Read this article on Nietzsche's übermensch. Do you think the übermensch was meant to be Nietsche's attempt to build a shrine on which he could kneel? Can an übermensch or "ideal of strength" be a protective mask for someone like Nietzsche, who had a sensitive, passionate interior?
The Loneliest Loneliness and the Abyss of Being
Still is the bottom of my sea: who would guess that it harbours such sportive monsters.
(Nietzsche, 1883-1885/2005, p. 101)
The human is a rope, fastened between beast and Übermensch - a rope over an abyss.
(Nietzsche, 1883-1885/2005, p. 13)
In
the normal course of development, an individual goes through a stage of
being meaningfully mirrored by significant others, usually parents.
Lacan, and after him Winnicott, called it "the
mirror stage". Failure at this stage may lead to a fragile ego-formation
with lifelong consequences. If a person has not learned how to
internalise the "mirrored self", he might not benefit from it even if a
meaningful mirroring is offered later in life. Such a person might
become a kind of solitary island, beyond reach. Nietzsche once compared
himself to the wounded and abandoned archer Philoctetes, and wrote to
Heinrich von Stein, after his visit to Sils-Maria: "you may have come
far too close to finding Philoctetes on his island".
The
early death of his father shattered Nietzsche's childhood, not only
because of the loss of a male figure with whom he could identify, but
also because his contrary emotions could not be contained. These
continued to flood his conscious and unconscious self, creating mayhem.
Moreover, he was not given a chance to experience realistic, age
appropriate disappointment, and this left him with a persistent tendency
towards idealisation. His young, widowed mother, who had to care for
three young children, was not able to give this highly intelligent,
sensitive boy the "mirroring" and containment that he needed. A vital
part of Nietzsche's soul seems to have died then, and he carried this
sense of deadness throughout his life. "As my father I have already
died", he lamented in Ecce Homo. He
learned how to retreat behind a barricade of lofty solitude and
construct an invisible world of the ideal. As a young boy, he wrote
short plays and poems, and paraded toy soldiers in honour of a small
porcelain squirrel, which he called King Squirrel I. Whilst creating a kind of "Über-squirrel" can be seen as age
appropriate in the case of a child, Nietzsche's tendency to erect altars
and worlds before which he could kneel persisted well into adulthood. I
would argue that the Übermensch may be a culmination of this tendency
towards idealisation. It could also have been a product of psychotic
imagination, a kind of delusional idea. Initially,
delusional constructions may serve an apotropaic function by warding off
the impending disintegration of the self. Yet, ultimately, psychotic
constructions destroy the self and reality. As De Masi has
convincingly argued, they present themselves as saviours but in the end
they become the inner tyrants that colonise the ego, luring it into the
delirious joy of an omnipotent pseudo-paradise. These fantasies thus
serve only to lead the person further into the labyrinth of the
Unconscious, where the thread of reason can be irretrievably lost.
Nietzsche's
urge to idealise reached its apogee with Wagner, who, instead of
containing the idealising projections and allowing them to dissipate
naturally, fuelled and used them for his own narcissistic needs. This
pattern recurred in the encounter with Lou Salomé who, ironically, later
advised Freud on the psychopathology of narcissism. Nietzsche "created"
his Wagner and Lou Salomé, at huge cost to himself. Subsequently, he
withdrew from the world and lived the rest of his life in radical
solitude and "off his own fat". There was no-one who could contain his
powerful, contrary emotions and refuel his self-love, and there was
no-one for whom he could do the same either. He never developed any
intimate relationship or shared his life with anyone, and his
resignation from teaching at the age of 35 deprived him of any
subsequent human interactions of a potentially rewarding kind. His life
consequently became an emotional desert.
Idealisation is not
about seeing the best in another person, but about constructing what is
not there; in essence, it is a refusal to engage with reality. Unless
deconstructed by timely devaluations, idealisations have a depleting
effect on the self, which is then left with "bad internal objects". These can turn into monsters, either to be
fiercely fought against or to be projected onto the external world. In
his "transvaluation of all values", Nietzsche claimed that an
exceptional man, standing beyond good and evil, was entitled to the
sacrifice of the mediocre others.
In a private note of 1884, he proposed:
Destruction of the ill-bred - for that purpose one must emancipate
oneself from all traditional morality.
And, disturbingly:
Not merely a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with its own sphere of life, with an excess of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of the spirit ... .
Nietzsche's
concept of the "slave morality" of the weak, as opposed to the "master
morality" of the strong (see first essay in On the Genealogy of
Morality, 1887/1994), may well have been the result of splitting and
projection, so that "the ill-bred" and "the herd" became the carriers of
what he resented in himself. The attempt at emancipation from
traditional morality ultimately led to further alienation - both from
himself and from the world. The phantasm of the Übermensch, instead of
being a rainbow-bridge over the abyss, became the abyss itself. In
Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard recognised the danger of
the fantastic: "The fantastic is generally speaking what carries a
person into the infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from
himself and thus prevents him from coming back to himself. When emotion
becomes fantastic in this way, the self is simply more and more
volatilized. ... The person whose emotions have become fantastic ... in a
way becomes infinitized, but not in such a way as to become more and
more himself, for he loses himself more and more".