Monetary Policy and the Fed
Read this chapter to understand in more detail the monetary policy tools, process, and impacts on the U.S. economy. Review specific monetary policies and their effects from our recent history.
Problems and Controversies of Monetary Policy
Rational Expectations
One hypothesis suggests that monetary
policy may affect the price level but not real GDP. The rational
expectations hypothesis states that people use all available information
to make forecasts about future economic activity and the price level,
and they adjust their behavior to these forecasts.
Figure 11.5
"Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations" uses the model of aggregate
demand and aggregate supply to show the implications of the rational
expectations argument for monetary policy. Suppose the economy is
operating at YP, as illustrated by point A. An increase in the money
supply boosts aggregate demand to AD2. In the analysis we have explored
thus far, the shift in aggregate demand would move the economy to a
higher level of real GDP and create an inflationary gap. That, in turn,
would put upward pressure on wages and other prices, shifting the
short-run aggregate supply curve to SRAS2 and moving the economy to
point B, closing the inflationary gap in the long run. The rational
expectations hypothesis, however, suggests a quite different
interpretation.
Figure 11.5 Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations
Suppose
the economy is operating at point A and that individuals have rational
expectations. They calculate that an expansionary monetary policy
undertaken at price level P1 will raise prices to P2. They adjust their
expectations - and wage demands - accordingly, quickly shifting the
short-run aggregate supply curve to SRAS2. The result is a movement
along the long-run aggregate supply curve LRAS to point B, with no
change in real GDP.
Suppose people observe the initial monetary
policy change undertaken when the economy is at point A and calculate
that the increase in the money supply will ultimately drive the price
level up to point B. Anticipating this change in prices, people adjust
their behavior. For example, if the increase in the price level from P1
to P2 is a 10% change, workers will anticipate that the prices they pay
will rise 10%, and they will demand 10% higher wages. Their employers,
anticipating that the prices they will receive will also rise, will
agree to pay those higher wages. As nominal wages increase, the
short-run aggregate supply curve immediately shifts to SRAS2. The result
is an upward movement along the long-run aggregate supply curve, LRAS.
There is no change in real GDP. The monetary policy has no effect, other
than its impact on the price level. This rational expectations argument
relies on wages and prices being sufficiently flexible - not sticky, as
described in an earlier chapter - so that the change in expectations
will allow the short-run aggregate supply curve to shift quickly to
SRAS2.
One important implication of the rational expectations
argument is that a contractionary monetary policy could be painless.
Suppose the economy is at point B in Figure 11.5 "Monetary Policy and
Rational Expectations", and the Fed reduces the money supply in order to
shift the aggregate demand curve back to AD1. In the model of aggregate
demand and aggregate supply, the result would be a recession. But in a
rational expectations world, people's expectations change, the short-run
aggregate supply immediately shifts to the right, and the economy moves
painlessly down its long-run aggregate supply curve LRAS to point A.
Those who support the rational expectations hypothesis, however, also
tend to argue that monetary policy should not be used as a tool of
stabilization policy.
For some, the events of the early 1980s
weakened support for the rational expectations hypothesis; for others,
those same events strengthened support for this hypothesis. As we saw in
the introduction to an earlier chapter, in 1979 President Jimmy Carter
appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve and pledged
his full support for whatever the Fed might do to contain inflation. Mr.
Volcker made it clear that the Fed was going to slow money growth and
boost interest rates. He acknowledged that this policy would have costs
but said that the Fed would stick to it as long as necessary to control
inflation. Here was a monetary policy that was clearly announced and
carried out as advertised. But the policy brought on the most severe
recession since the Great Depression - a result that seems inconsistent
with the rational expectations argument that changing expectations would
prevent such a policy from having a substantial effect on real GDP.
Others,
however, argue that people were aware of the Fed's pronouncements but
were skeptical about whether the anti-inflation effort would persist,
since the Fed had not vigorously fought inflation in the late 1960s and
the 1970s. Against this history, people adjusted their estimates of
inflation downward slowly. In essence, the recession occurred because
people were surprised that the Fed was serious about fighting inflation.
Regardless
of where one stands on this debate, one message does seem clear: once
the Fed has proved it is serious about maintaining price stability,
doing so in the future gets easier. To put this in concrete terms,
Volcker's fight made Greenspan's work easier, and Greenspan's legacy of
low inflation should make Bernanke's easier.