Driven by Nature: The Future of the Arctic

Because of climate change, the Arctic is transitioning to an ice-free future that will open new trade routes and exploit the polar region's vast natural resources amid the receding ice pack. Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the United States, and international organizations are all vying to access these resources. Read the qualitative analysis in this chapter to explore the complexities of international treaties that govern the Arctic and the prospects of innovative multilateral agreements.

How does the changing landscape create a need for political and environmental balance? What are some new opportunities for businesses, economies, and human development?

Policies And Strategies

The European Union and NATO

Not to be outdone, a memo from the European Commission cheerfully announced to the European Council and Parliament that the "European Union is inextricably linked to the Arctic region (…) by a unique combination of history, geography, economy, and scientific achievements".  With Denmark in the inner circle, and Finland and Sweden in the next echelon, the EU is vying for a greater role and a permanent observer seat in the Arctic Council. EU members Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are full members of the Arctic Council; and the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, France, Germany, and Spain have the status of Permanent Observers. But the EU itself has not yet succeeded in upgrading its status of ad hoc observer. Finland campaigned the strongest on behalf of the EU, and Norway supported the EU's application.  Their application was approved at the Kiruna session of the Council in May 2013, but a final decision has been deferred until the EU lifts its seal trade ban.  With Canada's Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq as Arctic Council chair, the EU will be pressed to reverse a policy of immature and emotive environmentalism that has caused great harm to the way of life of the Inuit.

The Arctic holds precious resources for the EU, and the EU in turn is a huge consumer market for Arctic produce. Half of the fish caught in the waters above the Arctic Circle are consumed in the EU, and more than a quarter of Arctic oil and gas flows to the EU. More than €200 million of European funds has been invested in Arctic scientific research. As the world's largest trading bloc and most profitable consumer market in control of 40 percent of the world's shipping, the EU has a natural interest in securing nondiscriminatory access through the Northern Sea Route and the Canadian Northwest Passage, when it opens. But while Canada is decisively turning east in its trade orientation, the EU has yet to secure its strategic interests.

The NATO alliance has also taken note of the security requirements for the Arctic. In January 2009, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer convened a NATO seminar on the Far North in Iceland. He spoke about the importance of securing new routes of Arctic navigation, and also the development of adequate disaster relief capabilities. Concerning natural resources, he envisaged five areas of NATO involvement in energy security: "Information and intelligence fusion; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure". And finally, he took note of territorial claims, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Exclusive Economic Zones, and continental shelf claims. In all these areas, he noted that the NATO-Russia Council could play a role, both on the political level, and on the operational level for coordination of search and rescue, and disaster relief operations. All in all, he noted that there are many opportunities for NATO to play an active role, but the approach was decidedly modest, referring only to making use of existing mechanisms. NATO's low-key approach to the Arctic was continued by his successor as Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

The Russians will not accept any role for NATO in the Arctic. As the dominant Arctic power, inviting a greater power in would have a destabilizing effect. Given that the entire Arctic Circle from Alaska to Norway is already covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (whereby an attack on a NATO member state is considered an attack on all members), it is not necessary to cause unnecessary confrontation. NATO members, without a NATO flag, participate in the Arctic ChoDs meetings and Coast Guard forums, and NATO members should conduct ad hoc exercises and operations in a manner that could strengthen Norway without antagonizing Russia. But without a solid institutional basis, it will be very difficult to elevate the Arctic ChoDs meetings to a genuine concept of regional security architecture.