Driven by Nature: The Future of the Arctic

Driven by Nature: The Future of the Arctic

Innovative international co-operation will be the key to the future of the Arctic. Climate change will drive the process as it offers the opportunity to open new trade routes and exploit the polar region's vast natural resources amid the receding ice pack. The five littoral Arctic countries - Russia, Norway, Denmark (with Greenland), Canada, and the United States - have developed different strategies for the protection and development of the Arctic which are examined in detail in this chapter. But other international powers and organizations, such as the European Union, Nato, and China, have a stake too and are moving to extend their influence and interests. All of them work under a complex framework of international treaties that govern the region, but their track record of co-operation is mixed. In the years ahead, the Arctic offers the tantalizing prospect of innovative new multilateral deals and agreements over security, economic development, and environmental protection. What is lacking at present is the leadership to achieve these challenging but vital goals. 

The key factors are international and national vision and the natural and political environment.

Source: Arne Solli, Sverre Diesen, Nils Wang, Haakon Bruun-Hansen, and Benjamin Bilski, https://archive.org/details/breakthrough-innovation-impact/page/n65/mode/2up
This work is in the Public Domain.

Introduction

We live on the threshold of the greatest climatic change in recorded human history.  The earth and oceans are warming, and the Arctic region is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the planet. Where the planet has warmed 0.7 °C since 1951, the Arctic region has warmed 1.5 °C. In the coming century, the world is expected to warm 2 °C and the Arctic will heat up 3 to 6 °C.  These trends of nature coincide with the age of man, for human activity is the long-term cause for a warming earth and oceans. In the warming Arctic, humankind is forced to innovate and adapt to a breakthrough driven by nature.

The changing natural balance of the Arctic region is adjusting the strategic balance, as the receding ice is creating new access to natural resources and trade routes. For regional powers this is a test as to whether a range of issues can be managed responsibly. These include bilateral and international agreements; the settlement of outstanding maritime boundary disputes; effective and responsible use of new lines of maritime communication; competition and cooperation over natural resources; and the development of adequate naval and security capabilities required to match a new range of economic activities. It also requires prudent protection of the environment and the ecosystems that underpin the way of life of native populations.

In this chapter we will examine these natural and international developments that lead nations to innovate as they articulate visions, guiding principles, policy concepts, and strategic goals. These processes, from vision, concept, strategy, and implementation, are visible on both the international and national levels. We have interviewed key stakeholders with responsibilities for the Far North, and we consider their priorities and whether opportunities are being recognised and seized.

There are great challenges ahead in a region with a thinly spread human population, limited infrastructure, incomplete knowledge, inadequate governance, and significant resource wealth. Competitive and cooperative efforts are converging in a new set of industrial activities, legal frameworks, and safety regimes. The trends of nature will force a natural breakthrough without our permission, but it is in our power to secure greater cooperation, security, and economic efficiency for the century ahead. Will we also innovate and develop the necessary leadership to accomplish breakthroughs in our human arrangements?

Background: Trends And Visions

Natural Trends And Incentives

The climate is changing because of global warming trends, with the greatest part of heat content building up in the oceans. Because a changing climate has a multiplier effect on existing national and international security concerns, such as food, water, and energy, it is an area of strategic concern. The global consequences of these trends include increased variability in weather patterns, rising sea levels, floods, droughts, ecological extinctions, population displacement, and uncertainties in crop yields and food supplies. Sea ice has receded in the Arctic in a consistent trend since the middle of the twentieth century with an average 8 per cent decline per decade of summer sea-ice. And because of several reinforcing cycles, the rate of heating in the Arctic Circle has accelerated at more than double the global average.  While many factors play their part and short-term predictions are not possible, the large-scale trends point in one direction: the Arctic will see its first ice-free summer in 2030.

The natural breakthrough of the contracting northern ice mass is creating new access to mineral resources, energy resources, and lucrative new trade routes, elevating the economic and strategic value of the Far North. A geopolitical synergy is occurring in which the three conditions for industrial development are converging in energy, raw materials, and transport.  With the rising importance of the region, we are witnessing a complex mechanism of developing international and national visions, policies, and strategies. The ongoing natural breakthrough is spurring processes on the international and national levels: the outcome of these movements will be more than the sum of its parts.

The Arctic is not the scene of a great national scramble or ‘land rush’ for territory and resources leading to an ice-cold war.  It is a highly regulated area covered by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other instruments. More than 95 per cent of its natural resources lie within agreed national boundaries, internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, or continental shelf claims. International legal frameworks provide ample mechanisms and precedents for settling outstanding disputes. National and corporate economic interests are stabilizing factors that create incentives for states to settle disputes and cooperate economically.

The littoral Arctic five countries – Russia, Norway, Denmark (and Greeenland), Canada, and the United States – and others have articulated shared visions that established the core principles, the institution, and the concept of the overall legal framework. The two most important international breakthroughs, from which other developments are derived, are the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 and the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008.

International Visions

Two international visions have been articulated for the region, in the establishment of the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat Declaration, which named the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the legal regime for the Far North.

Both visions are reflected in concepts and initiated processes.

The 1996 Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council with the modest vision of "promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction, with the involvement of indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic".  The core membership is made up of the littoral five Arctic states, together with Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. Six organizations representing indigenous peoples have the status of Permanent Participants with "full consultation rights".  Voting is by consensus of the eight core states. Following the Kiruna ministerial meeting of May 2013, the permanent observer states have been expanded to 12 members.

The core mission of the Arctic Council is scientifically driven, and the accession of a widening circle of observer states and institutions was determined by what states could bring to the table in the physical or social sciences. In the early years the Arctic Council was a small outfit, but important expertise and assessments were developed there.  In the first 16 years of the Council its importance has grown. At the 2013 Kiruna meeting, a new shared vision was articulated for the next 16 years with a greater emphasis on human development. The Kiruna Vision for the Arctic stresses core principles and aims for peaceful cooperation, a safe home for indigenous peoples, prosperity, sustainable development, economic cooperation, the development of knowledge, and further strengthening of the Arctic Council.  Almost all national Arctic policies and strategies echo these principles. The increased global interest in the Arctic Council is also a breakthrough and testimony to its success and strategic importance.

The most important legal vision and concept agreed by the Arctic Five was articulated at the Arctic Ocean Conference in May 2008 in Ilulissat, Greenland. An underappreciated milestone and breakthrough, the Ilulissat Declaration affirmed two core principles: firstly, that the adequate legal regime and mechanism for settling disputes in the Far North is the international law of the sea for all "rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea".  The Declaration also implied that it was not necessary to develop any other general legal regime for the region. It definitively put to rest the idea of an 'Arctic Treaty’, analogous to the Antarctic Treaty of 1958, that was the fantasy of certain environmentalists.  

What is not included in these overarching visions, however, is any security concept. A footnote in the original 1996 declaration clarifies that the Arctic Council "should not deal with matters related to military security," but two legally binding operational-level agreements for safety have been concluded under its auspices: a search-and-rescue (SAR) agreement in 2011, and an agreement on oil-spill prevention and response in 2013,  strengthening existing SAR cooperation already present in the Arctic. As constabulary and safety tasks, it was not controversial to take these up in the Arctic Council, which cannot host a military committee.

In practice, however, safety and security will overlap. To carry out constabulary responsibilities over large areas with difficult access, coastguards will have to call upon air forces or navies with greater reach. But in the absence of a regional concept for an international security framework for the region, ad-hoc military-to-military meetings, and joint exercises have taken shape.

Outside the Arctic Council an informal arrangement of an annual meeting of Northern Chiefs of Defence (ChoDs) has recently filled this vacuum.  The first two 'Arctic ChoDs’ dialogues took place in April 2012 and June 2013, which focused on developing guidelines for cooperation and the practicalities of search-and-rescue capabilities and support for civil authorities. In addition, the coastguards of all Arctic states meet at the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum.

