PHIL103: Moral and Political Philosophy

The first version or expression of the categorical imperative: Act in a way that the rule for your action could be universalized. When you're thinking about doing something, this means you should imagine that everyone did it all the time. Now, can this make sense? Can it happen? Is there a world you can imagine where everyone does this thing that you're considering at every opportunity? Take the case of Madoff asking himself, "Should I lie to keep investor money flowing in?" What we need to do is imagine this act as universalized: everyone lies all the time. Just imagine that. You ask someone whether it's sunny outside. It is sunny, but they say, "No, it's raining". The next day you ask someone else. Again, it's sunny, but they say, "No, it's snowing". This goes on day after day. Pretty soon, wouldn't you just give up listening to what people say? Here's the larger point: if everyone lies all the time, pretty soon people are going to stop listening to anyone. And if no one's listening, is it possible to lie to them?

What Kant's categorical imperative shows is that lying cannot be universalized. The act of lying can't survive in a world where everyone's just making stuff up all the time. Since no one will be taking anyone else seriously, you may try to sell a false story but no one will be buying.

Something similar happens in comic books. No one accuses authors and illustrators of lying when Batman kicks some bad guys into the next universe and then strips off his mask and his hair is perfect. That's not a lie; it's fiction. And fictional stories can't lie because no one expects they'll tell the truth. No one asks whether it's real or fake, only whether it's entertaining. The same would go in the real world if everyone lied all the time. Reality would be like a comic: it might be fun, or maybe not, but accusing someone of lying would definitely be absurd.

Bringing this back to Madoff, as Kant sees it he has to make a basic decision: should I lie to investors to keep my operation afloat? The answer is no. According to the categorical imperative, it must be no, not because lying is directly immoral, but because lying cannot be universalized and therefore it's immoral.

The same goes for Sheryl Weinstein as she wonders whether she should keep the lid on her family-wrecking affair. The answer is no because the answer is always no when the question is whether I should lie. You might want to respond by insisting, "She's already done the deed, and Bernie's in jail so it's not going to happen again. The best thing at this point would be for her to just keep her mouth shut and hold her family together as best she can". That's a fair argument. But for Kant it's also a loser because the categorical imperative gives the last word. There's no appeal. There's no lying, no matter what.

One more point about the universalization of acts: even if you insist that a world could exist where everyone lied all the time, would you really want to live there? Most of us don't mind lying so much as long as we're the ones getting away with it. But if everyone's doing it, that's different. Most of us might agree that if we had a choice between living in a place where everyone told the truth and one where everyone lied, we'd go for the honest reality. It just makes sense: lying will help you only if you're the sole liar, but if everyone's busy taking advantage of everyone else, then there's nothing in it for you, and you might just as well join everyone in telling the truth.

Conclusion. The first expression of the categorical imperative – act in such a way that the rule for your action could be universalized – is a consistency principle. Like the golden rule (treat others as you'd like to be treated), it forces you to ask how things would work if everyone else did what you're considering doing.