
reimpose control over its own economy or to restrain European greed
because of the superiority of European military power, and European
trading companies reaped huge profits in the process.
The
nineteenth century was thus an era of crisis for the empire. In 1805
the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, seized power and governed
Egypt as an indepedent state despite being (on paper) an official
working for the Ottoman government. In 1839 Resid Pasha, a high-ranking
official serving the sultan Abd al-Macid, instituted a broad reform
movement, the Tanzimat, that introduced sweeping changes to Ottoman
governance and law, culminating in a liberal constitution and the first
meeting of an Ottoman parliament in 1876. The same year, however, the
reactionary Sultan Abdulhamit II (r. 1876 – 1909) came to power and soon
did everything he could to roll back the reforms. Abdulhamit heavily
emphasized the empire's Muslim identity, inviting conservative Sunni
clerics from across the Islamic world to settle in the empire and
playing up the Christian vs. Muslim aspect of European aggression. In
the process, he moved the empire away from its traditional identity as
religiously diverse and tolerant.
Part of Abdulhamit's emphasis
on Muslim identity was due to a simple demographic fact, however: much
of the non-Muslim territories of the empire seized their independence
either before or during his reign. The Greek Revolution that began in
1821 garnered the support of European powers and ultimately succeeded in
seizing Greek independence. Serbia became completely independent in
1867, Bulgaria in 1878, and Bosnia passed into Austrian hands in 1908.
Simply put, the Christian-dominated Balkans that had been part of the
Ottoman Empire for centuries slipped away thanks to the strength of
modern nationalism and the military support they received from
sympathetic European powers.
Meanwhile, while Abdulhamit hoped in
vain that doubling down on his own role as sultan and caliph would
somehow see the empire through its period of weakness, other Ottoman
elites reached very different conclusions. High-ranking officers in the
Ottoman military educated in the (European-style) War College
established during the Tanzimat formed a conspiratorial society known as
the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. Disgusted by what
they regarded as the hopelessly archaic approach of Abdulhamit, they
launched a successful coup d'etat in 1909 and set out to remake the
empire as a modern, secular, and distinctly Turkish (rather than
diverse) state. World War I, however, began in 1914 and ultimately
dealt the empire its death blow as European powers both attacked the
empire directly and encouraged uprisings among its ethnic and religious
minorities.
When the dust settled, one of the leaders of the CUP,
Mustafa Kemal, led a Turkish army to expel European forces from the
geographic core of the former empire, namely Anatolia, and form a new
nation in its place. Soon known as Atatürk ("Father of the Turks"),
Kemal pushed through a constitution that explicitly rejected the state's
Muslim identity, adhering instead to the secularism of European and
American countries. It also, however, represented a nation of ethnic
Turks, with minority groups either expelled or slaughtered outright.
The most horrific violence of the Turkish revolution was directed at the
Armenian minority, with over a million Armenians forced on death
marches into deserts or murdered outright. While the state of Turkey
refuses to acknowledge it to this day, historians have long recognized
that the Armenian massacres amounted to a full-scale genocide.
To
sum up, the Ottoman Empire was beset by external pressures in the form
of growing European military might and European intrusion into its
economy. It also suffered from internal issues, most notably the
corruption of the Janissaries and the intransigence of reactionaries
like Abdulhamit. Its reform movements culminated in the CUP revolution
of 1909, but world war tore the empire apart before those reforms had
time to take effect. And, while Turkey entered the world stage as a
modern nation, it was a modern nation with the blood of over a million
people on the hands of its leaders. In that sense, Turkey was like
European imperialism in reverse: Western European states left a trail of
bodies as they built empires around the globe while Turkey's genocidal
crime came about during imperial collapse.
Qajar Persia
Along with the Ottoman Empire, the other major
Middle Eastern power had long been Persia (Iran), a country whose
ancient history stretched back to the Achaemenid dynasty begun by the
legendary Cyrus the Great in 550 BCE. By the modern period, however,
Persia was in many ways a shadow of its glorious past. A ruling dynasty
known as the Qajars seized power in 1779 but struggled to maintain
control over the various tribal groups that had long competed for power
and influence. Likewise, the Qajar shahs (kings) were unable to resist
the encroachment of European powers as the latter expanded their
influence in Central Asia. Like the Ottoman Empire, Persia was not
formally colonized by a European power, but Europeans were still able to
dictate international politics in the region.
For most of the
nineteenth century, Britain and Russia were the two European powers that
most often competed against one another for power in Persia, with the
Qajar shahs repeatedly trying and failing to play the European rivals
off against each other in the name of Persian independence. Russia
seized control of the Caucasus region from Persia (permanently, as it
turned out) in 1813, and subsequently imposed capitulation agreements on
Persia that were a direct parallel of those that so hobbled the
Ottomans to the west. In the following decades succession disputes
within the Qajar line were resolved by Russia and Britain choosing which
heir should hold the Qajar throne, an obvious violation of Persian
sovereignty. Persia was spared actual invasion largely because of what a
British diplomat referred to as the "great game": the battle for
influence in the region in the name of preserving the British hold on
India on the one hand versus the expansion of Russian power on the
other. Neither European power would allow the other to actually take
over in Persia as a result.
One effect of European domination in
Persia was the growth of Iranian nationalism. The central government
proved utterly incapable (and mostly uninterested) in economic
development, with the fruits of industry technology arriving at a
glacial pace across the country. Instead of trying to expand the
country's infrastructure directly, the Qajar state handed off
"concessions" to European banks, companies, and private individuals to
build railroads, issue bank notes, and in one notorious case, monopolize
the production and sale of tobacco. Public outcry often forced the
cancellation of the concessions, but foreign meddling in the Persian
economy remained a constant regardless. Reformers, some of them
religious leaders from the Shia ulama (Muslim clergy), others members of
the commercial classes familiar with European ideas, demanded a more
effective government capable of protecting national sovereignty.