Admiral Bruun-Hanssen, the Norwegian Chief of Defence, described this new inclusive role for the armed forces: "This is a regional focus, it is not a single-sector focus on a region. We see different parties and different approaches to the entire region, and that’s what gives us armed forces an interesting and inclusive role, because we become a sort of Swiss army knife – a multiple tool for a lot of purposes".

This ChoDs network is consciously not a NATO project in order to prevent any Russian allergic reaction, but this forum will be vulnerable unless over the long term it is embedded in a more solid concept of an institutional framework to enable its development into a regional security architecture. After two productive gatherings, however, there had been no meeting in 2014. But the creation of this military dialogue still represents an important breakthrough that derived from the national dialogue initiated by the Arctic Council.  These efforts are also complemented by joint military exercises.  All these are useful steps, but a stronger institutional basis will be needed for a genuine integrated and allied security framework, if the outcome is to be more than the sum of its parts.

Beside the Law of the Sea and the work of the Arctic Council, additional topic-specific concepts are being developed in a variety of institutions. The International Maritime Organization is developing a mandatory Polar Code for shipping standards.  As Chair of the Arctic Council for 2013-2015, Canada prioritized supporting the IMO in the development and passage of the code.  The European Union and NATO have also shown interest in the region and the circle of observer states is growing. Cooperation has also increased for deepening scientific understanding, for the protection of the northern environment and ecosystems, and the well-being of the peoples of the North. Converging natural and political trends are bringing about a number of innovations and international breakthroughs.

The Ilulissat Declaration articulated a shared international legal vision and declared an existing treaty the legal concept for the region. Pointing to an existing concept solved and prevented many problems, and UNCLOS is treated as a general framework and ‘constitution’ for the region. The treaty provides for a framework of environmental protection and resolving maritime boundaries. The establishment of the Arctic Council articulated a shared environmental, developmental, and economic vision, and it has been followed up with joint research efforts, development programmes, and two safety agreements. But with a limited scope on economic and environmental matters, the Arctic Council has no decision-making authority. Neither vision can pave the way to regional concepts of either governance or security.

Security and governance concepts are carried out on the national level, bilaterally or improvised informally. We next consider the resource claims, national visions, policy concepts, and strategies. The natural process has awoken expressions of international vision, but these are still largely carried out within states whose priorities differ. Individual nations and subnational groups pursue their interests in cooperation and competition with each other. In the history of the pursuit of resource exploitation, competition for the riches of the region, however, is nothing new. The receding ice is creating access to both resources and trade routes. What are the players competing for?

Concepts: Resources, Routes And Boundaries

Access to Natural Resources

Exploration for natural resources in the Arctic Circle goes back many centuries, since the discovery of Spitsbergen by the Dutch explorer Willem Barents in 1596; and competition between nations for northern riches is nothing new. In the Spitsbergen archipelago, English and Dutch whalers competed in the seventeenth century; Norwegian and Russian hunters competed in the next century; and in the nineteenth century a coal industry was created that operates to this day. Russia had sought to increase control over Spitsbergen, but Norway enforces its sovereignty there in accordance with its interpretation of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty.  Since Barents's explorations, such competition for control over Arctic lands, waters and resources has been a staple of the region. Today, the main prizes in the Arctic are minerals, energy, and fish. Given that nearly all maritime boundaries are settled, the pursuit of these economic interests is a stabilizing factor, because all concerned stand to gain more from cooperation and shared risk.

The new treaty delimiting the maritime boundary between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea is a promising example of a formalized mechanism for resource sharing.  With fish stocks at their highest level in 60 years, Norway has generously given 40 percent of its fish quota to Russian fisheries and takes a 'business over bullets' approach of economic incentives and fines to regulate activity.

North of the Arctic Circle there are diverse mineral resources.  There are active mining industries in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Scandinavia, as well as many Russian Arctic mining operations around Murmansk, Norilsk, and the Kola Peninsula. Greenland has great potential for mining iron, uranium, diamonds, rubies, and, above all, the largest deposits of rare earth minerals outside China.  The entire region has great hydrocarbon energy deposits. In 2008 the US Geological Survey published the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, which concluded that the region contains 30 percent of the world's undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil, mostly offshore under less than 500 meters of water.  In this assessment, undiscovered natural gas is three times more abundant than oil.

By 2007, more than 400 oil and gas fields, containing 40 billion barrels of oil, 1,136 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 8 billion barrels of natural gas liquid had been developed north of the Arctic Circle. It is estimated that 84 percent of the undiscovered oil and gas lies offshore. The total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources are estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of liquid natural gas. Altogether, the Arctic region contains around 25 percent of the world's undiscovered conventional hydrocarbon energy resources.

Because more than 95 percent of these northern resources are found within the jurisdictions of agreed national and maritime boundaries,  the economic competition is not between nations, but rather between multinational corporations competing for national contracts and concessions. For purposes of risk-sharing and technological support, it is in the strategic interest of Norway as much as of Russia to attract investment from energy companies. These interests and incentives drove the decision to settle the Barents Sea maritime boundary, and it is the absence of such incentives that is holding up settling the disputed maritime boundary between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.

Access to Northern Routes

The most strategically sensitive resources are the new maritime lines of communication opened by receding ice. The new routes present an opportunity for unprecedented efficiency, with 40 percent distance reduction, and similar reductions in fuel and CO₂ emissions.  Significant savings are possible in time, fuel cost, and insurance cost, with shorter distances and the absence of insurance 'piracy premiums' for the passage between the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal.

China is particularly interested in the Arctic, because the route from Shanghai to Rotterdam or Hamburg across the Northern Sea Route over Russia is 10,000 km shorter than through the Panama Canal; or 6,400 km shorter than through the Malacca Strait, Gulf of Aden, Suez, and Gibraltar. The route from Shanghai to New York is 3,000 km shorter through the Canadian Northwest Passage than through Panama. For supertankers that normally go around the Cape because they are too big to pass through the Suez Canal, the prospect of a northern route is even more profitable, although with a greater distance from the shore they might need to lease an escort to break the ice.

The natural trends differ between Russia and Canada, however, resulting in different policy and strategy priorities. While in Russia the receding ice has already created new northern shipping opportunities for seasonal transit, the ice will not disappear from the Canadian Northwest Passage any time soon.

Even if the Arctic is ice-free, the Canadian archipelago will be the last to clear its sea ice.

But not all shipping will concern serious transit and energy. There will also be leisure. More than five million tourists visit the broader Arctic each year and cruise tourism in the northern seas currently represents 10 percent of Arctic shipping.  Because tourists want to see "cool stuff",  cruise tourism may become a very hazardous activity for which search and rescue capabilities are currently inadequate. A major shipwreck could have disastrous consequences. In 1989, the Soviet cruise liner TS Maxim Gorky crashed into an iceberg, but the Norwegians managed to rescue everyone on board because they happened to be close.

For these reasons, Russia is currently investing the most in building the infrastructure to support and secure increased economic activity, in all areas of transport, energy, and natural resources. Canada and Russia are careful about admitting unrestrained shipping to the northern routes, for reasons of sovereignty and environmental protection. But with the right conditions and management, both countries stand to gain from overseeing viable trade routes. These passages are the principal reason that China and the European Union have been clamouring to be admitted as permanent observers to the Arctic Council, in order to secure non-discriminatory trade privileges. Russia has a keen interest in developing effective logistics for the Northeast Passage, not only to support transit, but especially to bring Russian resources to the world market.

The new trade routes are strategically the most sensitive issue in the Arctic. Their success will depend very heavily on great power relations, because in the Bering Strait, Russia is on one side, the US on the other, and China is in between. If one of the three has a problem with any of the other two anywhere in the world, the Arctic would be the place to cause a nuisance. A standoff is unlikely to be initiated in the Arctic itself. However if tension builds up between the US and China in the South China Sea, the Chinese could counter this in the future by sending a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to the Polar Seas or carrying out another military action in the Arctic that could trigger a more systematic militarisation.

Developing northern trade routes still requires big investment in specialized shipping and icebreaker capacity; in refueling and support logistics; and in search-and-rescue capabilities. The big question is when these routes will be ready for maritime transit traffic on a larger scale. A quick answer is that it will happen when these investments are covered by the revenues they generate.

