Great Depression: Turning Point and Recovery
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Description
Read this article. Some people contend that the beginning of World War II ended the Great Depression, while others suggest it was the end of World War II that brought economic restabilization.
Great Depression



Economic historians usually consider the catalyst of the Great Depression to be the sudden devastating collapse of U.S. stock market prices, starting on October 24, 1929. However, some dispute this conclusion and see the stock crash as a symptom, rather than a cause, of the Great Depression.
Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression#Turning_point_and_recovery
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
Overview
After the Wall Street Crash of 1929, where the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dropped from 381 to 198 over the course of two
months, optimism persisted for some time. The stock market rose in early
1930, with the Dow returning to 294 (pre-depression levels) in April
1930, before steadily declining for years, to a low of 41 in 1932.
At
the beginning, governments and businesses spent more in the first half
of 1930 than in the corresponding period of the previous year. On the
other hand, consumers, many of whom suffered severe losses in the stock
market the previous year, cut expenditures by 10%. In addition,
beginning in the mid-1930s, a severe drought ravaged the agricultural
heartland of the U.S.
Interest rates dropped to low levels by
mid-1930, but expected deflation and the continuing reluctance of
people to borrow meant that consumer spending and investment remained
low. By May 1930, automobile sales declined to below the levels of
1928. Prices, in general, began to decline, although wages held steady
in 1930. Then a deflationary spiral started in 1931. Farmers faced a
worse outlook; declining crop prices and a Great Plains drought crippled
their economic outlook. At its peak, the Great Depression saw nearly
10% of all Great Plains farms change hands despite federal
assistance.
The decline in the U.S. economy was the factor
that pulled down most other countries at first; then, internal
weaknesses or strengths in each country made conditions worse or
better. Frantic attempts by individual countries to
shore up their economies through protectionist policies – such as the
1930 U.S. Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act and retaliatory tariffs in other
countries – exacerbated the collapse in global trade, contributing to
the depression. By 1933, the economic decline pushed world trade to
one third of its level compared to four years earlier.
Economic Indicators
Change in economic indicators 1929–1932
United States | United Kingdom | France | Germany | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Industrial production | −46% | −23% | −24% | −41% |
Wholesale prices | −32% | −33% | −34% | −29% |
Foreign trade | −70% | −60% | −54% | −61% |
Unemployment | +607% | +129% | +214% | +232% |
Causes
The two classic competing economic theories of the Great Depression are the Keynesian (demand-driven) and the Monetarist explanation. There are also various heterodox theories that downplay or reject the explanations of the Keynesians and monetarists. The consensus among demand-driven theories is that a large-scale loss of confidence led to a sudden reduction in consumption and investment spending.
Once panic and
deflation set in, many people believed they could avoid further losses
by keeping clear of the markets. Holding money became profitable as
prices dropped lower and a given amount of money bought ever more goods,
exacerbating the drop in demand. Monetarists believe that the Great
Depression started as an ordinary recession, but the shrinking of the
money supply greatly exacerbated the economic situation, causing a
recession to descend into the Great Depression.
Money supply decreased considerably between Black Tuesday and the Bank Holiday in March 1933 when there were massive bank runs across the United States.
Crowd gathering at the intersection of Wall Street and Broad Street after the 1929 crash.
Economists
and economic historians are almost evenly split as to whether the
traditional monetary explanation that monetary forces were the primary
cause of the Great Depression is right, or the traditional Keynesian
explanation that a fall in autonomous spending, particularly investment,
is the primary explanation for the onset of the Great Depression.
Today there is also significant academic support for the debt deflation
theory and the expectations hypothesis that – building on the monetary
explanation of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz – add non-monetary
explanations.
U.S. Industrial Production, 1928–1939
There is a consensus that the Federal
Reserve System should have cut short the process of monetary deflation
and banking collapse, by expanding the money supply and acting as lender
of last resort. If they had done this, the economic downturn would have
been far less severe and much shorter.
Mainstream Explanations
Modern mainstream economists see the reasons in
- A money supply reduction (Monetarists) and therefore a banking crisis, reduction of credit and bankruptcies.
- Insufficient demand from the private sector and insufficient fiscal spending (Keynesians).
- Passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act exacerbated what otherwise might
have been a more "standard" recession (Both Monetarists and
Keynesians).
Insufficient spending, the money supply reduction, and debt on margin led to falling prices and further bankruptcies (Irving Fisher's debt deflation).
Monetarist View
The monetarist explanation was given by American economists Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz. They argued that the Great Depression was caused by the banking crisis that caused one-third of all banks to vanish, a reduction of bank shareholder wealth and more importantly monetary contraction of 35%, which they called "The Great Contraction". This caused a price drop of 33% (deflation).
By not lowering
interest rates, by not increasing the monetary base and by not injecting
liquidity into the banking system to prevent it from crumbling, the
Federal Reserve passively watched the transformation of a normal
recession into the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that
the downward turn in the economy, starting with the stock market crash,
would merely have been an ordinary recession if the Federal Reserve had
taken aggressive action. This view was endorsed by Federal
Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke in a speech honoring Friedman and Schwartz
with this statement:
The
Great Depression in the U.S. from a monetary view. Real gross domestic
product in 1996-Dollar (blue), price index (red), money supply M2
(green) and number of banks (grey). All data adjusted to 1929 = 100%.
Crowd at New York's American Union Bank during a bank run early in the Great Depression.
Let me end my talk by abusing slightly
my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would
like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression, you're
right. We did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it
again.
—Ben S. Bernanke
The Federal Reserve
allowed some large public bank failures – particularly that of the New
York Bank of United States – which produced panic and widespread runs on
local banks, and the Federal Reserve sat idly by while banks collapsed.
Friedman and Schwartz argued that, if the Fed had provided emergency
lending to these key banks, or simply bought government bonds on the
open market to provide liquidity and increase the quantity of money
after the key banks fell, all the rest of the banks would not have
fallen after the large ones did, and the money supply would not have
fallen as far and as fast as it did.
With significantly less
money to go around, businesses could not get new loans and could not
even get their old loans renewed, forcing many to stop investing. This
interpretation blames the Federal Reserve for inaction, especially the
New York branch.
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not
act to limit the decline of the money supply was the gold standard. At
that time, the amount of credit the Federal Reserve could issue was
limited by the Federal Reserve Act, which required 40% gold backing of
Federal Reserve Notes issued. By the late 1920s, the Federal Reserve had
almost hit the limit of allowable credit that could be backed by the
gold in its possession.
This credit was in the form of Federal Reserve demand notes. A "promise of gold" is not as good as "gold in the hand", particularly when they only had enough gold to cover 40% of the Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. During the bank panics, a portion of those demand notes was redeemed for Federal Reserve gold. Since the Federal Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction in gold in its vaults had to be accompanied by a greater reduction in credit. On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6102 making the private ownership of gold certificates, coins and bullion illegal, reducing the pressure on Federal Reserve gold.
Keynesian View
British
economist John Maynard Keynes argued in The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money that lower aggregate expenditures in the
economy contributed to a massive decline in income and to employment
that was well below the average. In such a situation, the economy
reached equilibrium at low levels of economic activity and high
unemployment.
Keynes's basic idea was simple: to keep people
fully employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is
slowing, as the private sector would not invest enough to keep
production at the normal level and bring the economy out of recession.
Keynesian economists called on governments during times of economic
crisis to pick up the slack by increasing government spending or cutting
taxes.
As the Depression wore on, Franklin D. Roosevelt tried
public works, farm subsidies, and other devices to restart the U.S.
economy, but never completely gave up trying to balance the budget.
According to the Keynesians, this improved the economy, but Roosevelt
never spent enough to bring the economy out of recession until the start
of World War II.
Debt Deflation
Crowds outside the Bank of United States in New York after its failure in 1931.
