Read this report. Executive privilege is the power the president and other executive branch members claim to resist subpoenas and other interventions from the legislative and judicial branches. The U.S. Constitution does not mention executive privilege, but the Supreme Court ruled the concept is an element of the separation of powers doctrine. It is derived from the supremacy of the executive branch, an element of its area of constitutional activity. Various presidents – most infamously Richard Nixon – have invoked their right to executive privilege over a litany of issues they deemed private communications.
Introduction
Presidential claims of a right to preserve the confidentiality of information and documents in the face of legislative demands have figured prominently, though intermittently, in executive-congressional relations since at least 1792, when President Washington discussed with his cabinet how to respond to a congressional inquiry into the military debacle that befell General St. Clair's expedition. Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have reached the courts for substantive resolution, the vast majority achieving resolution through political negotiation and accommodation.
In fact, it was not until the Watergate-related lawsuits in the 1970s seeking access to President Nixon's tapes that the existence of a presidential confidentiality privilege was judicially established as a necessary derivative of the President's status in the U.S. constitutional scheme of separated powers. Of the nine court decisions involving interbranch or private information access disputes, four have involved Congress and the Executive. Two of these resulted in decisions on the merits.
One other case involving legislation granting custody of President Nixon's presidential records to the Administrator of the General Services Administration also determined several pertinent executive privilege issues. The most recent appellate court ruling, involving a private group's right of access under the Freedom of Information Act to pardon documents in the custody of the Justice Department, centered on a presidential claim of privilege which was rejected and further clarified the law in this area.
The Nixon and Post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the
presidential communications privilege. Under those precedents, the privilege, which
is constitutionally rooted, could be invoked by the President when asked to produce
documents or other materials or information that reflect presidential decision-making
and deliberations that he believes should remain confidential. If the President does
so, the materials become presumptively privileged. The privilege, however, is
qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need.
Finally, while reviewing courts have expressed reluctance to balance executive
privilege claims against a congressional demand for information, they have
acknowledged they will do so if the political branches have tried in good faith but
failed to reach an accommodation.
However, until the District of Columbia Circuit's 1997 ruling in In re Sealed
Case (Espy) and its 2004 decision in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice, these
judicial decisions had left important gaps in the law of presidential privilege, which
have increasingly become focal points, if not the source, of interbranch
confrontations that have made their resolution more difficult. Among the more
significant issues left open included whether the President has to have actually seen
or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the presidential privilege
encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession of,
officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch;
whether the privilege encompasses all communications with respect to which the
President may be interested or is it confined to presidential decisionmaking and, if
so, is it limited to any particular type of presidential decisionmaking; and precisely
what kind of demonstration of need must be shown to justify the release of materials that
qualify for the privilege. The unanimous panel in Espy, and the subsequent
reaffirmation of the principles articulated in Espy by Judicial Watch, authoritatively
addressed each of these issues in a manner that may have drastically altered the future
legal playing field in resolving such disputes.
A more recent dispute with Congress involving the removal and replacement of
nine United States Attorneys has drawn formal claims of privilege by President
George W. Bush. Those privilege claims have been successfully challenged in a civil
suit brought by the House Judiciary Committee seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief with respect to refusals by present and former senior presidential aides to
appear, to testify, and to provide documents by two subpoenaed present and former officials. The district court's opinion may serve to further amplify the law in this
area. It is useful, however, before proceeding with a description and explication of
Espy and Judicial Watch and the recent civil enforcement ruling to review and
understand the prior case law and how it has affected the positions of the disputants.