Boundaries and Claims

If we take the view from a helicopter, we can see that almost all boundaries are agreed. Only one territorial and one maritime boundary dispute are outstanding, while rapid change and economic interests brought about breakthroughs such as the 2010 settlement of the maritime boundary of the Barents Sea.

between Norway and Russia. As the culmination of a process that started in the 1970s, this treaty is a major accomplishment.

Almost all maritime boundaries are settled. West past the Spitsbergen archipelago, the areas between Norway and Denmark's Greenland have been resolved in a series of agreements.  Between Alaska and the Northern Territories, the only outstanding maritime boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea is north of Alaska and the Yukon Territories. Between the west of Greenland and the Canadian Ellesmere Island, the maritime boundary in the Davis Strait was settled in 1973,  except for the uninhabited rock of Hans Island, which remains the only outstanding territorial dispute in the Far North. As we shall see, this rock played an important part in the Canadian elections of 2006.

North of the territorial waters exclusive economic zones extend up to 200 nautical miles, and beyond there are claims on the continental shelves for an additional 150 nm. In accordance with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, a Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) was established in Paris, where these claims are under review. The deadline for a coastal state to submit a claim is ten years after its ratification of UNCLOS.  Russia, Norway, and Canada have submitted claims to the CLCS.

In the summer of 2012 Denmark leased the strongest Swedish icebreaker, Oden, and took 46 scientists on board to gather seismic data to back up the Danish claim,  which will be submitted before their deadline of 16 November 2014. Canada, Russia, and Denmark are making overlapping claims to the Lomonosov Ridge and the geographical North Pole, and each is presenting arguments to the CLCS based on scientific and geological, rather than political or legal argument. The Lomonosov Ridge spans 1,800 km from the New Siberian Islands to Canada's Ellesmere Island and, at four times the length of Arizona's Grand Canyon, is the largest canyon on the Earth's crust.

The Danes will claim that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Greenland, the Canadians claim that it is an extension of the North American landmass, and the Russians argue that it is an extension of the Siberian landmass. Because the CLCS assesses claims on their scientific merit, and does not adjudicate territorial disputes, it is entirely possible that the commission will conclude that the rules apply to all claims and tell the three claimants to sort it out among themselves.  If they have a desire to settle, they can turn to the International Tribunal for the Law on the Sea, the International Court of Justice, or arrange ad hoc arbitration. In this scenario, it is also possible that one or more parties might not be able to resist political grandstanding.

Because the US has not yet ratified UNCLOS – and the Danes are the last of the other four to submit their claim to Paris – the Danish deadline of 16 November 2014 applies to the US as well. If the US Senate fails to ratify UNCLOS, and the State Department fails to submit a claim before that date, the US will lose an important window of opportunity.

Policies And Strategies

Every state pursuing territorial or economic claims in the Arctic region does so with a legal, diplomatic and security strategy derived from a vision and concept for the future of the Far North. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration first affirmed a shared vision in a number of key principles, most notably commitments to the wellbeing of northern peoples, sustainable development, protection of the environment, international cooperation, and the advancement of science and research in all these areas. All these principles have trickled down and are reflected in the concepts of the published northern policies and strategies of the wider Arctic Five, the EU, and the non-littoral states Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.  This general agreement on the level of international vision is a positive development, but with regard to policy concepts and strategies there are important differences in emphasis and strategic priority. The littoral Arctic Five all emphasize sovereignty and national security, whereas the non-littoral states and the EU highlight international security. Russia emphasizes development of infrastructure, whereas Canada has recently made the development of northern peoples the priority in both domestic policy and its Arctic Council chairmanship.

In some cases, we see Arctic policies that are called 'strategies', but lack a genuine strategy. The difference is that a policy is more limited. A policy is a concept that states the preferences and goals of a government or a ministry. But without a comprehensive means of placing those goals in a process, the concept is not translated into a strategy. A viable strategy must have three characteristics: it should be comprehensive or integrated among a whole government or alliance; it should concern the long term; and it should incorporate a mechanism for dealing with a dynamic interaction with other players.

Several of our interview subjects have expressed a desire for good scenario planning capabilities, on the national level and in the Arctic Council, as well as in assessments of ecological resilience.  As we shall see, the Russians and the Chinese can be said to have comprehensive international strategies, whereas Canada has the most comprehensive domestic Arctic strategy and policy framework. All these national movements, taken together, reveal a breakthrough process that is still ongoing. We next examine the players in turn: Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the US, China, the EU, and NATO.

Russia

The Russian Federation is pursuing a comprehensive grand strategy for the Arctic region, economically, politically, and militarily. With the widest northern border, covering more than 50 percent of the Arctic coastline and around 60 percent of Arctic land, Russia has the biggest exclusive economic zones and continental shelf claims. Natural geography gives Russia the largest slice of the Arctic pie in accordance with international law and custom. The Russians therefore have no incentive to make a fuss over minor boundary disputes. 

Where Russia may behave recklessly in other parts of the world, she is in fact very cautious in the Arctic region. When the 2007 flag-planting stunt beneath the North Pole caused uproar among other Arctic nations, the government quickly disowned the incident as a private act by an eccentric billionaire. Russia knows her interests are best secured through cooperation, even if at times there is a measure of double communication between international conciliation and outbursts of nationalist rhetoric for domestic consumption.

In 2008, the Russian government published an Arctic strategy that stresses the economic and strategic importance of the region, and the means to protect these interests.  The document elaborately asserts sovereign rights over territories and maritime claims in accordance with Russian and international law, and goes on to specify national interests of the Arctic zone as a strategic resource for Russia's wealth and global competitiveness. The Northern Sea Route is described in terms of "national integrated transport communications".  The document outlines a methodical strategy for control, detailing investment, formalization of boundaries and claims, and logistical development to consolidate the Arctic zone as a leading strategic resource base.

Military security is emphasized for the "protection of state borders"; it is a priority to "ensure favorable operating conditions in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintaining the necessary combat capabilities of troops (forces) of the general purpose of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies in the region". With the Siloviki (security services) firmly in control, the document notes the central role of the Federal Security Services (FSB) for protecting national interests. Unlike other countries, the Russian Coast Guard is a well-armed paramilitary force that is a part of the Federal Border Guard, which in turn is part of the FSB.

With dwindling output from Siberian oil and gas fields, President Putin has noted that "offshore fields, especially in the Arctic, are without any exaggeration our strategic reserve for the twenty-first century".  To develop these resources, Russia desperately needs new capital and technology. The Russians needed the maritime boundary agreement with Norway, because they intended to use it and share risk. In a three-week period after it was signed in April and May 2012, the Russian oil giant Rosneft signed deals with ExxonMobil, Eni, and Statoil.  

After the invasion of Iraq, the US sought alternatives to the Gulf and started importing oil from Russia. After several hundred tanker shipments a year, this demand has diminished significantly with American discoveries of oil in their own seas and West Africa, and the breakthrough of the shale gas revolution. The US is now exporting its gas to Europe, which has shocked Gazprom. In response, Russia updated its 2010 Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 in November 2012, with an emphasis on exports to Asian markets.

Russia needs access to new markets for its oil and gas, and is looking to build the infrastructure on its northern shore for transit shipping and for energy exports that can equally move east and west. To manage a broad spectrum of economic activity, the Russians are investing more than any other state to develop northern infrastructure. Dutch firms are dredging harbor areas and cutting a deep channel in the Kara Strait to make room for oil tanker traffic. New nuclear icebreakers are being built, search-and-rescue stations are being installed across the northern seabed, and polar orbiting satellites have been launched. There were never satellites over the Arctic during the Cold War, and all these investments are part of the preparation to exercise control over a strategic hub for transit, energy, and exports.