U.S. Public and Private Debt as a % of GDP
- Debt liquidation and distress selling
- Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off
- A fall in the level of asset prices
- A still greater fall in the net worth of businesses, precipitating bankruptcies
- A fall in profits
- A reduction in output, in trade and in employment
- Pessimism and loss of confidence
- Hoarding of money
- A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates
During
the Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression, margin requirements
were only 10%. Brokerage firms, in other words, would lend $9 for
every $1 an investor had deposited. When the market fell, brokers called
in these loans, which could not be paid back. Banks began to fail
as debtors defaulted on debt and depositors attempted to withdraw their
deposits en masse, triggering multiple bank runs. Government guarantees
and Federal Reserve banking regulations to prevent such panics were
ineffective or not used. Bank failures led to the loss of billions of
dollars in assets.
Outstanding debts became heavier, because
prices and incomes fell by 20–50% but the debts remained at the same
dollar amount. After the panic of 1929 and during the first 10 months of
1930, 744 U.S. banks failed. (In all, 9,000 banks failed during the
1930s). By April 1933, around $7 billion in deposits had been frozen in
failed banks or those left unlicensed after the March Bank Holiday.
Bank failures snowballed as desperate bankers called in loans that
borrowers did not have time or money to repay. With future profits
looking poor, capital investment and construction slowed or completely
ceased. In the face of bad loans and worsening future prospects, the
surviving banks became even more conservative in their lending.
Banks built up their capital reserves and made fewer loans, which
intensified deflationary pressures. A vicious cycle developed and the
downward spiral accelerated.
The liquidation of debt could not
keep up with the fall of prices that it caused. The mass effect of the
stampede to liquidate increased the value of each dollar owed, relative
to the value of declining asset holdings. The very effort of individuals
to lessen their burden of debt effectively increased it. Paradoxically,
the more the debtors paid, the more they owed. This
self-aggravating process turned a 1930 recession into a 1933 great
depression.
Fisher's debt-deflation theory initially lacked
mainstream influence because of the counter-argument that debt-deflation
represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to
another (creditors). Pure re-distributions should have no significant
macroeconomic effects.
Building on both the monetary hypothesis
of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz and the debt deflation hypothesis
of Irving Fisher, Ben Bernanke developed an alternative way in which the
financial crisis affected output. He builds on Fisher's argument that
dramatic declines in the price level and nominal incomes lead to
increasing real debt burdens, which in turn leads to debtor insolvency
and consequently lowers aggregate demand; a further price level decline
would then result in a debt deflationary spiral.
According to Bernanke, a small decline in the price level simply reallocates wealth from debtors to creditors without doing damage to the economy. But when the deflation is severe, falling asset prices along with debtor bankruptcies lead to a decline in the nominal value of assets on bank balance sheets. Banks will react by tightening their credit conditions, which in turn leads to a credit crunch that seriously harms the economy. A credit crunch lowers investment and consumption, which results in declining aggregate demand and additionally contributes to the deflationary spiral.
Expectations Hypothesis
Since economic mainstream turned to the new neoclassical synthesis, expectations are a central element of macroeconomic models. According to Peter Temin, Barry Wigmore, Gauti B. Eggertsson and Christina Romer, the key to recovery and to ending the Great Depression was brought about by a successful management of public expectations. The thesis is based on the observation that after years of deflation and a very severe recession important economic indicators turned positive in March 1933 when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office. Consumer prices turned from deflation to a mild inflation, industrial production bottomed out in March 1933, and investment doubled in 1933 with a turnaround in March 1933.
There were no monetary forces to explain that turnaround. Money supply was still falling and short-term interest rates remained close to zero. Before March 1933, people expected further deflation and a recession so that even interest rates at zero did not stimulate investment. But when Roosevelt announced major regime changes, people began to expect inflation and an economic expansion. With these positive expectations, interest rates at zero began to stimulate investment just as they were expected to do.
Roosevelt's fiscal and monetary policy
regime change helped make his policy objectives credible. The
expectation of higher future income and higher future inflation
stimulated demand and investment. The analysis suggests that the
elimination of the policy dogmas of the gold standard, a balanced budget
in times of crisis and small government led endogenously to a large
shift in expectation that accounts for about 70–80% of the recovery of
output and prices from 1933 to 1937. If the regime change had not
happened and the Hoover policy had continued, the economy would have
continued its free fall in 1933, and output would have been 30% lower in
1937 than in 1933.
The recession of 1937–1938, which
slowed down economic recovery from the Great Depression, is explained
by fears of the population that the moderate tightening of the monetary
and fiscal policy in 1937 were first steps to a restoration of the
pre-1933 policy regime.
Common Position
There is common
consensus among economists today that the government and the central
bank should work to keep the interconnected macroeconomic aggregates of
gross domestic product and money supply on a stable growth path. When
threatened by expectations of a depression, central banks should expand
liquidity in the banking system and the government should cut taxes and
accelerate spending in order to prevent a collapse in money supply and
aggregate demand.
At the beginning of the Great Depression,
most economists believed in Say's law and the equilibrating powers of
the market, and failed to understand the severity of the Depression.
Outright leave-it-alone liquidationism was a common position, and was
universally held by Austrian School economists. The liquidationist
position held that a depression worked to liquidate failed businesses
and investments that had been made obsolete by technological development
– releasing factors of production (capital and labor) to be redeployed
in other more productive sectors of the dynamic economy. They argued
that even if self-adjustment of the economy caused mass bankruptcies, it
was still the best course.
Economists like Barry Eichengreen
and J. Bradford DeLong note that President Herbert Hoover tried to keep
the federal budget balanced until 1932, when he lost confidence in his
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon and replaced him. An
increasingly common view among economic historians is that the
adherence of many Federal Reserve policymakers to the liquidationist
position led to disastrous consequences.
Unlike what liquidationists expected, a large proportion of the capital stock was not redeployed but vanished during the first years of the Great Depression. According to a study by Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers, the recession caused a drop of net capital accumulation to pre-1924 levels by 1933. Milton Friedman called leave-it-alone liquidationism "dangerous nonsense". He wrote:
I think the Austrian business-cycle theory has done the world a great deal of harm. If you go back to the 1930s, which is a key point, here you had the Austrians sitting in London, Hayek and Lionel Robbins, and saying you just have to let the bottom drop out of the world. You've just got to let it cure itself. You can't do anything about it. You will only make it worse. ... I think by encouraging that kind of do-nothing policy both in Britain and in the United States, they did harm.
Heterodox Theories
Austrian School
Two
prominent theorists in the Austrian School on the Great Depression
include Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek and American economist Murray
Rothbard, who wrote America's Great Depression (1963). In their view,
much like the monetarists, the Federal Reserve (created in 1913)
shoulders much of the blame; however, unlike the Monetarists, they argue
that the key cause of the Depression was the expansion of the money
supply in the 1920s which led to an unsustainable credit-driven
boom.
In the Austrian view, it was this inflation of the
money supply that led to an unsustainable boom in both asset prices
(stocks and bonds) and capital goods. Therefore, by the time the Federal
Reserve tightened in 1928 it was far too late to prevent an economic
contraction. In February 1929 Hayek published a paper predicting the
Federal Reserve's actions would lead to a crisis starting in the stock
and credit markets.
According to Rothbard, the government
support for failed enterprises and efforts to keep wages above their
market values actually prolonged the Depression. Unlike Rothbard,
after 1970 Hayek believed that the Federal Reserve had further
contributed to the problems of the Depression by permitting the money
supply to shrink during the earliest years of the Depression.
However, during the Depression (in 1932 and in 1934) Hayek had
criticized both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England for not
taking a more contractionary stance.
Hans Sennholz argued
that most boom and busts that plagued the American economy, such as
those in 1819–20, 1839–1843, 1857–1860, 1873–1878, 1893–1897, and
1920–21, were generated by government creating a boom through easy money
and credit, which was soon followed by the inevitable bust.
Ludwig
von Mises wrote in the 1930s: "Credit expansion cannot increase the
supply of real goods. It merely brings about a rearrangement. It diverts
capital investment away from the course prescribed by the state of
economic wealth and market conditions. It causes production to pursue
paths which it would not follow unless the economy were to acquire an
increase in material goods. As a result, the upswing lacks a solid base.
It is not real prosperity. It is illusory prosperity. It did not
develop from an increase in economic wealth, i.e. the accumulation of
savings made available for productive investment. Rather, it arose
because the credit expansion created the illusion of such an increase.
Sooner or later, it must become apparent that this economic situation is
built on sand".
