Read this article about the Great Depression in the United States. In addition to introducing the various causes, the text also covers The New Deal, a bundle of legislation that pulled the country out of depression and was arguably responsible for fully modernizing the United States.
Herbert Hoover and the Politics of the Depression

Unemployed men queued outside a depression soup kitchen opened in Chicago by Al Capone. February 1931.
As the Depression spread, public blame settled on President Herbert Hoover and the conservative politics of the Republican Party. In 1928, having won the presidency in a landslide, Hoover had no reason to believe that his presidency would be any different than that of his predecessor, Calvin Coolidge, whose time in office was marked by relative government inaction, seemingly rampant prosperity, and high approval ratings.7 Hoover entered office on a wave of popular support, but by October 1929 the economic collapse had overwhelmed his presidency.
Like all too many
Americans, Hoover and his advisors assumed – or perhaps simply hoped -
that the sharp financial and economic decline was a temporary downturn,
another "bust" of the inevitable boom-bust cycles that stretched back
through America's commercial history. "Any lack of confidence in the
economic future and the basic strength of business in the United States
is simply foolish," he said in November.8 And yet the crisis grew.
Unemployment commenced a slow, sickening rise. New-car registrations
dropped by almost a quarter within a few months.9 Consumer spending on
durable goods dropped by a fifth in 1930.10
When suffering
Americans looked to Hoover for help, Hoover could only answer with
volunteerism. He asked business leaders to promise to maintain
investments and employment and encouraged state and local charities to
assist those in need. Hoover established the President's Organization
for Unemployment Relief, or POUR, to help organize the efforts of
private agencies. While POUR urged charitable giving, charitable relief
organizations were overwhelmed by the growing needs of the many
multiplying unemployed, underfed, and unhoused Americans. By mid-1932,
for instance, a quarter of all of New York's private charities closed:
they had simply run out of money. In Atlanta, solvent relief charities
could only provide $1.30 per week to needy families. The size and scope
of the Depression overpowered the radically insufficient capacity of
private volunteer organizations to mediate the crisis.11
Although
Hoover is sometimes categorized as a "business president" in line with
his Republican predecessors, he also embraced a kind of business
progressivism, a system of voluntary action called associationalism that
assumed Americans could maintain a web of voluntary cooperative
organizations dedicated to providing economic assistance and services to
those in need. Businesses, the thinking went, would willingly limit
harmful practice for the greater economic good. To Hoover, direct
government aid would discourage a healthy work ethic while
associationalism would encourage the self-control and self-initiative
that fueled economic growth. But when the Depression exposed the
incapacity of such strategies to produce an economic recovery, Hoover
proved insufficiently flexible to recognize the limits of his
ideology.12 "We cannot legislate ourselves out of a world economic
depression," he told Congress in 1931.13
Hoover resisted direct
action. As the crisis deepened, even bankers and businessmen and the
president's own advisors and appointees all pleaded with him to use the
government's power to fight the Depression. But his conservative
ideology wouldn't allow him to. He believed in limited government as a
matter of principle. Senator Robert Wagner of New York said in 1931 that
the president's policy was "to do nothing and when the pressure becomes
irresistible to do as little as possible".14
By 1932, with the economy
long since stagnant and a reelection campaign looming, Hoover, hoping to
stimulate American industry, created the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC) to provide emergency loans to banks, building-and-loan
societies, railroads, and other private industries. It was radical in
its use of direct government aid and out of character for the normally
laissez-faire Hoover, but it also bypassed needy Americans to bolster
industrial and financial interests. New York congressman Fiorello
LaGuardia, who later served as mayor of New York City, captured public
sentiment when he denounced the RFC as a "millionaire's dole".15