The Path of Dictatorship

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 would last until the Revolution of 1910, with the onset of the Mexican Civil War (1910–1920). This revolution ended the Porfiriato, the rule of Porfirio Diaz (1830–1915). Diaz seized political power in 1876 and created a dictatorship from 1876 to 1911. During his 34-year dictatorship, Porfirio Diaz created a centralized government. He pursued an aggressive policy to build a modern capitalist and industrialized state with substantial investment from the United States and other foreign countries. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 represented the culmination of a century of political and social conflict in Latin and South America following independence from Spain and Portugal. We have learned that Mexico became a democracy when it separated from Spain. However, wealthy elites dominated its political, economic, and social institutions. Lower and middle-class Mexicans had little political power and faced constant subjugation from corrupt landlords and political officials. The 1910 revolution changed Mexico's culture and government on a national and regional level. Important revolutionary figures include Francisco Madero (1873–1913), Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919), and Pancho Villa (1878–1923). The Mexican Revolution began as an upper-middle-class political conflict between Porfirio Diaz and Francisco Madero, his political rival, but eventually encompassed all classes of Mexican society. The conflict led to Diaz's fall from power and a series of coups and counter-coups that prevented a return to stable government. Poor farmers and the indigenous population took advantage of the revolutionary chaos to challenge the political and economic power of wealthy landlords and local officials. In the early 1930s, President Lazaro Cardenas restored political and social order by implementing several social reforms to address extreme social and economic inequalities. Power and wealth were concentrated within the central government, among the foreign (usually American) investors, and among the members of the wealthier upper classes, who were often of Spanish heritage. They included wealthy merchants and the owners of the large landed estates (haciendas). The peasants, villagers, and members of the Mexican working class were often of mixed race (Mestizos) or members of the indigenous population (Zapotecs, Yaquis, and Maya). Both the peasants and workers had a history of rebellion in Mexico. Not only were Mexican landowners and American conglomerates abusing the peasants, miners, oil workers, ranch hands, and other members of the working class, but massive amounts of land were being transferred to foreign corporations, such as American agribusiness and Mexican landowners. These groups had few rights and saw little of the economic prosperity that benefited those who supported Diaz. Read this paper describing Mexico's political situation before the 1910 Revolution. How did capitalism and the desire for wealth and power create an economic and political structure that fomented revolution in Mexico? Consider the larger situation in Latin America – these Mexican revolutionaries in 1910 were the first members of the lower classes to rise in rebellion against the established society.

The Path of Dictatorship

In turn-of-the-century Mexico, the editors of La Gaceta Comercial surveyed the accomplishments of the decades-long project of national regeneration called the Porfiriato. Dismissing criticisms that President Porfirio Díaz' long rule was undemocratic, they instead applauded the regime's obtainment of order, thus allowing material progress: "Men of experience care little or nothing if governments are republican or monarchical; what is important is that, under one name or the other, in this or that form, that they realize the ends of the State - security and justice, progress through order". In both Mexico and Colombia, the last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed projects to restrict vibrant, if often disorderly, democratic cultures, undertaken with the goals of promoting capitalist economic development. This essay, after briefly exploring why we should consider mid-nineteenth-century Colombia and Mexico as democratic, will focus on what those in control of the state thought they had to do to secure this capitalist development. In other words, in the context of already vibrant democratic experiments, what did the quest for capitalist development tell us about the historical relationship between capitalism and democracy around the world? In both Colombia and Mexico, the correlation was negative. Both Liberal and Conservative political elites determined that too much democracy was inimical to capitalist development. Thus, both acted (Mexico successfully, Colombia much less so) to restrict democracy and promote capitalism (part of a broader erosion of democratic culture across the hemisphere, I will suggest). Both Mexico and Colombia provide heretofore-unutilized case studies - since Latin America is a region of the world not much considered in these scholarly arguments - for a long-running debate, both scholarly and popular, over the historic relationship between democracy and capitalism.

The historic relationship between democracy and capitalism is the rare debate that ignites both scholarly (across numerous disciplines) and popular interest. The philosopher and public intellectual Slavoj Žižek, in reference to China's present-day authoritarian capitalism, queried, "What if democracy is no longer the necessary and natural accompaniment of economic development, but its impediment?" (2009, A21). Following Žižek, most non-scholarly North Americans and many Western Europeans, especially politicians and public intellectuals, assume the relationship as positive, perhaps the two terms are perfect synonyms: capitalism supports democracy and democracy supports capitalism. Martin Wolf (2016), the chief economics commentator for the Financial Times, states, "A natural connection exists between liberal democracy…and capitalism". Among historians and social scientists there is less consensus. Many assert, there exists a strong, positive connection between capitalism and democracy (if framed often as unintended consequences of capitalist development). Others see no correlation between the two processes or even argue that the two are historically antagonistic. This project will explore how, in Mexico and Colombia, the massive expansion of capitalism (or at least the desire to join an Atlantic capitalist system) led to the erosion, if not complete destruction, of democracy in those two societies (and, I will suggest, weakened democratic culture across the hemisphere).

A new wave of research has reassessed the history of democracy in Latin America. An older master narrative gave Latin America no role in the world history of democracy, at least in the nineteenth century. While most Spanish American states were republics, these were largely seen as anarchic failures, pantomimes of true democracies. However, new research has re-examined nineteenth-century Latin America's political and cultural history, recovering a rich, vibrant experimentation with democracy and republicanism, promoted especially by popular actors. Whether measured through voting, constitutional guarantees for individual rights, daily democratic practices (attending legislative sessions in the galleries, demonstrations, political clubs), or Latin Americans' own sense of their societies' success in creating democratic republics, Spanish America appears at the vanguard of the world history of democracy, especially compared to the United States (due to racial restrictions) or Europe (due to class restrictions).

The vindication of democracy's history, however, necessitates a reconsideration of the interaction of capitalism and democracy as well. If Mexico and Colombia were democratic in the 1860s and 1870s, these democratic republics collapsed over the next two decades. Why? This collapse happened at the same time as the expansion of capitalism through the region, after decades of economic stagnation. Was this rise of capitalism and the fall of democracy simply coincidence or were causal factors at work? Finally, how do Mexico's and Colombia's histories fit into the larger debate on the historical relationship between capitalism and democracy?