Consequences of Destructive Leadership

This text explores the negative consequences of abusive supervision and exploitative leadership. As you read, focus on the theoretical and practical implications.

Methods

Results

Manipulation check

The manipulation check was tested by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), including post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. The results revealed a significant effect of leadership style manipulation on the perception of exploitative leadership [F(2, 235) = 7.41, p < 0.001]. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the exploitative leadership manipulation was indeed perceived as being more exploitative (M = 4.32; SD = 0.76) compared to abusive supervision (M = 3.94; SD = 0.80) and organization-directed destructive leadership behaviors (M = 3.87; SD = 0.75). Similarly, there was a significant effect of leadership manipulation on the perception of abusive supervision [F(2, 237) = 109.33, p < 0.001]. Post-hoc analysis indicated that the abusive supervision vignette was indeed perceived as being more abusive (M = 4.44; SD = 0.64) than the exploitative leadership condition (M = 3.02; SD = 0.83) and the organization-directed destructive leadership condition (M = 3.00; SD = 0.75). Finally, we found a significant effect of leadership manipulation on the perception of organization-directed destructive leadership behaviors [F (2, 238) = 109.66, p < 0.001]. Post-hoc analysis showed that the organization-directed destructive leadership behaviors condition was indeed perceived as being more organization-directed destructive (M = 4.10; SD = 0.78) than the abusive supervision condition (M = 2.37; SD = 0.80) and the exploitative leadership condition (M = 2.40; SD = 0.84). Taken together, this pattern shows that the leadership manipulations were successful.

Hypothesis tests concerning followers' emotional reactions

Next, we tested our hypotheses regarding the proposed different effects of the three destructive leader behaviors. The first set of hypotheses refers to affective reactions. Although the focus of our analysis was the effects of destructive leader behavior on negative affect, we deemed it useful to account, too, for the effect on positive affect. The mean scores pertaining to the three conditions are shown in Table 1.


Table 1. Mean scores of emotional reactions (Study1).

A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with destructive leadership as independent variable and negative and positive affect as dependent variables showed a significant multivariate effect [F(4, 504) = 7.20, p < 0.001; Wilk's Λ = .89, η2 = 0.05]. Yet, univariate testing found the effect to be significant only for negative affect [F(2, 253) = 13.28, p < 0.001], and no significant effect was found for positive affect [F(2, 253) = 2.92, p = 0.06]. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that negative affect was significantly higher in the abusive supervision condition (M = 3.60, SD = 0.66), as compared to the exploitative leadership condition (M = 3.11, SD = 0.54) and the organization-directed destructive leadership condition (M = 3.34, SD = 0.62). No difference between the exploitative leadership and the organization-directed destructive leadership conditions was revealed. Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported.

Next, we adopted an explorative perspective and examined whether the different types of destructive leadership under investigation would be related to specific facets of negative affect. Specifically, building on the work of Mehrabian, Janke and Glöckner-Rist found evidence that the negative affect items of the PANAS reflect two sub-dimensions, upset and afraid. The upset dimension contains the upset, hostile, and irritable items, whereas the afraid dimension includes the guilty, ashamed, afraid, nervous, jittery, distressed, and scared items. Using the Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) emotion model as a framework, Mehrabian found that the upset dimension is characterized by high levels of displeasure (i.e., genuine negative emotional state) and, though less heavily, by arousal (i.e., mental and/or physical activity level). In contrast, the afraid dimension relates less strongly to displeasure, more to arousal, and also more to submissiveness (i.e., lack of control over others or situations).

The mean scores for the two sub-dimensions that we obtained in the current study are shown in Table 2. Again, a MANOVA with destructive leadership as the independent variable and the upset and afraid dimensions as dependent variables revealed a significant multivariate effect [F(4, 504) = 15.08, p < 0.001; Wilk's Λ = 0.80, η2 = 0.11].


Table 2. Mean scores of negative affect sub-dimensions (Study1).

Separate one-way ANOVAs for each dimension showed the following pattern. For the upset dimension, we found a significant effect of the leadership manipulation [F(2, 252) = 10.62, p < 0.001]. Post-hoc analyses revealed no significant difference between the exploitative leadership condition (M = 4.16, SD = 0.79) and the abusive supervision condition (M = 4. 25, SD = 0.72). Yet, both conditions were significantly different from the organization-directed destructive leadership condition (M = 3.73, SD = 0.81). Next, also for the afraid dimension, we found a significant main effect [F(2, 253) = 17.20, p < 0.001]. Respondents scored similarly high in the abusive supervision (M = 3. 32, SD = 0.85) and the organization-directed destructive leadership conditions (M = 3.18, SD = 0.69), which were both significantly different from the exploitative leadership condition (M = 2. 67, SD = 0.63).

Hypothesis tests concerning followers' turnover intentions

The MANOVA we conducted showed a statistically significant difference in turnover intentions based on the leadership manipulation [F(6, 482) = 2.69, p < 0.05, Wilk's Λ = 0.93, η2 = 0.03]. Separate ANOVAs showed the following pattern. For general turnover, we found a significant effect of the leadership manipulation [F(2, 243) = 3.70, p < 0.05]. Post-hoc analysis using the Tukey HSD procedure revealed a significant difference between the abusive supervision (M = 4.52, SD = 0.68) and the organization-directed destructive leadership conditions (M = 4.24, SD = 0.84). For the other combinations, no significant differences were revealed. Overall, general turnover intentions were substantially high in all three conditions, thus confirming hypothesis 2. Next, for calculative turnover intentions, we found no significant effect of the leadership manipulation [F(2, 243) = 1.24, p = 0.32]. Therefore, hypothesis 2a was not confirmed. Finally, immediate turnover significantly differed between the conditions [F(2, 243) = 3.58, p < 0.05]. Post-hoc analyses showed that immediate turnover was lower in the exploitative leadership (M = 2.01, SD = 0.90) than in the abusive supervision (M = 2.39, SD = 0.92) condition, thus confirming hypothesis 2b. The organization-directed destructive leadership condition (M = 2.30, SD = 0.96) did not significantly differ from the other two groups.