For Russia's military strategy, the Far North has been a function of five different factors since the Cold War: it is the home port of the advanced Northern Fleet; it is a transit area for Russian strategic bombers, and the only way to fly out from Russia and into the Western hemisphere; it is an important test area for new air and sea-launched weapons; it is the home port and base of the Russian nuclear retaliation capability; and finally, it is the most important air defence area for northern Russia, representing both the trajectory for strategic bombing and intercontinental missiles.  Today, new investments are being made to expand naval and aerial military capabilities, but these are not a reflection of a new militarisation of the region. Russian military activity in the Far North today is only a shadow of what it was during the Cold War. Rather, current and planned military activities are part of the securitisation of economic activity.

Despite its behavior domestically and elsewhere in the world, Russia understands very well that its interests in the Arctic can only be secured within international norms and in cooperation with other states to attract foreign investors. Russia has a comprehensive and far-sighted security strategy in the Arctic in preparation for natural, strategic, and economic breakthroughs.

Norway

Given the military importance that Russia attaches to the region, it has also become important to Norway. Despite respect for international law and diplomacy, the Russians are unlikely to give up the use of military strength as an instrument of diplomacy. For this reason, and because NATO is not as focused on the Arctic as it was during the Cold War, Norway is seeking to develop sufficient capabilities to be able to manage any crisis independently.  But as is the case in most Western liberal democratic states, it remains a challenge to forge an integrated grand strategy shared by the foreign policy and defense establishments.

Norway's relationship with Russia is now inevitably ambiguous. Unlike the Cold War era, when NATO and the Soviet Union agreed that they were enemies, it is harder to argue for deterrence and collective defense against a Russia that is also the most important business partner in the energy sector. This tension between the economic sphere and security policy requires a delicate balancing act.  

On the security side, Norway wishes to invite military exercises by NATO (or by NATO members without the NATO label) to the Arctic to internationalize its security posture. On the economic side, after the maritime boundary settlement, the subsequent set of multi-billion dollar oil agreements represents an important boost for Russia. This might lead to a paradoxical situation: will it be necessary within a decade for Norway to ask NATO for help to protect itself against a renewed Russian military that was largely financed by Western energy consumption?

The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy was published in 2006 and expanded in 2009. It is a policy statement without a strategy, and it reflects neither a political nor an administrative consensus, but the views and policy aims of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With an emphasis on three overarching principles – knowledge, presence and activity – the document outlines familiar themes of sovereignty, scientific research, strengthening cooperation, the protection of the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, and stewardship in environmental protection and economic activities.  With an emphasis on knowledge, education and diplomacy, the only long-term themes discussed in the policy statement concern economic interests, where security is an afterthought. 

The document mentions the Norwegian armed forces only in the context of a discussion on presence and a function of exercising sovereign authority.  The armed forces are there to support the coastguard, to provide up-to-date surveillance and intelligence, and above all, to be present. The document does not elaborate on the practicalities of safety, search-and-rescue or security. It does not address the relationship between the spheres of foreign policy, economics and security.

The Norwegian Ministry of Defense does not have a comparable single public policy document explicitly spelling out its strategy for the Far North, but there are some indications of a long-term strategic outlook. The region is a prioritized area for defense policy, and "Norway's prime area for strategic investment".  While it is beyond Norway's scope to develop a war-fighting capability against Russia, today's military thinking is focused on developing a capability of situational awareness and independent crisis management, a capability that would allow a margin of political freedom of action for Norwegian decision-makers without having to call on divided NATO allies.  

These defense priorities are reflected in a document Future Acquisitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces 2012-2020, published in July 2012. In all areas, there is an emphasis on modernizing communications and monitoring capabilities to maximize situational awareness; and in both land and naval systems, crisis management includes search-and-rescue and offensive capabilities. The overwhelming portion of the air force budget is devoted to the purchase of 55 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, while naval systems receive the greatest attention for modernisation and expansion".

Being both a NATO member and an economic partner to Russia, the Norwegian armed forces are in a unique position to bridge the two. Admiral BruunHanssen, Chief of Staff of the Norwegian armed forces since 2013, noted that he frequently briefs NATO on Russian military activities, and is even consulted by Russians for advice on certain situations. The informal club of Arctic Chiefs of Staff contributes to the military dialogue with the Russians, where all parties are very aware of their zones of responsibility for search-and-rescue.  In the thin atmosphere of limited resources, capabilities, and infrastructure for monitoring, communications, and responsive action, necessity is driving unprecedented cooperation. The Pomor series of joint Norwegian-Russian military exercises also reflects greater military-to-military cooperation.

What is still needed, however, is a long-term, integrated, and allied grand strategy. Published documents and our interviews reveal that the Norwegian armed forces are very aware that they need to develop an integrated toolkit for a broad spectrum of action, "because we become a sort of Swiss army knife. A multiple tool for a lot of purposes".  The allied approach is pursued through inclusiveness and cooperation as the best way to achieve one's interests: "To join, to find strength through cooperation. Because you are not big enough to achieve all your goals on your own".

Among Scandinavian countries, Norway has the greatest tradition of self-reliance, and this is inherent in its culture and strategic outlook. Its vision and concept for the Arctic includes the elements of environmental protection, international cooperation, and development of energy resources. There are many parallel developments in Norway with regard to the Far North: scientific research, economic development in the private sector, the policies of the foreign ministry, and the strategy of the armed forces. Norway would benefit from political leadership that could steer greater cooperation between diplomats, the military, and industry.

Denmark and Greenland

The Kingdom of Denmark extends far into the Arctic because of the Faroe Islands and Greenland – an Arctic island more than 2 million sq km in size, inhabited by fewer than 57,000 people. A dispute between Norway and Denmark about the sovereignty of the eastern part of Greenland was settled in 1933 by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which agreed that uncolonised parts of eastern Greenland were not terra nullius but fell under Danish sovereignty. The judgment also specified that "the two elements necessary to establish a valid title to sovereignty" had to be present,  "namely: the intention and will to exercise such sovereignty and the manifestation of State activity".  Since then Denmark has maintained a presence with a military dog-sledge patrol, where six two-man teams carry out a 3,000 km heroic schlep in the desolate parts of Greenland. In addition, the Danish defense Forces enforce sovereignty on behalf of the Kingdom and maintain a continuous presence with patrol ships and surveillance aircraft. Thus sovereignty is upheld in accordance with international law. Today, several visions and concepts have emerged for the Arctic in general, and the status of Greenland in particular.

Greenland has not been economically self-sufficient in the past, and today, with fewer than 27,000 people in the workforce, it is still far from being so. Nonetheless, in recent years there have been some calls for political independence, because of a very real possibility of economic independence. Greenland was granted home rule in 1979 and a self-rule agreement went into force on 21 June 2009. Following this agreement, Copenhagen still pays for half of Greenland's budget with DKK 3.4 billion ($593 million or €455 million) annually. The Greenlandic economy has traditionally been based on fishing and hunting. But the discovery of oil, gas, and minerals, including the highest deposits of rare earth oxide outside China's Bayan Obo mining district, has opened new avenues to potential unprecedented riches.

The strategic importance of the 17 heavy and light rare earth elements (REE) has grown in recent decades. They possess a unique set of metallurgical, catalytic, electrical, magnetic, and optical properties.  China currently controls more than 95 per cent of the rare earth market and is hoarding reserves as a strategic deposit – and alongside British and Australian companies, the Chinese have submitted bids for Greenlandic fields. This is a great challenge to the West, where both the US and the EU have declared REE among their long-term strategic priorities. Greenland's rare earth deposits are found in two districts, Kringlerne and Kvanefjeld. Because the rich rare earth deposits in Kvanefjeld are structurally connected to uranium, these deposits cannot be capitalized upon before Greenland and Denmark agree on a common uranium export policy. To tap the mineral wealth of rare earths and uranium, as well as the estimated 50 billion barrels of offshore oil and gas, Greenland is seeking to attract long-term investments, but these require a level of stability and human development that Greenland currently does not possess.

With these riches in sight, members of the Greenland political class have expressed a vision calling for independence, but this cannot be translated into a viable concept or strategy. Economic development is not enough to build a sovereign state unless it is complemented by the development of human and state capacity and institutions. 

