Intrusion Detection Systems

The purpose of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a system. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to detect specific issues, and are categorized as signature-based (SIDS) or anomaly-based (AIDS). IDS can be software or hardware. How do SIDS and AIDS detect malicious activity? What is the difference between the two? What are the four IDS evasion techniques discussed, and how do they evade an IDS?

Introduction

Challenges of IDS for ICSs

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are commonly comprised of two components: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) hardware which receives information from sensors and then controls the mechanical machines; and the software that enables human administrators to control the machines.

Cyber attacks on ICSs are a great challenge for the IDS due to the unique architectures of ICSs as the attackers are currently focusing on ICSs. A standout amongst the recent attacks against ICSs is the Stuxnet attack, which is known as the first cyber-warfare weapon. Dissimilar to a typical attack, the primary target of Stuxnet was probably the Iranian atomic program (Nourian & Madnick, 2018). Attacks that could target ICSs could be state-sponsored or they might be launched by the competitors, internal attackers with a malicious target, or even hacktivists.

The potential consequences of compromised ICS can be devastating to public health and safety, national security, and the economy. Compromised ICS systems have led to extensive cascading power outages, dangerous toxic chemical releases, and explosions. It is therefore important to use secure ICSs for reliable, safe, and flexible performance.

It is critical to have IDS for ICSs that takes into account unique architecture, real-time operation, and dynamic environment to protect the facilities from the attacks. Some critical attacks on ICSs are given below:

  • In 2008, Conficker malware infected ICS systems, such as an aeroplane's internal systems. Conficker disables many security features and automatic backup settings, erases stored data, and opens associations to get commands from a remote PC (Pretorius & van Niekerk, 2016).

  • In 2009, a 14-year-old schoolboy hacked the city's tram system and used a homemade remote device to redirect a number of trams, injuring 12 passengers (Rege-Patwardhan, 2009).

  • In 2017, WannaCry ransomware spread globally and seriously affected the National Health System, UK, and prevented emergency clinic specialists from using health systems (Mohurle & Patil, 2017).

 

Since Microsoft no longer creates security patches for legacy systems, they can simply be attacked by new types of ransomware and zero-day malware.

Similarly, it may not be possible to fix or update the operating systems of ICSs for legacy applications.

A robust IDS can help industries and protect them from the threat of cyber attacks. Unfortunately, current intrusion detection techniques proposed in the literature focus at the software level. A vital detection approach is needed to detect the zero-day and complex attacks at the software level as well as at the hardware level without any previous knowledge. This can be done by integrating both hardware and software intrusion detection systems and extracting useful features of both HIDS and NIDS.