ECON102: Principles of Macroeconomics (2021.A.01)

"We don't have a currency of our own," proclaimed Nerchivan Barzani, the Kurdish regional government's prime minister in a news interview in 2003. But, even without official recognition by the government, the so-called "Swiss" dinar certainly seemed to function as a fiat money. Here is how the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, during the period between the Gulf War in 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, came to have its own currency, despite the pronouncement of its prime minister to the contrary.

After the Gulf War, the northern, mostly Kurdish area of Iraq was separated from the rest of Iraq though the enforcement of the no-fly-zone. Because of United Nations sanctions that barred the Saddam Hussein regime in the south from continuing to import currency from Switzerland, the central bank of Iraq announced it would replace the "Swiss" dinars, so named because they had been printed in Switzerland, with locally printed currency, which became known as "Saddam" dinars. Iraqi citizens in southern Iraq were given three weeks to exchange their old dinars for the new ones. In the northern part of Iraq, citizens could not exchange their notes and so they simply continued to use the old ones.

And so it was that the "Swiss" dinar for a period of about 10 years, even without government backing or any law establishing it as legal tender, served as northern Iraq's fiat money. Economists use the word "fiat," which in Latin means "let it be done," to describe money that has no intrinsic value. Such forms of money usually get their value because a government or authority has declared them to be legal tender, but, as this story shows, it does not really require much "fiat" for a convenient, in-and-of-itself worthless, medium of exchange to evolve.

What happened to both the "Swiss" and "Saddam" dinars? After the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assumed control of all of Iraq, Paul Bremer, then head of the CPA, announced that a new Iraqi dinar would be exchanged for both of the existing currencies over a three-month period ending in January 2004 at a rate that implied that one "Swiss" dinar was valued at 150 "Saddam" dinars. Because Saddam Hussein's regime had printed many more "Saddam" dinars over the 10-year period, while no "Swiss" dinars had been printed, and because the cheap printing of the "Saddam" dinars made them easy to counterfeit, over the decade the "Swiss" dinars became relatively more valuable and the exchange rate that Bremer offered about equalized the purchasing power of the two currencies. For example, it took about 133 times as many "Saddam" dinars as "Swiss" dinars to buy a man's suit in Iraq at the time. The new notes, sometimes called "Bremer" dinars, were printed in Britain and elsewhere and flown into Iraq on 22 flights using Boeing 747s and other large aircraft. In both the northern and southern parts of Iraq, citizens turned in their old dinars for the new ones, suggesting at least more confidence at that moment in the "Bremer" dinar than in either the "Saddam" or "Swiss" dinars.