HIST363: Global Perspectives on Industrialization

The isolationist policy of the Tofugawa shogunate known as sakoku tightly controlled Japanese trade and foreign influences for over 200 years, ending with the Perry Expedition that forced Japan to open its market to European imperial powers.

Sakoku

Sakoku was the foreign relations policy of Japan under which severe restrictions were placed on the entry of foreigners to Japan and Japanese people were forbidden to leave the country without special permission, on penalty of death if they returned. The policy was enacted by the Tokugawa shogunate under Tokugawa Iemitsu, the third shogun of the Tokugawa dynasty, through a number of edicts and policies from 1633–39. It largely remained officially in effect until 1866, although the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in the 1850s began the opening of Japan to Western trade, eroding its enforcement.

Historians have argued that the sakoku policy was established to remove the colonial and religious influence of Spain and Portugal, perceived as posing a threat to the stability of the shogunate and to peace in the archipelago. Some scholars, however, have challenged this view as only a partial explanation. Another important factor behind sakoku was the Tokugawa government's desire to acquire sufficient control over Japan's foreign policy to guarantee peace and maintain Tokugawa supremacy over other powerful lords in the country.

Japan was not completely isolated under the sakoku policy, but strict regulations were applied to commerce and foreign relations by the shogunate and certain feudal domains (han). The policy stated that the only European influence permitted was the Dutch factory at Dejima in Nagasaki. Trade with China was also handled at Nagasaki. Trade with Korea was limited to the Tsushima Domain. Trade with the Ainu people was limited to the Matsumae Domain in Hokkaidō and trade with the Ryūkyū Kingdom took place in Satsuma Domain. Apart from these direct commercial contacts in peripheral provinces, trading countries sent regular missions to the shogun in Edo and Osaka Castle. Due to the necessity for Japanese subjects to travel to and from these trading posts, this trade resembled outgoing trade, with Japanese subjects making regular contact with foreign traders in essentially extraterritorial land. Trade with Chinese and Dutch traders in Nagasaki took place on an island called Dejima, separated from the city by a small strait. Foreigners could not enter Japan from Dejima, nor could Japanese enter Dejima, without special permissions or authority.

Western Challenges to Japanese Isolationism

The growing commerce between America and China, the presence of American whalers in waters off Japan, and the increasing monopolization of potential coaling stations by the British and French in Asia were all contributing factors in the decision by U.S. President Millard Fillmore to dispatch an expedition to Japan. The Americans were also driven by the idea that Western civilization and Christianity would benefit and thus should be imposed on Asian nations, which were seen as "backwards". By the early 19th century, the Japanese policy of isolation was increasingly challenged. In 1844, King William II of the Netherlands sent a letter urging Japan to end the isolation policy on its own before change would be forced from the outside. Between 1790 and 1853, at least 27 U.S. ships (including three warships) visited Japan, only to be turned away. There were increasing sightings and incursions of foreign ships in Japanese waters and leading to debate in Japan on how to meet this potential threat to Japan's economic and political sovereignty.

In 1851, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster drafted a letter addressed to the "Japanese Emperor" with assurances that the planned expedition under the authority of Commodore John H. Aulick had no religious purpose, but was only to request "friendship and commerce" and supplies of coal needed by ships en route to China. The letter also boasted of American expansion across the North American continent and the technical prowess of the country. It was signed by President Fillmore. However, Aulick became involved in a diplomatic row with a Brazilian diplomat and quarrels with the captain of his flagship and was relieved of his command before he could undertake the expedition. His replacement, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794–1858) was a senior-ranking officer in the United States Navy and had extensive diplomatic experience.