The 2009 Self-Rule Act transferred to Greenland authority over 33 new areas of responsibility, including the management of natural resources, while foreign and security policy remain the remit of the Danish government in Copenhagen. The Self-Rule Act does not present a solution to the problem of rare earth and uranium minerals that are both an economic and strategic matter. Who controls these resources and where they end up is a matter of national and international security.

The Greenlandic view, pointing to the self-rule agreement, is that they can sell concessions to their mineral resources to whomever they want and get all the money. The Danish government in turn points to the Constitution of Denmark and says that it remains responsible for foreign, security, and defense policy. Both are right, and heated political discussions in Copenhagen and Greenland's capital, Nuuk, have led the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene and negotiate an agreement for closer cooperation and coordination in the Kingdom's common security policy.

To resolve this dilemma, a grand strategy is needed that starts with the recognition that control over minerals such as uranium and REE has both an economic and security impact.  

Admiral Nils Wang brought this dilemma to public attention in June 2012, arguing that short-term economic interests should not lead to the sacrifice of long-term strategic interests.  He cited the example of the Australian government blocking an attempt by the Chinese government to purchase a controlling stake in the Lynas Corporation, a rare-earth mining company, because it recognised the long-term strategic risks of allowing China to tighten its monopolistic grip on rare earths. The Greenlandic Mineral Strategy 2009, on the other hand, only mentions exploration, geology, mineral potential, environment, economy, employment, and Greenlandic values.  The Greenland government has not considered all the strategic consequences of its actions.

In the March 2013 Greenland parliamentary election, the opposition Siumut party emerged as the winner, defeating the ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit party in a contest that centered on the regulatory framework for the mining industry and the question of the 'zero-tolerance policy' towards uranium exploitation that prevented the exploitation of rare earths in Kvanefjeld. With Greenland's first female Prime Minister, Aleqa Hammond, at the helm, a more nationalist course towards Denmark emerged, and shortly after the election the new government changed the regulatory framework and abandoned the more than 30-year-old 'zero-tolerance policy' by a single-vote margin in parliament. But to be able to export uranium, Greenland must accede to the necessary control regimes and possess the necessary "expertise to handle uranium in accordance with international treaties, which might take five to ten years to develop," wrote Wang and co-author Damien Degeorges in a report.  It remains to be seen how these developments in Greenland affect Denmark's long-term strategic interests.

Increased interest in Arctic resources in general, and rare earths in particular, are causing Greenland to "quickly become clogged with wealthy international dance partners".  This recognition on the world stage is highlighted by high-profile meetings. In 2012, the South Korean President, Lee MyungBak, visited Greenland without stopping in Denmark; and when Greenland's Minister for Industry and Natural Resources Ove Karl Bertelsen, visited China, he was received by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, now Prime Minister.

The Danes cannot blame the Greenlanders for being tempted by the prospect of Chinese or other investors, if they are not offering a better alternative. Admiral Wang's column contributed to alerting Copenhagen to these questions, and now there is a growing understanding in the business sector and among pension funds that Greenland might be a lucrative long-term investment area.

Strategy abhors a vacuum. Instant independence for Greenland is not realistic because it would create a sudden gap in the NATO treaty area and Denmark would cease to be a littoral state. But more importantly, Greenland is not yet viable as an independent state because its population lacks the necessary resources and skills. Even if it were to 'outsource' external security to NATO and Denmark, on the Icelandic model, it would still have to pay for and manage its own coastguard – as Iceland does – for sea surveillance, fishery protection, and search-and-rescue.  These require not only large investments, but also the development of a skill set not currently present in Greenland's population.

Now that the noise and dust of electioneering has settled, a few sobering assessments of Greenland have appeared. Wang and Degeorges conclude:

Educational standards need to undergo significant improvement if Greenland wants to build a sufficiently skilled workforce that could form the foundation for the required future political and central administrative system. The development of a viable Greenlandic state is heavily dependent on improving the general level of education, as well as the need for a highly educated elite with a deep understanding of global affairs.

The long-term process of economic development should lead to human development, and efforts need to be made to prevent corruption, nepotism, and the 'resource curse'. It is a generational question whether Greenland can elevate itself to the status of a viable sovereign state, and it would take 30 to 40 years to be a realistic prospect.  These conclusions were reinforced in a report published in early 2014, To the Benefit of Greenland, that was developed by the Universities of Copenhagen and Greenland.

In May 2014, the Greenlandic Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond wrote an op-ed article, with Professor Minik Rosing, welcoming the report, highlighting policy priorities of Greenlandic development, and the ways in which mineral development will benefit the population. In addition to resource development, "Greenland has formulated an ambitious plan to raise the education level with massive investment in primary schools, secondary schools, vocational schools, and the university".  These are welcome signs of long-term realism replacing the short-term nationalism that characterised the elections of the previous year.

On the international level, Denmark does not have a fully integrated Arctic grand strategy, but progress has been made in the scientific, legal, diplomatic, and defense spheres. As mentioned, Denmark dispatched a scientific expedition in the summer of 2012 to collect seismic data in preparation of its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf before 16 November 2014. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, a mildly worded document that covers a familiar spectrum of themes in international cooperation and security, sustainable development, environmental protection and maritime security. It is slightly more comprehensive than its Norwegian counterpart, but its tenor is similar and it has a more assertive conclusion. In a brief section on exercising sovereignty the bottom line emerges: while cooperation with the Arctic Ocean's coastal states is close, "there will be continuing need to enforce the Kingdom's sovereignty, especially in light of the anticipated increase in activity in the region".

The Danish defense Agreement 2010-2014 white paper specifies several overriding initiatives for the Arctic. The North Atlantic command structure will be streamlined, by bringing Greenland Command and Faroe Command into a single joint service structure, the Arctic Command Headquarters, which was inaugurated on 31 October 2012. In addition, an Arctic Response Force has been established, and an extensive new risk analysis in and around Greenland is being conducted on the future tasks of the armed forces beyond 2014. This analysis is ongoing, and will be finalized by the end of 2014.

Denmark is the smallest Arctic country but is responsible for the largest land mass. A variety of visions has been expressed by Copenhagen and Nuuk, but neither the published Danish Arctic strategy nor the defense agreement provide satisfactory answers for the grand strategic implications of Greenland's resource wealth. It appears, however, that both Copenhagen and Nuuk have woken up to the implications of these matters with prudent assessments and policy concepts, where long-term strategies for investment, resource development, and human development are converging.

Canada

Canada is the most passionate player in the Arctic and the one country where international policy and strategy are most derived from domestic priorities. These priorities are now focused on the economic and human development of the indigenous peoples of the North. Canada was shocked into action by a 2005 United Nations report on the development of its indigenous peoples, which noted:

The report added: "Canada has taken up the challenge to close this gap".

Canada's new determination to focus on the human and economic development of the peoples of the North is manifested in its domestic political priorities, as well as the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, in which it has placed human development at the top of the agenda. The process of Canadian deliberation serves to maximize the inclusiveness of all stakeholders. Because the Far North is a very emotive subject for the Canadian people, seasonal political grandstanding for electoral purposes is to be expected. More important, however, is the vision and concept described in Canada's new Northern strategy, which many Canadians we spoke to consider to be an integrated strategy.

Canada is a federation with ten provinces and three Northern Territories: Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. Out of a population of 33.5 million, a mere 100,000 live in the Northern Territories, the majority of whom are indigenous. Because Canada is not a unitary state, there are always many players involved in each issue, where the federal government departments negotiate with provincial governments, territorial governments, municipalities, native peoples, and other stakeholders. With the overall aim to make the North economically self-sufficient, any initiative requires a policy of outreach. This consultative approach is inherent in the country's structure and culture. The Canadian government has made a point of including Northerners as much as possible in the development of the new Northern strategy, and also named the Inuit Minister of the Environment, Leona Aglukkaq, as the representative to the Arctic Council during Canada's chairmanship from 2013 to 2015. 

