Network Intrusion Detection
Read sections 22.4 and 22.4.1. What is the main idea behind network intrusion detection? What is the basis for network intrusion detection systems (NIDS)? What is the issue that occurs when NIDS has to reassemble TCP streams?
Network Intrusion Detection
The idea behind network intrusion detection is to monitor one's network for signs of attack. Many newer network intrusion-detection systems (NIDS) also attempt to halt the attack, but the importance of simple monitoring and reporting should not be underestimated. Many attacks (such as password guessing, or buffer overflows in the presence of ASLR) take multiple (thousands or millions) of tries to succeed, and a NIDS can give fair warning.
There are also host-based intrusion-detection systems (HIDS) that run on and monitor a specific host; we will not consider these further.
Most NIDS detect intrusions based either on traffic anomalies or on pattern-based signatures. As an example of the former, a few pings (7.11 Internet Control Message Protocol) might be acceptable but a large number, or a modest number addressed to nonexistent hosts, might be cause for concern.
As for signatures, the attack in 22.3.2 A JPEG heap vulnerability can be identified by the hex strings 0xFFFE0000 or 0xFFFE0001. What about the attack in 188.8.131.52 The exploit? Using the shellcode itself as signature tends to be ineffective
as shellcode is easy to vary. The NOPslide, too, can be replaced with a wide variety of other instructions that just happen to do nothing in the present context, such as
sub eax,eax. One of the most common signatures used by
NIDSs for overflow attacks is simply the presence of overly long strings; the false-positive rate is relatively low. In general, however, coming up with sufficiently specific signatures can be nontrivial. An attack that keeps changing in relatively
trivial ways to avoid signature-based detection is sometimes said to be polymorphic.
The NIDS will have to reassemble TCP streams (and sometimes sequences of UDP packets) in order to match signatures. This raises the possibility of evasion: the attacker might arrange the packets so that the NIDS reassembles them one way and the target another way. The possibilities for evasion are explored in great detail in [PN98].
One simple way to do this is with overlapping TCP segments. What happens if one packet contains bytes 1-6 of a TCP connection as "help" and a second packet contains bytes 2-7 as "armful"?
h e l p a r m f u l
These can be reassembled as either "helpful" or "harmful"; the TCP specification does not say which is preferred and different operating systems routinely reassemble these in different ways. If the NIDS reassembles the packets one way, and the target the other, the attack goes undetected. If the attack is spread over multiple packets, there may be many more than two ways that reassembly can occur, increasing the probability that the NIDS and the target will differ.
Another possibility is that one of the overlapping segments has a header irregularity (in either the IP or TCP header) that causes it to be rejected by the target but not by the NIDS, or vice-versa. If the packets are
h e l p h a r m f u l
and both systems normally prefer data from the first segment received, then both would reassemble as "helpful". But if the first packet is rejected by the target due to a header flaw, then the target receives "harmful". If the flaw is not recognized by the NIDS, the NIDS does not detect the problem.
A very similar problem occurs with IPv4 fragment reassembly, although IPv4 fragments are at this point intrinsically suspicious.
One approach to preventing evasion is to configure the NIDS with information about how the actual target does its reassembly, so the NIDS can match it. An even safer approach is to have the NIDS reassemble any overlapping packets and then forward the result to the potential target.
Source: Peter Lars Dordal, https://eng.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Computer_Science/Book%3A_An_Introduction_to_Computer_Networks_(Dordal)/22%3A_Security
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