Perry Expedition

In 1852, Perry was assigned a mission to force the opening of Japanese ports to American trade, through the use of gunboat diplomacy if necessary. On November 24, 1852, Perry embarked from Norfolk, Virginia, in pursuit of a Japanese trade treaty. On his way, he met with American-born Sinologist Samuel Wells Williams, who provided Chinese language translations of his official letters, and with the Dutch-born American diplomat, Anton L. C. Portman, who translated his official letters into the Dutch language. Perry finally reached Uraga at the entrance to Edo Bay in Japan on July 8, 1853. His actions at this crucial juncture were shaped by a careful study of Japan's previous contacts with Western ships and what he knew about the Japanese hierarchical culture. As he arrived, Perry ordered his ships to steam past Japanese lines towards the capital of Edo and turn their guns towards the town of Uraga. He refused Japanese demands to leave or to proceed to Nagasaki, the only Japanese port open to foreigners.

Matthew Calbraith Perry, photo by Mathew Brady, ca. 1856-58.: When Perry returned to the United States in 1855, Congress voted to grant him a reward of $20,000 (USD $514,000 in 2017) in appreciation of his work in Japan. He used part of this money to prepare and publish a report on the expedition in three volumes, titled Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan.

Perry attempted to intimidate the Japanese by presenting them a white flag and a letter, which said that if they chose to fight, the Americans would destroy them. He also fired blank shots from his 73 cannons, which he claimed was in celebration of the American Independence Day. Perry's ships were equipped with new Paixhans shell guns, cannons capable of wreaking explosive destruction with every shell. He also ordered his ship boats to commence survey operations of the coastline and surrounding waters over the objections of local officials.

In the meantime, the Japanese government was paralyzed by the illness of Shogun Tokugawa Ieyoshi and political indecision on how to handle the unprecedented threat to the nation's capital. On July 11, the chief senior councilor (rōjū) Abe Masahiro decided that simply accepting a letter from the Americans would not constitute a violation of Japanese sovereignty and Perry was asked to move his fleet slightly southwest to the beach at Kurihama, where he was allowed to land. After presenting the letter to attending delegates, Perry departed for Hong Kong, promising to return the following year for the Japanese reply.

Perry returned on February 13, 1854, after only half a year rather than the full year promised, with ten ships and 1,600 men. Both actions were calculated to put even more pressure on the Japanese. After initial resistance, Perry was permitted to land at Kanagawa, where after month-long negotiations the Convention of Kanagawa was signed on March 31, 1854. Signed under the threat of force, the convention effectively meant the end of Japan's 220-year-old policy of national seclusion by opening the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels. It also ensured the safety of American castaways and established the position of an American consul in Japan.

Consequences

In the short-term, both sides were satisfied with the agreement. Perry had achieved his primary objective of breaking Japan's sakoku policy and setting the grounds for protection of American citizens and an eventual commercial agreement. The Tokugawa shogunate could point out that the treaty was not actually signed by the Shogun or any of his rōjū, and by the agreement made, had at least temporarily averted the possibility of immediate military confrontation.

Japanese 1854 print relating Perry's visit.

After the signing of the convention, the Americans presented the Japanese with a miniature steam locomotive, a telegraph apparatus, various agricultural tools, and small arms as well as 100 gallons of whiskey, clocks, stoves, and books about the United States. The Japanese responded with gold-lacquered furniture and boxes, bronze ornaments, porcelain goblets, and upon learning of Perry's personal hobby, a collection of seashells.

Externally, the treaty led to the United States-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the Harris Treaty of 1858, which allowed the establishment of foreign concessions, extraterritoriality for foreigners, and minimal import taxes for foreign goods. The Kanagawa Convention was also followed by similar agreements with the United Kingdom (Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty, 1854), the Russians (Treaty of Shimoda, 1855), and the French (Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and Japan, 1858).

Internally, the treaty had far-reaching consequences. Decisions to suspend previous restrictions on military activities led to re-armament by many domains and further weakened the position of the Shogun. Debate over foreign policy and popular outrage over perceived appeasement to the foreign powers was a catalyst for the sonnō jōi movement (the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate) and a shift in political power from Edo back to the Imperial Court in Kyoto. The opposition of Emperor Kōmei to the treaties further lent support to the tōbaku (overthrow the Shogunate) movement, and eventually to the Meiji Restoration.