The vision and policy concepts were translated into Canada's Northern Strategy, published in 2009, which aims to be an overarching policy framework, to be used as a guideline and umbrella for all government departments, although each department remains accountable to its minister. The colorful trilingual document, written in English, French, and Inuit, heralds the four pillars of Canada's Arctic strategy: sovereignty, governance, economic and social development, and environmental protection. Each of these pillars carries equal weight, and international policy derives almost as an afterthought from these domestic priorities. We spoke with members of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and the Department of National Defense. How does the strategy translate into their policy processes?

In the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Jeanette Menzies heads the Canadian International Center for the Arctic Region. Her portfolio includes formulating Canada's Arctic foreign policy; bringing coherence to the work by missions and embassies; working on the Arctic Council chairmanship; conducting outreach to foreign embassies in Ottawa; managing a leading role in scientific research; and encouraging business and investment in Canada's North.

The Department for Aboriginal Affairs covers policy towards the three Northern territorial governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. This geographical area of more than 3.9 million sq km is 40 percent of Canada's landmass and faces three oceans. In Nunavut the indigenous population is 85 percent, in the Northwest Territories about 50 percent and in the Yukon 20 percent. The overarching policy aim is "development of the North for Northerners" politically, economically, and socially, but overcoming the challenges of remoteness and isolation is hard.

There are more than 50 isolated communities in the Northern Territories with around 1,000-2,000 people in each, living in conditions of six months light, six months darkness, and -40°C winters. Over 50 percent of the Northern population is under 25, and they have great potential to connect via new media, both in social media and broadcasting. While economic development is slow, this new connectivity is an important enabling factor. Each of these communities has its infrastructure requirements in housing, schools, hospitals, energy, ports, and airfields. The Inuit there have independence in issuing contracts and choosing whom to do business with. And with the consultative approach, the DAA organizes large advisory boards with all stakeholders involved in order to coordinate this development at all layers of government, federal, territorial, and municipal. It should come as no surprise that the primary theme of Canada's chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2013-2015 is the 'Development of the Peoples of the North'.  

And what about the level of defense? The military and defense mandate derives solely from the government strategy outlined above, and helping to deliver that mandate. Necessity is driving this integrated approach.  In 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared, "'Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this government intends to use it".  But despite this bellicose language, the military and security presence of Canada's north remains modest, with no more force additions than reinstating a presence that was removed after the Cold War.  With a fleet of 15 icebreakers, the Canadian Coast Guard has greater capability of operating in ice than the Royal Canadian Navy, and is called upon to escort an average of four vessels through the ice per day.

On the question of transport and traffic, it is notable how little the Canadian Northwest Passage is discussed as an international strait in any of the policy documents or by the policy practitioners we spoke to. This is in contrast to the emphasis the Russians are placing on the development of the Northern Sea Route. The political class, however, caused a stir in 2009 when a motion was passed in the Canadian House of Commons to rename the Northwest Passage, the Canadian Northwest Passage.  This was an effort to 'nationalize' a passage considered an international strait by the US and the EU,  but both the move and the reactions to it were largely beside the point. While the sea ice is melting north of Russia, it will not disappear from the Canadian archipelago for a long time to come. While human activity is expected to increase in the North, Canadian civil servants noted to us, "In our analyses the Northwest

Passage is probably not going to be open for the next 20 years".

This explains why transport is barely discussed. The question of natural mineral and energy resources is also mentioned very little. While there is recognition that there is going to be an increase in resource-based human activity, the Northern strategy does mention the preparatory scientific research needed for resource exploitation. The government will stimulate this research, but the private sector is expected to take over from there and stimulate employment:

In Norway and Russia, energy, fish, and mineral resources, and their surrounding logistics and instruments of international cooperation, are all considered central to their Northern strategies. For Canada, international cooperation is peripheral to the domestic considerations of social development. While Canada is developing the Alberta tar sands, it matters little if the buyer is the US or China. Neither of those countries seems interested in resolving the maritime delimitation of the Beaufort Sea, quite possibly because there are no joint exploration agreements in the pipeline for oil and gas. The biggest increase in traffic will be driven by domestic resource development.

As a corollary to the emphasis on domestic priorities, international interest in Canada's Arctic policy also focuses on domestic developments. Sometimes the view from Denmark can be strange, when domestic politics, rather than policy, takes center stage.

In 2005 Harper's Conservatives put the Arctic at the center of the election campaign, attacking the Liberals for weakness in their emphasis on diplomacy. They argued that if there is insufficient investment in military hardware, Canadian inherent rights to the Arctic will be challenged by other players.  In response, the Liberal defense minister Bill Graham flew to Hans Island, the disputed barren rock between Greenland and Ellesmere Island, and hauled down a Danish flag that had been planted there in 1984 and replaced in 2003.  Graham took the flag and delivered it to the Danish Ambassador in Ottawa, stating that a Danish flag had been found on a Canadian island, and would he take it back to Copenhagen and inform the Ministry that Canada would not accept this? The result was a period of diplomatic turmoil.  But the stunt was to no avail. The Conservatives won.

Given the emotive importance that the Arctic holds for the general population of Canada, this kind of grandstanding can be expected every five years. Other Arctic states should not worry too much about the double communication between posturing for a domestic audience and the outreach that Canada makes to international partners. The politics is part of the game, but the policy is quite serious.

All in all, Canada has a fairly comprehensive and integrated domestic Arctic strategy. It is natural considering the geographical, social, and governance structure of the country. It is admirable that Canada has prioritized the geographically challenging task of the development of its indigenous peoples. With its national and international attention focused on this question, it may well be possible to create a meaningful breakthrough to dramatically improve the lives of the peoples of the north. But Canada would benefit if it were also to develop an integrated international strategy with planning that looks further ahead than the next election cycle.

United States of America

Of the Arctic Five, the United States government has been the slowest to move on Arctic affairs. In the very last days of the George W. Bush Administration, the Arctic Region Policy was announced on 9 January 2009 as a Presidential Directive,  which was reaffirmed by the Obama administration in the National Security Strategy of 2011. This is a policy concept, not a strategy.

The directive enumerates familiar Arctic themes: emphasizing the question of sovereignty that the US holds in the Arctic; urging protection of the environment and environmentally sustainable resource management; protecting and involving indigenous communities; and enhancing scientific research. On the legal front, the directive acknowledges the Beaufort Sea dispute with Canada and seeks consultation with the Senate to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

What sets the American view of the Arctic apart from other states is that it is viewed solely as a security and homeland defense challenge. The melting ice opens a back door to the American continent, and this has to be secured. Whereas the Arctic strategies of Norway and Denmark are largely diplomatic pamphlets written by diplomats for international consumption, and Canada has an integrated social development strategy, President Bush's 2009 Arctic Region Policy and the Pentagon's 2011 Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage treat the Arctic solely as a security matter. And if it is only a security challenge, then it competes for attention and money with the Middle East, the South China Sea, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

It is therefore very difficult to finance even the modest ambitions that these documents contain. Although Hillary Clinton attended the 2013 Kiruna session of the Arctic Council, the State Department under her and her successor John Kerry did not take any initiatives on the Beaufort Sea dispute or the Law of the Sea. With such little attention and guidance coming from the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department, the US Navy and US Coast Guard chose to develop their own Arctic policies and strategies. Not to be upstaged, the White House and Department of Defense did eventually produce two short Arctic strategy documents of their own.  

The US Navy's department of Energy, Environment, and Climate Change established the Task Force on Climate Change in 2009. This office, until recently headed by Rear Admiral David Titley, the chief oceanographer and navigator of the US Navy, has carried out the most innovative work on the Arctic in the American government. The TFCC's remit included research on the changing Arctic, rising sea levels, changes in storm patterns, assistance to vulnerable nations, and increases in humanitarian assistance and disaster response.  In October 2009, the TFCC published the US Navy Arctic Roadmap, which provided a comprehensive overview of investments in capabilities the Navy requires, as well as new methods of strategic and operational planning. The roadmap in the document describes three phases of navy action, from assessments to developing capabilities and their implementation. This work was followed up in May 2010 with the publication of the US Navy Climate Change Roadmap, which includes a similar phased plan, calling for education on climate change in the Naval War College curriculum and implementation of climate change assessments in training and in strategic and operational planning.  Rear Admiral Titley and his successor Rear Admiral Jonathan White, with their staff, have shown valuable leadership in laying the intellectual and organizational foundations for the US Navy's future activities in the Arctic.