Inequality
Power farming displaces tenants from the land in the western dry cotton area. Childress County, Texas, 1938
Two economists of the 1920s, Waddill Catchings and William Trufant Foster, popularized a theory that influenced many policy makers, including Herbert Hoover, Henry A. Wallace, Paul Douglas, and Marriner Eccles. It held the economy produced more than it consumed, because the consumers did not have enough income. Thus the unequal distribution of wealth throughout the 1920s caused the Great Depression.
According to this view, the root cause of the Great Depression was a global over-investment in heavy industry capacity compared to wages and earnings from independent businesses, such as farms. The proposed solution was for the government to pump money into the consumers' pockets. That is, it must redistribute purchasing power, maintaining the industrial base, and re-inflating prices and wages to force as much of the inflationary increase in purchasing power into consumer spending. The economy was overbuilt, and new factories were not needed. Foster and Catchings recommended federal and state governments to start large construction projects, a program followed by Hoover and Roosevelt.
Productivity Shock
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the [productivity, output, and employment] trends we are describing are long-time trends and were thoroughly evident before 1929. These trends are in nowise the result of the present depression, nor are they the result of the World War. On the contrary, the present depression is a collapse resulting from these long-term trends.
— M. King Hubbert
The first three
decades of the 20th century saw economic output surge with
electrification, mass production, and motorized farm machinery, and
because of the rapid growth in productivity there was a lot of excess
production capacity and the work week was being reduced. The dramatic
rise in productivity of major industries in the U.S. and the effects of
productivity on output, wages and the workweek are discussed by Spurgeon
Bell in his book Productivity, Wages, and National Income (1940).
The Gold Standard and the Spreading of Global Depression
The gold
standard was the primary transmission mechanism of the Great
Depression. Even countries that did not face bank failures and a
monetary contraction first hand were forced to join the deflationary
policy since higher interest rates in countries that performed a
deflationary policy led to a gold outflow in countries with lower
interest rates. Under the gold standard's price–specie flow mechanism,
countries that lost gold but nevertheless wanted to maintain the gold
standard had to permit their money supply to decrease and the domestic
price level to decline (deflation).
There is also
consensus that protectionist policies, and primarily the passage of the
Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, helped to exacerbate, or even cause the Great
Depression.
Gold Standard
The Depression in international perspective.
Some
economic studies have indicated that just as the downturn was spread
worldwide by the rigidities of the gold standard, it was suspending gold
convertibility (or devaluing the currency in gold terms) that did the
most to make recovery possible.
Every major currency left the
gold standard during the Great Depression. The UK was the first to do
so. Facing speculative attacks on the pound and depleting gold reserves,
in September 1931 the Bank of England ceased exchanging pound notes for
gold and the pound was floated on foreign exchange markets.
Japan
and the Scandinavian countries joined the United Kingdom in leaving the
gold standard in 1931. Other countries, such as Italy and the United
States, remained on the gold standard into 1932 or 1933, while a few
countries in the so-called "gold bloc", led by France and including
Poland, Belgium and Switzerland, stayed on the standard until 1935–36.
According
to later analysis, the earliness with which a country left the gold
standard reliably predicted its economic recovery. For example, The UK
and Scandinavia, which left the gold standard in 1931, recovered much
earlier than France and Belgium, which remained on gold much longer.
Countries such as China, which had a silver standard, almost avoided the
depression entirely. The connection between leaving the gold standard
as a strong predictor of that country's severity of its depression and
the length of time of its recovery has been shown to be consistent for
dozens of countries, including developing countries. This partly
explains why the experience and length of the depression differed
between regions and states around the world.
Breakdown of International Trade
Many economists have argued that the sharp decline in international trade after 1930 helped to worsen the depression, especially for countries significantly dependent on foreign trade. In a 1995 survey of American economic historians, two-thirds agreed that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act (enacted June 17, 1930) at least worsened the Great Depression. Most historians and economists blame this Act for worsening the depression by seriously reducing international trade and causing retaliatory tariffs in other countries. While foreign trade was a small part of overall economic activity in the U.S. and was concentrated in a few businesses like farming, it was a much larger factor in many other countries.
The average ad valorem rate of duties on dutiable imports
for 1921–1925 was 25.9% but under the new tariff it jumped to 50%
during 1931–1935. In dollar terms, American exports declined over the
next four years from about $5.2 billion in 1929 to $1.7 billion in 1933;
so, not only did the physical volume of exports fall, but also the
prices fell by about 1⁄3 as written. Hardest hit were farm commodities
such as wheat, cotton, tobacco, and lumber.
Governments around
the world took various steps into spending less money on foreign goods
such as: "imposing tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls". These
restrictions triggered much tension among countries that had large
amounts of bilateral trade, causing major export-import reductions
during the depression. Not all governments enforced the same measures of
protectionism. Some countries raised tariffs drastically and enforced
severe restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, while other
countries reduced "trade and exchange restrictions only marginally":
- "Countries that remained on the gold standard, keeping currencies
fixed, were more likely to restrict foreign trade". These countries
"resorted to protectionist policies to strengthen the balance of
payments and limit gold losses". They hoped that these restrictions and
depletions would hold the economic decline.
- Countries that
abandoned the gold standard, allowed their currencies to depreciate
which caused their balance of payments to strengthen. It also freed up
monetary policy so that central banks could lower interest rates and act
as lenders of last resort. They possessed the best policy instruments
to fight the Depression and did not need protectionism.
- "The length and depth of a country's economic downturn and the timing and vigor of its recovery are related to how long it remained on the gold standard. Countries abandoning the gold standard relatively early experienced relatively mild recessions and early recoveries. In contrast, countries remaining on the gold standard experienced prolonged slumps".
Effect of Tariffs
The consensus view among economists and economic historians (including Keynesians, Monetarists and Austrian economists) is that the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff exacerbated the Great Depression, although there is disagreement as to how much. In the popular view, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was a leading cause of the depression. According to the U.S. Senate website the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act is among the most catastrophic acts in congressional history
German Banking Crisis of 1931 and British Crisis
The financial crisis escalated out of control in mid-1931, starting with the collapse of the Credit Anstalt in Vienna in May. This put heavy pressure on Germany, which was already in political turmoil. With the rise in violence of Nazi and communist movements, as well as investor nervousness at harsh government financial policies. Investors withdrew their short-term money from Germany, as confidence spiraled downward.
The Reichsbank lost 150 million marks in the first week of June, 540 million in the second, and 150 million in two days, June 19–20. Collapse was at hand. U.S. President Herbert Hoover called for a moratorium on Payment of war reparations. This angered Paris, which depended on a steady flow of German payments, but it slowed the crisis down, and the moratorium was agreed to in July 1931. An International conference in London later in July produced no agreements but on August 19 a standstill agreement froze Germany's foreign liabilities for six months.
Germany received emergency funding from
private banks in New York as well as the Bank of International
Settlements and the Bank of England. The funding only slowed the
process. Industrial failures began in Germany, a major bank closed in
July and a two-day holiday for all German banks was declared. Business
failures were more frequent in July, and spread to Romania and Hungary.
The crisis continued to get worse in Germany, bringing political
upheaval that finally led to the coming to power of Hitler's Nazi regime
in January 1933.
The world financial crisis now began to
overwhelm Britain; investors around the world started withdrawing their
gold from London at the rate of £2.5 million per day. Credits of £25
million each from the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and an issue of £15 million fiduciary note slowed, but did not
reverse the British crisis. The financial crisis now caused a major
political crisis in Britain in August 1931.
With deficits mounting, the bankers demanded a balanced budget; the divided cabinet of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government agreed; it proposed to raise taxes, cut spending, and most controversially, to cut unemployment benefits 20%. The attack on welfare was unacceptable to the Labour movement. MacDonald wanted to resign, but King George V insisted he remain and form an all-party coalition "National Government".
The
Conservative and Liberals parties signed on, along with a small cadre of
Labour, but the vast majority of Labour leaders denounced MacDonald as a
traitor for leading the new government. Britain went off the gold
standard, and suffered relatively less than other major countries in the
Great Depression. In the 1931 British election, the Labour Party was
virtually destroyed, leaving MacDonald as Prime Minister for a largely
Conservative coalition.
