HIST363: Global Perspectives on Industrialization

Bosnia and Herzegovina On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip of Young Bosnia, a group whose aims included the unification of the South Slavs and independence from Austria. This assassination set in motion a series of fast-moving events that escalated into a full-scale war.

The cause of the conflict, however, is complex. Historians and political scientists have grappled with this question for nearly a century without reaching a consensus. The treaty that ended the war required Germany to admit to being the aggressor (Article 231) but this was achieved in the context of Germany's defeat, economic sanctions, and the threat of renewed hostilities. The damage this caused to national pride would help Adolf Hitler's rise to power.

Gavrilo Princip - the igniting torch of World War I

Alliances

Political scientists regard the building of alliances as a cause, specifically the formation of the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance. Alliances emboldened participating nations, leading each to believe that they had powerful backing. Both camps functioned in unique ways that contributed to the spread of war. For the Triple Alliance, the strong relationship between Germany and Austria expanded the conflict to a level where it would include at least four participants. Russia, France, and Britain had a relationship that was much less certain in 1914, contributing to the fact that each made the decision to go to war without collaborative consultation and with their own interests in mind.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria

Arms Races

The German-British naval arms race drastically intensified after the 1906 launch of the HMS Dreadnought, a revolutionary battleship that made all previous battleships obsolete. A major naval arms race in shipbuilding developed, related to the concept of new imperialism, furthering the interest in alliances.

Kennedy argues that both nations adopted U.S. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's conclusion that control of the oceans was vital to a great nation. (Kennedy, 1997) Additionally, this concentration kept related industries active and unemployment down while minimizing internal strife through the focus on a common, patriotic goal. Different scholars have different opinions about the degree to which the arms race was itself a cause of the war. Ferguson points out that Britain easily maintained her advantage. On the other hand, both sides were prepared for war. (Ferguson, 1999)

Plans, Distrust, and Mobilization: The First Out of the Gate Theory

Many political scientists argue that the German, French, and Russian war plans automatically escalated the conflict. Fritz Fischer (1908-1999) and his followers emphasized the inherently aggressive nature of Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which outlined German strategy if at war with both France and Russia. Conflict on two fronts meant that Germany had to eliminate one opponent quickly before attacking the other, relying on a strict timetable. France's well-defended border with Germany meant that an attack through Belgian (and possibly Dutch) territory was necessary, creating a number of unexpected problems. In a greater context, France's own Plan XVII called for an offensive thrust into Germany's industrial Ruhr Valley, crippling Germany's ability to wage war. Russia's revised Plan XIX implied a mobilization of its armies against both Austria-Hungary and Germany.

All three created an atmosphere where generals and planning staffs were anxious to take the initiative and seize decisive victories using these elaborate mobilization plans with precise timetables. Once the mobilization orders were issued, it was understood by both generals and statesmen alike that there was little or no possibility of turning back or a key advantage would be sacrificed. The problem of communications in 1914 should also not be underestimated; all nations still used telegraphy and ambassadors as the main form of communication, which resulted in delays from hours to even days.

Militarism and Autocracy

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and other observers blamed the war on militarism. The idea was that aristocrats and military elites had too much control over Germany, Russia, and Austria, and the war was a consequence of their thirst for military power and disdain for democracy. This was a theme that figured prominently in anti-German propaganda, which cast Kaiser Wilhelm II and Prussian military tradition in a negative light.

Consequently, supporters of this theory called for the abdication of such rulers, the end of the aristocratic system, and the end of militarism - all of which justified American entry into the war once Czarist Russia dropped out of the Allied camp. Wilson hoped the League of Nations and universal disarmament would secure a lasting peace, although he failed to secure U.S. support for the league. He also acknowledged variations of militarism that, in his opinion, existed within the British and French political systems.

Economic Imperialism

Lenin famously asserted that the worldwide system of imperialism was responsible for the war. In this he drew upon the economic theories of English economist John A. Hobson, who, in his 1902 book entitled Imperialism had earlier predicted that the outcome of economic imperialism, or unlimited competition for expanding markets, would lead to a global military conflict. [1] This argument proved persuasive in the immediate wake of the war and assisted in the rise of Marxism and Communism. Lenin's 1917 pamphlet "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" made the argument that large banking interests in the various capitalist-imperialist powers had pulled the strings in the various governments and led them into the war. [2]

Nationalism and Romanticism

Civilian leaders of European powers found themselves facing a wave of nationalist zeal that had been building across Europe for years as memories of war faded or were convoluted into a romantic fantasy that resonated in the public conscience. Frantic diplomatic efforts to mediate the Austrian-Serbian quarrel simply became irrelevant, as public and elite opinion commonly demanded war to uphold national honor. Most of the belligerents envisioned swift victory and glorious consequences. The patriotic enthusiasm, unity and ultimate euphoria that took hold during the Spirit of 1914 was full of that very optimism regarding the post-war future. Also, the Socialist-Democratic movement had begun to exert pressure on aristocrats throughout Europe, who optimistically hoped that victory would reunite their countries via the consolidation of their domestic hegemony. However, Lord Kitchener and Erich Ludendorff were among those who predicted that modern, industrialized warfare would be a lengthy excursion.

Culmination of European History

A localized war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was made possible due to Austria-Hungary's deteriorating world position and the Pan-Slavic separatist movement in the Balkans. The expansion of such ethnic sentiments coincided with the growth of Serbia and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, as the latter had previously ruled much of the region.

Map of the world with the Participants in World War I. The Allies are depicted in green, the Central Powers in orange, and the neutral countries in grey.

Imperial Russia also supported the Pan-Slavic movement, motivated by ethnic loyalties, dissatisfaction with Austria (dating back to the Crimean War), and a centuries-old dream of a warm water port. [3] For the Germans, both the Napoleonic Wars and Thirty Years' War were characterized by incursions which had a lasting psychological effect; it was Germany's precarious position in the center of Europe that ultimately led to the decision for an active defense, culminating in the Schlieffen Plan. At the same time, the transfer of the contested Alsace and Lorraine territories and defeat in the Franco-Prussian War influenced France's policy, characterized by revanchism. However, after the League of the Three Emperors fell apart, the French formed an alliance with Russia and a two-front war became a distinct possibility for Germany.