In May 2013 the US Coast Guard took the lead and published its Arctic Strategy, the only constabulary agency in the world to do so. This is the most comprehensive document produced by the American government, covering its vision, policy concept, and long-term strategic objectives, which are defined as improving awareness, modernizing governance, and broadening partnerships. Each of these objectives is tied to a strategy for long-term success.

In the same month the White House released its first National Strategy for the Arctic Region, a rushed 11-page document that aims to be an overarching framework. It describes a set of policy preferences, with an emphasis on security, responsible stewardship, and international cooperation. The document lists objectives in a familiar range of areas: energy security, domain awareness, freedom of the seas, environmental conservation, integrated management, and to "increase understanding of the Arctic through scientific research and traditional knowledge".  While it states all these goals, the document says very little about how they are to be carried out. Despite its title, the objectives are not tied to clear processes, which are left for other departments to figure out. This document can therefore not be considered a serious strategy.

Six months later, the Department of Defense issued its own first Arctic Strategy, another brief document of 14 pages. The Pentagon defines the "desired end-state of the Arctic" as "a secure and stable region where US national interests are safeguarded, the US homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges".  In an improvement over the White House, the Pentagon document connects these goals to processes and means to achieve them, including multilateral security collaboration, preparation for a wide range of contingencies, engagement with private and public partners for domain awareness, and support for the Arctic Council. The emphasis of this document is on the exercise of sovereignty and the protection of the homeland.

With this relative inattention from the highest levels of executive authority in the American government, it is not surprising that the US Navy and Coast Guard took the lead in developing their own comprehensive strategies. In the 2011 Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage – reiterating the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review – the Pentagon urged both the development of necessary capabilities and the ratification of the Law of the Sea:

There is a slightly tragic sense in this report, in which the urgency and need for capabilities is recognised, but the limitations in the present fiscal environment are also acknowledged. The appeal to ratify the Law of the Sea is sensible, but has not moved the Senate to action. If the US fails to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in time, it will not have access to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to submit its claim before 16 November 2014 (the Danish deadline) despite the fact that the US recognises its guiding principles as international law.

This is an egregious oversight, not least because it was President Truman who first declared US sovereignty over its continental shelf in his Proclamation of 1945, initiating a custom that has matured into an established rule of international customary law. It is remarkable that in a situation where the international legal community, the defense establishment, and the White House are all in agreement about the necessity for ratification, the US Senate remains incapable of pulling together 60 senators to overcome the threat of a filibuster. The US has wasted several great opportunities already and risks being left behind in the Far North if the Senate doesn't take the region more seriously very soon.

On the political level, the US is a bystander in the big developments occurring in the region, and has no overall vision for the Arctic. Nonetheless, there have been some important positive moves. When Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton did attend the Arctic Council sessions, and expressed support for its growth and development. The US Navy's Task Force on Climate Change has done the most important intellectual groundwork and policy for the future of the Navy. This is the only part of the US government where an innovative vision, concept, strategy, and phased plan are being carried out to a genuine breakthrough transforming the US Navy on the whole spectrum from its curriculum and research to its activities. The US Coast Guard also developed a comprehensive vision, concept, and strategy for the long term. At the highest level, however, the two short documents published by the White House and Pentagon reflect their inattention. The Senate's failure to ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea is the greatest oversight, but it is not necessarily the greatest obstacle for regional governance, which can still be developed on the basis of international law and agreements. 

The European Union and NATO

Not to be outdone, a memo from the European Commission cheerfully announced to the European Council and Parliament that the "European Union is inextricably linked to the Arctic region (…) by a unique combination of history, geography, economy, and scientific achievements".  With Denmark in the inner circle, and Finland and Sweden in the next echelon, the EU is vying for a greater role and a permanent observer seat in the Arctic Council. EU members Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are full members of the Arctic Council; and the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, France, Germany, and Spain have the status of Permanent Observers. But the EU itself has not yet succeeded in upgrading its status of ad hoc observer. Finland campaigned the strongest on behalf of the EU, and Norway supported the EU's application.  Their application was approved at the Kiruna session of the Council in May 2013, but a final decision has been deferred until the EU lifts its seal trade ban.  With Canada's Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq as Arctic Council chair, the EU will be pressed to reverse a policy of immature and emotive environmentalism that has caused great harm to the way of life of the Inuit.

The Arctic holds precious resources for the EU, and the EU in turn is a huge consumer market for Arctic produce. Half of the fish caught in the waters above the Arctic Circle are consumed in the EU, and more than a quarter of Arctic oil and gas flows to the EU. More than €200 million of European funds has been invested in Arctic scientific research. As the world's largest trading bloc and most profitable consumer market in control of 40 percent of the world's shipping, the EU has a natural interest in securing nondiscriminatory access through the Northern Sea Route and the Canadian Northwest Passage, when it opens. But while Canada is decisively turning east in its trade orientation, the EU has yet to secure its strategic interests.

The NATO alliance has also taken note of the security requirements for the Arctic. In January 2009, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer convened a NATO seminar on the Far North in Iceland. He spoke about the importance of securing new routes of Arctic navigation, and also the development of adequate disaster relief capabilities. Concerning natural resources, he envisaged five areas of NATO involvement in energy security: "Information and intelligence fusion; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure". And finally, he took note of territorial claims, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Exclusive Economic Zones, and continental shelf claims. In all these areas, he noted that the NATO-Russia Council could play a role, both on the political level, and on the operational level for coordination of search and rescue, and disaster relief operations. All in all, he noted that there are many opportunities for NATO to play an active role, but the approach was decidedly modest, referring only to making use of existing mechanisms. NATO's low-key approach to the Arctic was continued by his successor as Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

The Russians will not accept any role for NATO in the Arctic. As the dominant Arctic power, inviting a greater power in would have a destabilizing effect. Given that the entire Arctic Circle from Alaska to Norway is already covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (whereby an attack on a NATO member state is considered an attack on all members), it is not necessary to cause unnecessary confrontation. NATO members, without a NATO flag, participate in the Arctic ChoDs meetings and Coast Guard forums, and NATO members should conduct ad hoc exercises and operations in a manner that could strengthen Norway without antagonizing Russia. But without a solid institutional basis, it will be very difficult to elevate the Arctic ChoDs meetings to a genuine concept of regional security architecture.

China

China is the fastest-growing great power in the world, and as the world's greatest exporter of goods 50 percent of its GDP is related to shipping. China has a great economic and strategic interest in the Far North, both for access to natural resources and trade routes. Not only does the Northern Sea Route over Russia to Rotterdam mean a 40 percent distance and fuel reduction, but the very possibility of an alternative route could greatly increase China's freedom of action. At the moment, the passage west through the Malacca Strait is a bottleneck that can easily be corked by an American carrier battle group in times of dispute.  The Bering Strait could become a strategic chokepoint between the three great powers.

China stands to gain the most from both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, and is making generous overtures to Nordic countries and Canada with these interests in mind. China attempted to buy a large swathe of Iceland's territory, but was rebuffed. In Norway, China has invested heavily in Elkan, an electrochemical conglomerate. And China has recently shown interest in the Greenlandic rare earths, bidding alongside two Australian companies, Tanbreez and Greenland Mineral and Energy. What the Far North has not yet seen from China, however, is systematic buying of entire industries.

With about $4,000 billion in foreign currency reserves, of which approximately $3,000 billion is available for shopping around, there is no reason to believe that China may not decide at some point to engage in systematic acquisitions in the Far North.  Chinese investment tends to be more risk-averse in that it seeks out common stock of companies that are already publicly traded and scrutinized by markets and regulatory bodies. In its investment strategy, China does not appear to be venturing to explore and create new industries and markets.