Turning Point and Recovery
In
most countries of the world, recovery from the Great Depression began
in 1933. In the U.S., recovery began in early 1933, but the U.S.
did not return to 1929 GNP for over a decade and still had an
unemployment rate of about 15% in 1940, albeit down from the high of 25%
in 1933.
The overall course of the Depression in the United States, as reflected in per-capita GDP (average income per person) shown in constant year 2000 dollars, plus some of the key events of the period. Dotted red line = long-term trend 1920–1970.
There is no consensus among economists regarding the
motive force for the U.S. economic expansion that continued through most
of the Roosevelt years (and the 1937 recession that interrupted it).
The common view among most economists is that Roosevelt's New Deal
policies either caused or accelerated the recovery, although his
policies were never aggressive enough to bring the economy completely
out of recession.
Some economists have also called attention to the
positive effects from expectations of reflation and rising nominal
interest rates that Roosevelt's words and actions portended. It
was the rollback of those same reflationary policies that led to the
interruption of a recession beginning in late 1937. One
contributing policy that reversed reflation was the Banking Act of 1935,
which effectively raised reserve requirements, causing a monetary
contraction that helped to thwart the recovery. GDP returned to its
upward trend in 1938.
According to Christina Romer, the money
supply growth caused by huge international gold inflows was a crucial
source of the recovery of the United States economy, and that the
economy showed little sign of self-correction. The gold inflows were
partly due to devaluation of the U.S. dollar and partly due to
deterioration of the political situation in Europe. In their book, A
Monetary History of the United States, Milton Friedman and Anna J.
Schwartz also attributed the recovery to monetary factors, and contended
that it was much slowed by poor management of money by the Federal
Reserve System.
Former (2006–2014) Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke agreed that monetary factors played important roles both in the worldwide economic decline and eventual recovery. Bernanke also saw a strong role for institutional factors, particularly the rebuilding and restructuring of the financial system, and pointed out that the Depression should be examined in an international perspective.
Role of Women and Household Economics
Women's
primary role was as housewives; without a steady flow of family income,
their work became much harder in dealing with food and clothing and
medical care. Birthrates fell everywhere, as children were postponed
until families could financially support them. The average birthrate for
14 major countries fell 12% from 19.3 births per thousand population in
1930, to 17.0 in 1935. In Canada, half of Roman Catholic women
defied Church teachings and used contraception to postpone births.
Among
the few women in the labor force, layoffs were less common in the
white-collar jobs and they were typically found in light manufacturing
work. However, there was a widespread demand to limit families to one
paid job, so that wives might lose employment if their husband was
employed. Across Britain, there was a tendency for married
women to join the labor force, competing for part-time jobs
especially.
In France, very slow population growth,
especially in comparison to Germany continued to be a serious issue in
the 1930s. Support for increasing welfare programs during the depression
included a focus on women in the family. The Conseil Supérieur de la
Natalité campaigned for provisions enacted in the Code de la Famille
(1939) that increased state assistance to families with children and
required employers to protect the jobs of fathers, even if they were
immigrants.
In rural and small-town areas, women expanded
their operation of vegetable gardens to include as much food production
as possible. In the United States, agricultural organizations sponsored
programs to teach housewives how to optimize their gardens and to raise
poultry for meat and eggs. Rural women made feed sack dresses and
other items for themselves and their families and homes from feed
sacks. In American cities, African American women quiltmakers
enlarged their activities, promoted collaboration, and trained
neophytes. Quilts were created for practical use from various
inexpensive materials and increased social interaction for women and
promoted camaraderie and personal fulfillment.
Oral history
provides evidence for how housewives in a modern industrial city handled
shortages of money and resources. Often they updated strategies their
mothers used when they were growing up in poor families. Cheap foods
were used, such as soups, beans and noodles. They purchased the cheapest
cuts of meat - sometimes even horse meat - and recycled the Sunday roast
into sandwiches and soups. They sewed and patched clothing, traded with
their neighbors for outgrown items, and made do with colder homes. New
furniture and appliances were postponed until better days. Many women
also worked outside the home, or took boarders, did laundry for trade or
cash, and did sewing for neighbors in exchange for something they could
offer. Extended families used mutual aid – extra food, spare rooms,
repair-work, cash loans – to help cousins and in-laws.
In
Japan, official government policy was deflationary and the opposite of
Keynesian spending. Consequently, the government launched a campaign
across the country to induce households to reduce their consumption,
focusing attention on spending by housewives.
In Germany,
the government tried to reshape private household consumption under the
Four-Year Plan of 1936 to achieve German economic self-sufficiency. The
Nazi women's organizations, other propaganda agencies and the
authorities all attempted to shape such consumption as economic
self-sufficiency was needed to prepare for and to sustain the coming
war. The organizations, propaganda agencies and authorities employed
slogans that called up traditional values of thrift and healthy living.
However, these efforts were only partly successful in changing the
behavior of housewives.
World War II and Recovery
A female factory worker in 1942, Fort Worth, Texas. Women entered the workforce as men were drafted into the armed forces.
The common view among economic historians is that the Great Depression ended with the advent of World War II. Many economists believe that government spending on the war caused or at least accelerated recovery from the Great Depression, though some consider that it did not play a very large role in the recovery, though it did help in reducing unemployment.
The rearmament policies leading up to World War II helped stimulate the economies of Europe in 1937–1939. By 1937, unemployment in Britain had fallen to 1.5 million. The mobilization of manpower following the outbreak of war in 1939 ended unemployment.
When the United States entered the war in 1941, it finally eliminated the last effects from the Great Depression and brought the U.S. unemployment rate down below 10%. In the U.S., massive war spending doubled economic growth rates, either masking the effects of the Depression or essentially ending the Depression. Businessmen ignored the mounting national debt and heavy new taxes, redoubling their efforts for greater output to take advantage of generous government contracts.
Socio-Economic Effects
An impoverished American family living in a shanty, 1936
The
majority of countries set up relief programs and most underwent some
sort of political upheaval, pushing them to the right. Many of the
countries in Europe and Latin America that were democracies saw them
overthrown by some form of dictatorship or authoritarian rule, most
famously in Germany in 1933. The Dominion of Newfoundland gave up
democracy voluntarily.
Australia
Australia's dependence on agricultural and industrial exports meant it was one of the hardest-hit developed countries. Falling export demand and commodity prices placed massive downward pressures on wages. Unemployment reached a record high of 29% in 1932, with incidents of civil unrest becoming common. After 1932, an increase in wool and meat prices led to a gradual recovery.
Canada
Unemployed men march in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Harshly
affected by both the global economic downturn and the Dust Bowl,
Canadian industrial production had by 1932 fallen to only 58% of its
1929 figure, the second-lowest level in the world after the United
States, and well behind countries such as Britain, which fell to only
83% of the 1929 level. Total national income fell to 56% of the 1929
level, again worse than any country apart from the United States.
Unemployment reached 27% at the depth of the Depression in 1933.
Chile
The
League of Nations labeled Chile the country hardest hit by the Great
Depression because 80% of government revenue came from exports of copper
and nitrates, which were in low demand. Chile initially felt the impact
of the Great Depression in 1930, when GDP dropped 14%, mining income
declined 27%, and export earnings fell 28%. By 1932, GDP had shrunk to
less than half of what it had been in 1929, exacting a terrible toll in
unemployment and business failures.
Influenced profoundly by the
Great Depression, many government leaders promoted the development of
local industry in an effort to insulate the economy from future external
shocks. After six years of government austerity measures, which
succeeded in reestablishing Chile's creditworthiness, Chileans elected
to office during the 1938–58 period a succession of center and
left-of-center governments interested in promoting economic growth
through government intervention.
Prompted in part by the
devastating 1939 Chillán earthquake, the Popular Front government of
Pedro Aguirre Cerda created the Production Development Corporation
(Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, CORFO) to encourage with
subsidies and direct investments an ambitious program of import
substitution industrialization. Consequently, as in other Latin American
countries, protectionism became an entrenched aspect of the Chilean
economy.