Mass
protests finally forced the issue in 1905. The ruler Muzaffar al-Din
Shah signed a "Fundamental Law" on his deathbed that created a
parliamentary regime, and in 1907 his successor Muhammad Ali Shah signed
a supplement to the law that introduced civil equality and recognition
that national sovereignty is derived from the people. The period of
reform was short-lived, however, with a near civil war followed by the
dismissal of the parliament in 1911. The dynasty limped toward its end
in the years that followed, losing practically all authority over the
country until a Russian-trained military officer, Riza Khan, seized
power in a coup in 1925.
In sum, the Qajar dynasty coincided
with a dismal period in Persian history in which European powers called
the shots both politically and economically. Reform movements did
emerge around the turn of the twentieth century, but modernization did
not begin in earnest until after the Qajar period finally came to an
end. The dynasty that began with Riza Khan, known as the Pahlavis,
sought to radically reform the very nature of governance and society in
Iran, inspired by the one meaningful achievement of the attempt at
reform in the late Qajar period: the idea that Iran was a nation that should assert its national identity on the world stage.
The Counter-Examples – Ethiopia and Japan
Even the (in
historical hindsight, quite temporary) European and American monopoly on
advanced technology did not always translate into successful conquest,
as demonstrated in the cases of both Ethiopia and Japan. As the
Scramble for Africa began in earnest in the 1870s, the recently-united
nation of Italy sought to shore up its status as a European power by
establishing its own colonies. Italian politicians targeted East
Africa, specifically Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1889, the Italians signed
a treaty with the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, but the treaty
contained different wording in Italian and Amharic (the major language
of Ethiopia): the Italian version stipulated that Ethiopia would become
an Italian colony, while the Amharic version simply opened diplomatic
ties with Europe through Italy. Once he learned of the deception,
Menelik II repudiated the treaty, simultaneously directing the resources
of his government to the acquisition of modern weapons and European
mercenary captains willing to train his army.
Open war broke out
in the early 1890s between Italy and Ethiopia, culminating in a battle
at Adwa in 1896. There, the well-trained and well-equipped Ethiopians
decisively defeated the Italian army. The Italians were forced to
formally recognize Ethiopian independence, and soon other European
powers followed suit (as an aside, it is interesting to note that Russia
was already favorably inclined toward Ethiopia, and a small contingent
of Russian volunteers actually fought
against the Italians at the
Battle of Adwa). Thus, a non-European power could and did defeat
European invaders thanks to Menelik II's quick thinking. Nowhere else
in Africa did a local ruler so successfully organize to repulse the
invaders, but if circumstances had been different, they certainly could
have done so.
In Asia, something comparable occurred, but at an
even larger scale. In 1853, in the quintessential example of "gunboat
diplomacy," an American naval admiral, Matthew Perry, forced Japan to
sign a treaty opening it to contact with the west through very
thinly-veiled threats. As western powers opened diplomacy and then
trade with the Japanese shogunate, a period of chaos gripped Japan as
the centuries-old political order fell apart. In 1868, a new
government, remembered as the Meiji Restoration, embarked on a course of
rapid westernization after dismantling the old feudal privileges of the
samurai class. Japanese officials and merchants were sent abroad to
learn about foreign technology and practices, and European and American
advisers were brought in to guide the construction of factories and
train a new, modernized army and navy. The Japanese state was organized
along highly authoritarian lines, with the symbolic importance of the
emperor maintained, but practical power held by the cabinet and the
heads of the military.
Westernization in this case not only meant
economic, industrial, and military modernization, it also meant reaping
the rewards of that modernization, one of which was an empire. Just as
European states had industrialized and then turned to foreign conquest,
the new leadership of Japan looked to the weaker states of their region
as "natural" territories to be incorporated. The Japanese thus
undertook a series of invasions, most importantly in Korea and the
northern Chinese territory of Manchuria, and began the process of
building an empire on par with that of the European great powers.
Japanese
expansion, however, threatened Russian interests, ultimately leading to
war in 1904. To the shock and horror of much of the western world,
Japan handily defeated Russia by 1905, forcing Russia to recognize
Japanese control of Manchuria, along with various disputed islands in
the Pacific. Whereas Ethiopia had defended its own territory and
sovereignty, Japan was now playing by the same rules and besting
European powers at their own game: seizing foreign territory through
force of arms.

Japanese depiction of an assault on Russian forces. Note the European-style uniforms worn by the Japanese soldiers.
Conclusion
It is easy to focus on the technologies behind the new imperialism, to marvel at its speed, and to consider the vast breadth of European empires while overlooking what lay behind it all: violence. The cases of the Congo and the genocide of the Herero and Nama are rightly remembered, and studied by historians, as iconic expressions of imperialistic violence, but they were only two of the more extreme and shocking examples of the ubiquitous violence that established and maintained all of the imperial conquests of the time.
The scale of that violence on a global scale vastly exceeded any of the
relatively petty squabbles that had constituted European warfare itself
up to that point – the only European war that approaches the level of
bloodshed caused by imperialism was probably the 30 Years' War of the
seventeenth century, but imperialism's death toll was still far higher.
Until 1914, Europeans exported that violence hundreds or thousands of
miles away as they occupied whole continents. In 1914, however, it came
home to roost in the First World War.