China does appear to have a grand, if as yet unpublished, strategy for the region: there is clearly a long-term commercial strategy with the development of a substantial icebreaker fleet; and there is Chinese investment and integration into the scientific community.

There is also a concerted diplomatic strategy, reaching out to Iceland,

Greenland and others. The Chinese are connecting to far corners, such as the Norwegian ice-free port of Narvik, in order to develop an overland rail connection, for shipping to the American East Coast. These elements taken together reveal a grand strategic approach without a military component. China also sought to achieve permanent observer status at the Arctic Council in 2008; the application was approved in the Kiruna session of May 2013.

All in all, China is the wild card in the equation, but it seeks to secure its interests in a non-confrontational manner. With the prospect of Chinese shipping creating a situation in the Bering Strait where Russia is on one side, the United States on the other, and China in between, stability in the region will depend on the relations between the three great powers. While there is very little risk that the Arctic itself would become the source of tension, it is not unthinkable that a standoff caused in another part of the world, such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, or the Senkaku Islands, could lead to retaliation in the Arctic. The effect of connecting China through the Far North to the West means that the polar region will be exposed to the potential risks and dangers that surround China's ambitions in Asia's warmer waters.

Evaluation

We have considered the large-scale natural trends and a range of international and national initiatives that seek to catch up with innovations to adapt to a breakthrough process driven by nature. We can see that the natural breakthrough has spurred processes at the international and national levels. The Far North is a moving target and in recent years there has been a large number of new publications, policy statements, and strategy documents by national and international actors. The Arctic reveals surprising cooperation between rivals, and at times an equally surprising lack of cooperation within governments and among allies.

The race for resources and access is ongoing, but we do not see the hostile competition of the time when Spitsbergen was terra nullius. While there is good reason to believe there will be no open conflict, it remains an open question as to whether capabilities will be matched to requirements in safety and security, and whether some countries will fail to grasp the opportunities available to them.

Despite many positive developments, we should not forget that the situation today is still far from desirable. There are still great shortcomings in technology, access, logistics, communications, governance, and scientific knowledge about environmental trends, both in climate and in the resilience of ecosystems.  There is also a lack of high-detail geographical data publicly available. This sort of proprietary research is privately held by energy and shipping companies, but without a wider availability there is a greater risk of cruise ships running into trouble, or running aground as happened in 2010.

The Arctic Council is an important success story, and a part of this success was its relative unimportance in the early years since 1996. Bernard Funston, the Chairman of the Canadian Polar Commission who has been a part of the first 16 years of the Arctic Council's evolution, noted that "its weakness was its strength. It was non-threatening. It was consensus. It required people to get along. Issues percolated".

In the first decade, the Arctic Council operated below the radar and worked on developing scientific expertise and a series of very important assessments. Today with the greater interest in the Arctic Council, the policy community is taking over, and the center of gravity has shifted from science to national interests.  Nonetheless, the Arctic Council admits new members on the basis of what they bring to the table, and this is often measured by their scientific contributions.

The Arctic is a complex mechanism and efforts are being made to synchronize its many components to create a new and stable future. We have seen that the stabilizing factors which lead to greater cooperation have been economic interests. Another important stabilizing factor is that all parties recognise that they cannot meet the responsibilities they have for security and safety on their own, and they are working to cooperate. The informal Arctic ChoDs dialogue, while not a part of the Arctic Council, is very much its offspring.

Conclusion

The Arctic region is in the midst of a natural breakthrough process to an icefree future, in which great economic development and political cooperation are possible. It is an excellent example for the purposes of our book of an ongoing breakthrough process, but unlike other chapters, this breakthrough is in the near future. 

These changes create a new environmental balance and new levels of human access. This access, in turn, creates opportunities for business, economic and human development. On the national and international level, we can identify visions, policy concepts, strategies, and plans for implementation. We can identify innovative new mechanisms and cooperation in logistics, markets, safety, and security. This natural breakthrough process at the macro level is leading to human breakthroughs at the international level, which in turn are driving breakthroughs at national levels. Which of the process elements are the most decisive? It appears to be the international vision.

The International And National Visions

The most decisive human responses to macro-level environmental change are the international declarations that have expressed a large-scale vision. The international visions expressed in the Ottawa Declaration, Ilulissat Declaration, and Kiruna Vision for the Arctic affirmed a number of key principles that are reflected in all national policies and strategies.

The Ilulissat Declaration is an expression of an international legal vision, which pointed to an existing international concept that declared the law of the sea the 'constitution' for the Arctic region. No new treaties were needed, and the innovation of this brilliant and simple declaration was not to innovate, but to settle the most important questions of international law and legitimacy at a stroke. This opened the door to moving forward on all other dealings in the region. At the international legal level, we therefore had a clear progression from vision to overall legal concept.

With the vision of the Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council in 1996, we similarly see a transition from vision to a concept of cooperation on a range of issues in development, scientific research, and environmental protection. The Council has also succeeded in developing two binding safety agreements for search-and-rescue and oil-spill prevention.

These two visions do not, however, form a basis for comprehensive concepts of a regional governance structure or regional security architecture. The law of the sea is limited to the sea, and the Arctic Council explicitly excludes matters of military security and cannot host its own military staff committee. These international visions can therefore not be translated to comprehensive concepts and strategies at the international level. Governance and security matters have therefore been devolved to the national level, which is largely positive but also fragmentary.

The ad-hoc 'Arctic ChoDs' round table was created out of the necessity to develop the capabilities and cooperation needed to meet the obligations of the Arctic Council's safety agreements. In that respect, this dialogue is also a breakthrough that is forcing innovation to develop integrated and allied mechanisms and strategies. The shared recognition that no nation can handle the responsibilities and challenges alone is driving cooperation, and this too is an important breakthrough. Nonetheless, without a solid institutional basis, it will not be possible for international visions to develop into genuine concepts and a strategy for regional governance and security.

The national levels that we discussed at length are separately moving parts that differ in emphasis and strategic priority. Among all the participants, we can see the process flow of international visions into national policy concepts and strategies. The international visions are therefore the most decisive of the process elements at all levels. At the national level, the international visions mixed with domestic priorities to create a diverse set of concepts – some of which are more comprehensive than others.  

But if we want to see an international vision for governance and security of the Arctic translated into genuine international concepts and strategies, then leadership and innovation at the highest level will be needed.

Leadership

For the Arctic Council to become a genuine intergovernmental organization, rather than merely a high-level talking shop, a new kind of Arctic Treaty would be needed. It would transform the organization into one with a structure modeled on a regional group like the European Union, with an executive authority, a military staff committee, and other departments covering a broad spectrum of activity. But such a daring international move is beyond what is achievable today, and could upset the existing equilibrium. For a meaningful and genuine international breakthrough, innovative and courageous leadership would be needed – a leadership that can inspire a large-scale vision for a large number of people. It requires leadership to articulate a vision for the future that can inspire change. It takes leadership to see beyond what is being done to what might be possible.

The breakthrough driven by nature is forcing human innovations and breakthroughs. These national movements, with breakthroughs at national or subnational levels, are collectively driving breakthroughs at the macro level, to an outcome that will be more than the sum of its parts. The natural breakthrough is creating a new regional and strategic balance, and with varying levels of urgency a flurry of smaller innovations and breakthrough processes, ranging from ministries to national governments to international organizations. On the whole, these developments are very promising.

But what we have not yet seen is an inspirational leader like President John F. Kennedy, who articulated a large-scale vision, inspiring and challenging his nation to innovate in order to accomplish a seemingly impossible task within a decade.

But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as our goal? And they may well ask why climb the highest mountain? (…) We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.

After Kennedy's speech, industries were mobilized, and innovations sprang up in textiles, metals, plastics, aviation, and many other areas. An entire generation was inspired to take up science, with global benefits that have reached into every industry and field of science, and endure to this day. The discoveries of science can lead to policy outcomes, but genuine leadership inspiring innovation can be more enduring. If a great leader emerged and challenged his nation to innovate on a large scale, the impact could last deep into the century. Will a leader emerge in the coming decade to inspire us to innovate in the same way in the Arctic?