China
China was largely unaffected by the Depression, mainly by having stuck to the Silver standard. However, the U.S. silver purchase act of 1934 created an intolerable demand on China's silver coins, and so, in the end, the silver standard was officially abandoned in 1935 in favor of the four Chinese national banks' "legal note" issues. China and the British colony of Hong Kong, which followed suit in this regard in September 1935, would be the last to abandon the silver standard.
In addition, the Nationalist Government also acted energetically to modernize the legal and penal systems, stabilize prices, amortize debts, reform the banking and currency systems, build railroads and highways, improve public health facilities, legislate against traffic in narcotics and augment industrial and agricultural production. On November 3, 1935, the government instituted the fiat currency (fapi) reform, immediately stabilizing prices and also raising revenues for the government.
European African Colonies
The sharp fall in commodity prices, and the steep decline in exports, hurt the economies of the European colonies in Africa and Asia. The agricultural sector was especially hard hit. For example, sisal had recently become a major export crop in Kenya and Tanganyika. During the depression, it suffered severely from low prices and marketing problems that affected all colonial commodities in Africa. Sisal producers established centralized controls for the export of their fibre.
There was
widespread unemployment and hardship among peasants, labourers, colonial
auxiliaries, and artisans. The budgets of colonial governments
were cut, which forced the reduction in ongoing infrastructure projects,
such as the building and upgrading of roads, ports and
communications. The budget cuts delayed the schedule for creating
systems of higher education.
The depression severely hurt
the export-based Belgian Congo economy because of the drop in
international demand for raw materials and for agricultural products.
For example, the price of peanuts fell from 125 to 25 centimes. In some
areas, as in the Katanga mining region, employment declined by 70%. In
the country as a whole, the wage labour force decreased by 72.000 and
many men returned to their villages. In Leopoldville, the population
decreased by 33%, because of this labour migration.
Political
protests were not common. However, there was a growing demand that the
paternalistic claims be honored by colonial governments to respond
vigorously. The theme was that economic reforms were more urgently
needed than political reforms. French West Africa launched an
extensive program of educational reform in which "rural schools"
designed to modernize agriculture would stem the flow of under-employed
farm workers to cites where unemployment was high. Students were trained
in traditional arts, crafts, and farming techniques and were then
expected to return to their own villages and towns.
France
The
crisis affected France a bit later than other countries, hitting hard
around 1931. While the 1920s grew at the very strong rate of 4.43%
per year, the 1930s rate fell to only 0.63%.
The depression
was relatively mild: unemployment peaked under 5%, the fall in
production was at most 20% below the 1929 output; there was no banking
crisis.
However, the depression had drastic effects on the
local economy, and partly explains the February 6, 1934 riots and even
more the formation of the Popular Front, led by SFIO socialist leader
Léon Blum, which won the elections in 1936. Ultra-nationalist groups
also saw increased popularity, although democracy prevailed into World
War II.
France's relatively high degree of self-sufficiency meant
the damage was considerably less than in neighbouring states like
Germany.
Germany
Adolf Hitler speaking in 1935
The
Great Depression hit Germany hard. The impact of the Wall Street Crash
forced American banks to end the new loans that had been funding the
repayments under the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan. The financial crisis
escalated out of control in mid-1931, starting with the collapse of the
Credit Anstalt in Vienna in May. This put heavy pressure on
Germany, which was already in political turmoil with the rise in
violence of Nazi and communist movements, as well as with investor
nervousness at harsh government financial policies. Investors
withdrew their short-term money from Germany, as confidence spiraled
downward.
The Reichsbank lost 150 million marks in the first week of June, 540 million in the second, and 150 million in two days, June 19–20. Collapse was at hand. U.S. President Herbert Hoover called for a moratorium on Payment of war reparations. This angered Paris, which depended on a steady flow of German payments, but it slowed the crisis down, and the moratorium was agreed to in July 1931. An international conference in London later in July produced no agreements but on August 19 a standstill agreement froze Germany's foreign liabilities for six months.
Germany received emergency funding from private banks in New
York as well as the Bank of International Settlements and the Bank of
England. The funding only slowed the process. Industrial failures began
in Germany, a major bank closed in July and a two-day holiday for all
German banks was declared. Business failures became more frequent in
July, and spread to Romania and Hungary.
In 1932, 90% of
German reparation payments were cancelled (in the 1950s, Germany repaid
all its missed reparations debts). Widespread unemployment reached 25%
as every sector was hurt. The government did not increase government
spending to deal with Germany's growing crisis, as they were afraid that
a high-spending policy could lead to a return of the hyperinflation
that had affected Germany in 1923. Germany's Weimar Republic was hit
hard by the depression, as American loans to help rebuild the German
economy now stopped.
The unemployment rate reached nearly 30% in
1932, bolstering support for the Nazi (NSDAP) and Communist (KPD)
parties, causing the collapse of the politically centrist Social
Democratic Party. Hitler ran for the Presidency in 1932, and while he
lost to the incumbent Hindenburg in the election, it marked a point
during which both Nazi Party and the Communist parties rose in the years
following the crash to altogether possess a Reichstag majority
following the general election in July 1932.
Hitler
followed an autarky economic policy, creating a network of client states
and economic allies in central Europe and Latin America. By cutting
wages and taking control of labor unions, plus public works spending,
unemployment fell significantly by 1935. Large-scale military spending
played a major role in the recovery.
Greece
The reverberations of the Great Depression hit Greece in 1932. The Bank of Greece tried to adopt deflationary policies to stave off the crises that were going on in other countries, but these largely failed. For a brief period, the drachma was pegged to the U.S. dollar, but this was unsustainable given the country's large trade deficit and the only long-term effects of this were Greece's foreign exchange reserves being almost totally wiped out in 1932.
Remittances from abroad declined
sharply and the value of the drachma began to plummet from 77 drachmas
to the dollar in March 1931 to 111 drachmas to the dollar in April 1931.
This was especially harmful to Greece as the country relied on imports
from the UK, France, and the Middle East for many necessities. Greece
went off the gold standard in April 1932 and declared a moratorium on
all interest payments. The country also adopted protectionist policies
such as import quotas, which several European countries did during the
period.
Protectionist policies coupled with a weak drachma,
stifling imports, allowed the Greek industry to expand during the Great
Depression. In 1939, the Greek industrial output was 179% that of 1928.
These industries were for the most part "built on sand" as one report of
the Bank of Greece put it, as without massive protection they would not
have been able to survive. Despite the global depression, Greece
managed to suffer comparatively little, averaging an average growth rate
of 3.5% from 1932 to 1939. The dictatorial regime of Ioannis Metaxas
took over the Greek government in 1936, and economic growth was strong
in the years leading up to the Second World War.
Iceland
Icelandic post-World War I prosperity came to an end with the outbreak of the Great Depression. The Depression hit Iceland hard as the value of exports plummeted. The total value of Icelandic exports fell from 74 million kronur in 1929 to 48 million in 1932, and was not to rise again to the pre-1930 level until after 1939.
Government interference in the economy increased: "Imports were regulated, trade with foreign currency was monopolized by state-owned banks, and loan capital was largely distributed by state-regulated funds". Due to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, which cut Iceland's exports of saltfish by half, the Depression lasted in Iceland until the outbreak of World War II (when prices for fish exports soared).
India
How much India was affected has been hotly debated. Historians have argued that the Great Depression slowed long-term industrial development. Apart from two sectors - jute and coal - the economy was little affected. However, there were major negative impacts on the jute industry, as world demand fell and prices plunged. Otherwise, conditions were fairly stable. Local markets in agriculture and small-scale industry showed modest gains.
Ireland
Frank Barry and Mary E. Daly have argued that:
Ireland was a largely agrarian economy, trading almost exclusively with the UK, at the time of the Great Depression. Beef and dairy products comprised the bulk of exports, and Ireland fared well relative to many other commodity producers, particularly in the early years of the depression.
Italy
Benito Mussolini giving a speech at the Fiat Lingotto factory in Turin, 1932
The
Great Depression hit Italy very hard. As industries came close to
failure they were bought out by the banks in a largely illusionary
bail-out - the assets used to fund the purchases were largely worthless.
This led to a financial crisis peaking in 1932 and major government
intervention. The Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI) was formed
in January 1933 and took control of the bank-owned companies, suddenly
giving Italy the largest state-owned industrial sector in Europe
(excluding the USSR). IRI did rather well with its new
responsibilities - restructuring, modernising and rationalising as much as
it could. It was a significant factor in post-1945 development. But it
took the Italian economy until 1935 to recover the manufacturing levels
of 1930 - a position that was only 60% better than that of 1913.
Japan
The
Great Depression did not strongly affect Japan. The Japanese economy
shrank by 8% during 1929–31. Japan's Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo
was the first to implement what have come to be identified as Keynesian
economic policies: first, by large fiscal stimulus involving deficit
spending; and second, by devaluing the currency. Takahashi used the Bank
of Japan to sterilize the deficit spending and minimize resulting
inflationary pressures. Econometric studies have identified the fiscal
stimulus as especially effective.
The devaluation of the
currency had an immediate effect. Japanese textiles began to displace
British textiles in export markets. The deficit spending proved to be
most profound and went into the purchase of munitions for the armed
forces. By 1933, Japan was already out of the depression. By 1934,
Takahashi realized that the economy was in danger of overheating, and to
avoid inflation, moved to reduce the deficit spending that went towards
armaments and munitions.
This resulted in a strong and swift
negative reaction from nationalists, especially those in the army,
culminating in his assassination in the course of the February 26
Incident. This had a chilling effect on all civilian bureaucrats in the
Japanese government. From 1934, the military's dominance of the
government continued to grow. Instead of reducing deficit spending, the
government introduced price controls and rationing schemes that reduced,
but did not eliminate inflation, which remained a problem until the end
of World War II.
The deficit spending had a transformative
effect on Japan. Japan's industrial production doubled during the 1930s.
Further, in 1929 the list of the largest firms in Japan was dominated
by light industries, especially textile companies (many of Japan's
automakers, such as Toyota, have their roots in the textile industry).
By 1940 light industry had been displaced by heavy industry as the
largest firms inside the Japanese economy.
Latin America
Because
of high levels of U.S. investment in Latin American economies, they
were severely damaged by the Depression. Within the region, Chile,
Bolivia and Peru were particularly badly affected.
Before
the 1929 crisis, links between the world economy and Latin American
economies had been established through American and British investment
in Latin American exports to the world. As a result, Latin Americans
export industries felt the depression quickly. World prices for
commodities such as wheat, coffee and copper plunged. Exports from all
of Latin America to the U.S. fell in value from $1.2 billion in 1929 to
$335 million in 1933, rising to $660 million in 1940.
But on the
other hand, the depression led the area governments to develop new local
industries and expand consumption and production. Following the example
of the New Deal, governments in the area approved regulations and
created or improved welfare institutions that helped millions of new
industrial workers to achieve a better standard of living.
Middle East and North Africa
The Great Depression had severe impacts across the Middle East and North Africa, including economic decline which led to social unrest.
Netherlands
From roughly 1931 to 1937, the Netherlands suffered a deep and exceptionally long depression. This depression was partly caused by the after-effects of the American stock-market crash of 1929, and partly by internal factors in the Netherlands. Government policy, especially the very late dropping of the Gold Standard, played a role in prolonging the depression.
The Great Depression in the Netherlands led to some political instability and riots, and can be linked to the rise of the Dutch fascist political party NSB. The depression in the Netherlands eased off somewhat at the end of 1936, when the government finally dropped the Gold Standard, but real economic stability did not return until after World War II.
New Zealand
New Zealand was especially vulnerable to worldwide depression, as it relied almost entirely on agricultural exports to the United Kingdom for its economy. The drop in exports led to a lack of disposable income from the farmers, who were the mainstay of the local economy. Jobs disappeared and wages plummeted, leaving people desperate and charities unable to cope.
Work relief schemes were the only government support available to the unemployed, the rate of which by the early 1930s was officially around 15%, but unofficially nearly twice that level (official figures excluded Māori and women). In 1932, riots occurred among the unemployed in three of the country's main cities (Auckland, Dunedin, and Wellington). Many were arrested or injured through the tough official handling of these riots by police and volunteer "special constables".
Poland
Poland
was affected by the Great Depression longer and stronger than other
countries due to inadequate economic response of the government and the
pre-existing economic circumstances of the country. At that time, Poland
was under the authoritarian rule of Sanacja, whose leader, Józef
Piłsudski, was opposed to leaving the gold standard until his death in
1935. As a result, Poland was unable to perform a more active monetary
and budget policy. Additionally, Poland was a relatively young country
that emerged merely 10 years earlier after being partitioned between
German, Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires for over a century.
Prior to independence, the Russian part exported 91% of its exports to
Russia proper, while the German part exported 68% to Germany proper.
After independence, these markets were largely lost, as Russia
transformed into USSR that was mostly a closed economy, and Germany was
in a tariff war with Poland throughout the 1920s.
Industrial
production fell significantly: in 1932 hard coal production was down
27% compared to 1928, steel production was down 61%, and iron ore
production noted a 89% decrease. On the other hand,
electrotechnical, leather, and paper industries noted marginal increases
in production output. Overall, industrial production decreased by
41%. A distinct feature of the Great Depression in Poland was the
de-concentration of industry, as larger conglomerates were less flexible
and paid their workers more than smaller ones.
Unemployment rate
rose significantly (up to 43%) while nominal wages fell by 51% in 1933
and 56% in 1934, relative to 1928. However, real wages fell less due to
the government's policy of decreasing cost of living, particularly food
expenditures (food prices were down by 65% in 1935 compared to 1928
price levels). Material conditions deprivation led to strikes, some of
them violent or violently pacified - like in Sanok (March of the Hungry
in Sanok March 6, 1930), Lesko county (Lesko uprising June 21 –
July 9, 1932) and Zawiercie (Bloody Friday (1930) April 18, 1930).
To
adopt to the crisis, Polish government employed deflation methods such
as high interest rates, credit limits and budget austerity to keep a
fixed exchange rate with currencies tied to the gold standard. Only in
late 1932 the government created a plan to fight the economic
crisis. Part of the plan was mass public works scheme, employing up
to 100,000 people in 1935. After Piłsudski's death, in 1936 the
gold standard regime was relaxed, and launching the development of the
Central Industrial Region kicked off the economy, to over 10% annual
growth rate in the 1936-1938 period.
Portugal
Already under the rule of a dictatorial junta, the Ditadura Nacional, Portugal suffered no turbulent political effects of the Depression, although António de Oliveira Salazar, already appointed Minister of Finance in 1928 greatly expanded his powers and in 1932 rose to Prime Minister of Portugal to found the Estado Novo, an authoritarian corporatist dictatorship. With the budget balanced in 1929, the effects of the depression were relaxed through harsh measures towards budget balance and autarky, causing social discontent but stability and, eventually, an impressive economic growth.
Puerto Rico
In the years immediately preceding the depression, negative developments in the island and world economies perpetuated an unsustainable cycle of subsistence for many Puerto Rican workers. The 1920s brought a dramatic drop in Puerto Rico's two primary exports, raw sugar and coffee, due to a devastating hurricane in 1928 and the plummeting demand from global markets in the latter half of the decade.
1930 unemployment on the island was roughly 36% and by 1933 Puerto Rico's per capita income dropped 30% (by comparison, unemployment in the United States in 1930 was approximately 8% reaching a height of 25% in 1933).
To provide relief and economic reform, the United States government and Puerto Rican politicians such as Carlos Chardon and Luis Muñoz Marín created and administered first the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) 1933 and then in 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA).
Romania
Romania was also affected by the Great Depression.
South Africa
As world trade slumped, demand for South African agricultural and mineral exports fell drastically. The Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites had concluded in 1931 that nearly one-third of Afrikaners lived as paupers. The social discomfort caused by the depression was a contributing factor in the 1933 split between the "gesuiwerde" (purified) and "smelter" (fusionist) factions within the National Party and the National Party's subsequent fusion with the South African Party. Unemployment programs were begun that focused primarily on the white population.
Soviet Union
The
Soviet Union was the world's only socialist state with very little
international trade. Its economy was not tied to the rest of the world
and was mostly unaffected by the Great Depression.
At the
time of the Depression, the Soviet economy was growing steadily, fuelled
by intensive investment in heavy industry. The apparent economic
success of the Soviet Union at a time when the capitalist world was in
crisis led many Western intellectuals to view the Soviet system
favorably. Jennifer Burns wrote:
As the Great Depression ground on and unemployment soared, intellectuals began unfavorably comparing their faltering capitalist economy to Russian Communism [...] More than ten years after the Revolution, Communism was finally reaching full flower, according to New York Times reporter Walter Duranty, a Stalin fan who vigorously debunked accounts of the Ukraine famine, a man-made disaster that would leave millions dead.
Due to
having very little international trade and its policy of isolation, they
did not receive the benefits of international trade once the depression
ran its course, and were still effectively poorer than most developed
countries at their worst sufferings in the crisis.
The
Great Depression caused mass immigration to the Soviet Union, mostly
from Finland and Germany. Soviet Russia was at first happy to help these
immigrants settle, because they believed they were victims of
capitalism who had come to help the Soviet cause. However, when the
Soviet Union entered the war in 1941, most of these Germans and Finns
were arrested and sent to Siberia, while their Russian-born children
were placed in orphanages. Their fate remains unknown.
Spain
Spain
had a relatively isolated economy, with high protective tariffs and was
not one of the main countries affected by the Depression. The banking
system held up well, as did agriculture.
By far the most
serious negative impact came after 1936 from the heavy destruction of
infrastructure and manpower by the civil war, 1936–39. Many talented
workers were forced into permanent exile. By staying neutral in the
Second World War, and selling to both sides, the
economy avoided further disasters.
Sweden
By the 1930s, Sweden had what America's Life magazine called in 1938 the "world's highest standard of living". Sweden was also the first country worldwide to recover completely from the Great Depression. Taking place amid a short-lived government and a less-than-a-decade old Swedish democracy, events such as those surrounding Ivar Kreuger (who eventually committed suicide) remain infamous in Swedish history.
The Social Democrats under Per Albin Hansson formed their first long-lived government in 1932 based on strong interventionist and welfare state policies, monopolizing the office of Prime Minister until 1976 with the sole and short-lived exception of Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp's "summer cabinet" in 1936. During forty years of hegemony, it was the most successful political party in the history of Western liberal democracy.
Thailand
In Thailand, then known as the Kingdom of Siam, the Great Depression contributed to the end of the absolute monarchy of King Rama VII in the Siamese revolution of 1932.
United Kingdom
The
World Depression broke at a time when the United Kingdom had still not
fully recovered from the effects of the First World War more than a
decade earlier. The country was driven off the gold standard in 1931.
The
world financial crisis began to overwhelm Britain in 1931; investors
around the world started withdrawing their gold from London at the rate
of £2.5 million per day. Credits of £25 million each from the Bank
of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and an issue of £15
million fiduciary note slowed, but did not reverse the British crisis.
The financial crisis now caused a major political crisis in Britain in
August 1931. With deficits mounting, the bankers demanded a balanced
budget; the divided cabinet of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's Labour
government agreed; it proposed to raise taxes, cut spending and most
controversially, to cut unemployment benefits by 20%.
The attack on
welfare was totally unacceptable to the Labour movement. MacDonald
wanted to resign, but King George V insisted he remain and form an
all-party coalition "National Government". The Conservative and Liberals
parties signed on, along with a small cadre of Labour, but the vast
majority of Labour leaders denounced MacDonald as a traitor for leading
the new government. Britain went off the gold standard, and suffered
relatively less than other major countries in the Great Depression. In
the 1931 British election, the Labour Party was virtually destroyed,
leaving MacDonald as Prime Minister for a largely Conservative
coalition.
The effects on the northern industrial areas
of Britain were immediate and devastating, as demand for traditional
industrial products collapsed. By the end of 1930 unemployment had more
than doubled from 1 million to 2.5 million (20% of the insured
workforce), and exports had fallen in value by 50%. In 1933, 30% of
Glaswegians were unemployed due to the severe decline in heavy industry.
In some towns and cities in the north east, unemployment reached as
high as 70% as shipbuilding fell by 90%. The National Hunger March
of September–October 1932 was the largest of a series of hunger
marches in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. About 200,000 unemployed men
were sent to the work camps, which continued in operation until
1939.
In the less industrial Midlands and Southern England,
the effects were short-lived and the later 1930s were a prosperous time.
Growth in modern manufacture of electrical goods and a boom in the
motor car industry was helped by a growing southern population and an
expanding middle class. Agriculture also saw a boom during this
period.
United States
Unemployed men standing in line outside a depression soup kitchen in Chicago 1931.
Hoover's
first measures to combat the depression were based on encouraging
businesses not to reduce their workforce or cut wages but businesses had
little choice: wages were reduced, workers were laid off, and
investments postponed.
In June 1930, Congress approved
the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act which raised tariffs on thousands of
imported items. The intent of the Act was to encourage the purchase of
American-made products by increasing the cost of imported goods, while
raising revenue for the federal government and protecting farmers. Most
countries that traded with the U.S. increased tariffs on American-made
goods in retaliation, reducing international trade, and worsening the
Depression.
In 1931, Hoover urged bankers to set up the
National Credit Corporation so that big banks could help failing
banks survive. But bankers were reluctant to invest in failing banks,
and the National Credit Corporation did almost nothing to address the
problem.
Burning shacks on the Anacostia flats, Washington, D.C. put up by the Bonus Army (World War I veterans) after the marchers with their wives and children were driven out by the regular Army by order of President Hoover, 1932.
By 1932, unemployment had reached 23.6%, peaking in early 1933 at 25%. Those releasing from prison during this period had an especially difficult time finding employment given the stigma of their criminal records, which often led to recidivism out of economic desperation. Drought persisted in the agricultural heartland, businesses and families defaulted on record numbers of loans, and more than 5,000 banks had failed.
Hundreds of thousands of Americans found themselves homeless, and began congregating in shanty towns – dubbed "Hoovervilles" – that began to appear across the country. In response, President Hoover and Congress approved the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, to spur new home construction, and reduce foreclosures. The final attempt of the Hoover Administration to stimulate the economy was the passage of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERA) which included funds for public works programs such as dams and the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a
Federal agency with the authority to lend up to $2 billion to rescue
banks and restore confidence in financial institutions. But $2 billion
was not enough to save all the banks, and bank runs and bank failures
continued. Quarter by quarter the economy went downhill, as prices,
profits and employment fell, leading to the political realignment in
1932 that brought to power Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It is important to
note, however, that after volunteerism failed, Hoover developed ideas
that laid the framework for parts of the New Deal.
Buried machinery in a barn lot; South Dakota, May 1936. The Dust Bowl on the Great Plains coincided with the Great Depression.
Shortly after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933, drought and erosion combined to cause the Dust Bowl, shifting hundreds of thousands of displaced persons off their farms in the Midwest. From his inauguration onward, Roosevelt argued that restructuring of the economy would be needed to prevent another depression or avoid prolonging the current one. New Deal programs sought to stimulate demand and provide work and relief for the impoverished through increased government spending and the institution of financial reforms.
During a "bank holiday" that lasted five days, the Emergency Banking Act was signed into law. It provided for a system of reopening sound banks under Treasury supervision, with federal loans available if needed. The Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively regulated the securities industry. This was followed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which created the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although amended, key provisions of both Acts are still in force. Federal insurance of bank deposits was provided by the FDIC, and the Glass–Steagall Act.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act provided incentives to cut farm production in order to raise farming prices. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) made a number of sweeping changes to the American economy. It forced businesses to work with government to set price codes through the NRA to fight deflationary "cut-throat competition" by the setting of minimum prices and wages, labor standards, and competitive conditions in all industries. It encouraged unions that would raise wages, to increase the purchasing power of the working class. The NRA was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1935.
CCC workers constructing drainage culvert, 1933. Over 3 million unemployed young men were taken out of the cities and placed into 2,600+ work camps managed by the CCC.
These reforms, together with several other relief and recovery measures, are called the First New Deal. Economic stimulus was attempted through a new alphabet soup of agencies set up in 1933 and 1934 and previously extant agencies such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. By 1935, the "Second New Deal" added Social Security (which was later considerably extended through the Fair Deal), a jobs program for the unemployed (the Works Progress Administration, WPA) and, through the National Labor Relations Board, a strong stimulus to the growth of labor unions. In 1929, federal expenditures constituted only 3% of the GDP. The national debt as a proportion of GNP rose under Hoover from 20% to 40%. Roosevelt kept it at 40% until the war began, when it soared to 128%.
By 1936, the main economic indicators had regained the levels of the late 1920s, except for unemployment, which remained high at 11%, although this was considerably lower than the 25% unemployment rate seen in 1933. In the spring of 1937, American industrial production exceeded that of 1929 and remained level until June 1937. In June 1937, the Roosevelt administration cut spending and increased taxation in an attempt to balance the federal budget. The American economy then took a sharp downturn, lasting for 13 months through most of 1938. Industrial production fell almost 30 per cent within a few months and production of durable goods fell even faster. Unemployment jumped from 14.3% in 1937 to 19.0% in 1938, rising from 5 million to more than 12 million in early 1938. Manufacturing output fell by 37% from the 1937 peak and was back to 1934 levels.
The WPA employed 2–3 million at unskilled labor.
Producers
reduced their expenditures on durable goods, and inventories declined,
but personal income was only 15% lower than it had been at the peak in
1937. As unemployment rose, consumers' expenditures declined, leading to
further cutbacks in production. By May 1938 retail sales began to
increase, employment improved, and industrial production turned up after
June 1938. After the recovery from the Recession of 1937–38,
conservatives were able to form a bipartisan conservative coalition to
stop further expansion of the New Deal and, when unemployment dropped to
2% in the early 1940s, they abolished WPA, CCC and the PWA relief
programs. Social Security remained in place.
Between 1933 and
1939, federal expenditure tripled, and Roosevelt's critics charged that
he was turning America into a socialist state. The Great Depression
was a main factor in the implementation of social democracy and planned
economies in European countries after World War II.
Keynesianism generally remained the most influential economic school in
the United States and in parts of Europe until the periods between the
1970s and the 1980s, when Milton Friedman and other neoliberal
economists formulated and propagated the newly created theories of
neoliberalism and incorporated them into the Chicago School of Economics
as an alternative approach to the study of economics.
Neoliberalism
went on to challenge the dominance of the Keynesian school of Economics
in the mainstream academia and policy-making in the United States,
having reached its peak in popularity in the election of the presidency
of Ronald Reagan in the United States, and Margaret Thatcher in the
United Kingdom.
Literature
And the great owners, who must lose their land in an upheaval, the great owners with access to history, with eyes to read history and to know the great fact: when property accumulates in too few hands it is taken away. And that companion fact: when a majority of the people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need. And the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed.
— John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath
The Great Depression has been the subject of much writing, as authors have sought to evaluate an era that caused both financial and emotional trauma. Perhaps the most noteworthy and famous novel written on the subject is The Grapes of Wrath, published in 1939 and written by John Steinbeck, who was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for the work, and in 1962 was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. The novel focuses on a poor family of sharecroppers who are forced from their home as drought, economic hardship, and changes in the agricultural industry occur during the Great Depression. Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men is another important novella about a journey during the Great Depression.
Additionally,
Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird is set during the Great Depression.
Margaret Atwood's Booker prize-winning The Blind Assassin is likewise
set in the Great Depression, centering on a privileged socialite's love
affair with a Marxist revolutionary. The era spurred the resurgence of
social realism, practiced by many who started their writing careers on
relief programs, especially the Federal Writers' Project in the
U.S. Nonfiction works from this time also capture
important themes. The 1933 memoir Prison Days and Nights by Victor Folke
Nelson provides insight into criminal justice ramifications of the
Great Depression, especially in regard to patterns of recidivism due to
lack of economic opportunity.
A number of works for younger
audiences are also set during the Great Depression, among them the Kit
Kittredge series of American Girl books written by Valerie Tripp and
illustrated by Walter Rane, released to tie in with the dolls and
playsets sold by the company. The stories, which take place during the
early to mid 1930s in Cincinnati, focuses on the changes brought by the
Depression to the titular character's family and how the Kittredges
dealt with it. A theatrical adaptation of the series entitled Kit
Kittredge: An American Girl was later released in 2008 to positive
reviews.
Similarly, Christmas After All, part of the Dear
America series of books for older girls, take place in 1930s
Indianapolis; while Kit Kittredge is told in a third-person viewpoint,
Christmas After All is in the form of a fictional journal as told by the
protagonist Minnie Swift as she recounts her experiences during the
era, especially when her family takes in an orphan cousin from
Texas.
Naming
The
term "The Great Depression" is most frequently attributed to British
economist Lionel Robbins, whose 1934 book The Great Depression is
credited with formalizing the phrase, though Hoover is widely
credited with popularizing the term, informally referring to
the downturn as a depression, with such uses as "Economic depression
cannot be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement"
(December 1930, Message to Congress), and "I need not recount to you
that the world is passing through a great depression" (1931).
Black Friday, May 9, 1873, Vienna Stock Exchange. The Panic of 1873 and Long Depression followed.
The term "depression" to refer to an economic downturn dates to the 19th century, when it was used by varied Americans and British politicians and economists. Indeed, the first major American economic crisis, the Panic of 1819, was described by then-president James Monroe as "a depression", and the most recent economic crisis, the Depression of 1920–21, had been referred to as a "depression" by then-president Calvin Coolidge.
Financial crises were traditionally referred to as "panics", most recently the major Panic of 1907, and the minor Panic of 1910–11, though the 1929 crisis was called "The Crash", and the term "panic" has since fallen out of use. At the time of the Great Depression, the term "The Great Depression" was already used to refer to the period 1873–96 (in the United Kingdom), or more narrowly 1873–79 (in the United States), which has retroactively been renamed the Long Depression.
Other "Great Depressions"
The collapse of the
Soviet Union, and the breakdown of economic ties which followed, led to
a severe economic crisis and catastrophic fall in the standards of
living in the 1990s in post-Soviet states and the former Eastern
Bloc, which was even worse than the Great Depression. Even before Russia's financial crisis of 1998, Russia's GDP was half of
what it had been in the early 1990s, and some populations are still
poorer as of 2009 than they were in 1989, including Moldova, Central
Asia, and the Caucasus.
Comparison with the Great Recession
The worldwide economic decline after 2008 has been compared to the 1930s.
The
causes of the Great Recession seem similar to the Great Depression, but
significant differences exist. The then-chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, had extensively studied the Great Depression as
part of his doctoral work at MIT, and implemented policies to manipulate
the money supply and interest rates in ways that were not done in the
1930s. Bernanke's policies will undoubtedly be analyzed and scrutinized
in the years to come, as economists debate the wisdom of his choices. In
2011, one journalist contrasted the Great Depression of the 1930s as
opposed to the late-2000s recession.
If we contrast the 1930s with the Crash of 2008 where gold went through the roof, it is clear that the U.S. dollar on the gold standard was a completely different animal in comparison to the fiat free-floating U.S. dollar currency we have today. Both currencies in 1929 and 2008 were the U.S. dollar, but analogously it is as if one was a Saber-toothed tiger and the other is a Bengal tiger; they are two completely different animals. Where we have experienced inflation since the Crash of 2008, the situation was much different in the 1930s when deflation set in. Unlike the deflation of the early 1930s, the U.S. economy currently appears to be in a "liquidity trap," or a situation where monetary policy is unable to stimulate an economy back to health.
In terms of the stock market, nearly three years after the 1929 crash, the DJIA dropped 8.4% on August 12, 1932. Where we have experienced great volatility with large intraday swings in the past two months, in 2011, we have not experienced any record-shattering daily percentage drops to the tune of the 1930s. Where many of us may have that '30s feeling, in light of the DJIA, the CPI, and the national unemployment rate, we are simply not living in the '30s. Some individuals may feel as if we are living in a depression, but for many others the current global financial crisis simply does not feel like a depression akin to the 1930s.
1928
and 1929 were the times in the 20th century that the wealth gap reached
such skewed extremes; half the unemployed had been out of work for
over six months, something that was not repeated until the late-2000s
recession. 2007 and 2008 eventually saw the world reach new levels of
wealth gap inequality that rivalled the years of 1928 and 1929.