Regional Trading Blocs
Regional trading blocs have become common in recent decades. They remove trade borders between neighboring countries to expand local markets and bolster trade by streamlining regulations, tariffs, and economic policies. These blocs can also come in the form of customs unions, which essentially create one shared market between several countries and dictate trade policies between countries in the union and those outside it.
As was mentioned earlier, the key difference between a CU
and an FTA is the need to adjust the tariff structure applied to third-party suppliers, at least for some members. Countries that join an FTA are not required to change the tariffs
they apply to imports from the rest of the world. What
will differentiate the effects of a CU from those of an FTA
will be the extent to which the external tariff is increased or
decreased by a given member with respect to a given good.
The net economic effect of a CU crucially depends on how
the adjustment of the external tariff affects the degree of
discrimination vis-à-vis nonmember countries.
In order to isolate the impact of a CU, it is useful to
start with a case in which an FTA is already in place (i.e.,
trade is already liberalized among the partners) and member countries are considering establishing a customs
union by harmonizing their external tariff duties. For
ease of presentation, the following discussion assumes
that two countries, A and B, are members of an FTA and
have decided to form a customs union. Without loss of
generality, it will be further assumed that, for a particular
good, A has a low tariff and B has a high one. Two possible cases are relevant and are examined here.
One possibility is that the agreed common external
tariff (CET) leads to a higher tariff rate for a given CU
member (say, country A). The bloc's degree of discrimination is thus enhanced, and the negative impact of trade
diversion caused by the FTA is exacerbated. This usually
happens when a less advanced member has to implement
a CET aimed at protecting the industries of a more developed member. In this case, consumers in country A will
lose because they have to pay higher prices for imports
from the rest of the world or switch to less efficient
suppliers from country B. Despite the higher external
tariff, the government in country A could collect less tariff
revenues if the higher degree of discrimination leads to a
greater propensity for switching the sourcing of imports
to duty-free, country B suppliers. Producers of the good in
A face less competition from the rest of the world but
more competition from B. In fact, the adoption of a high
tariff by A effectively extends the protection received by
country B producers to country A's markets. These producers may be the only ones to gain from the CU in this
scenario. In some cases, and in a more dynamic setting,
the expansion of the protected market may lead to some
tariff-jumping types of investment in the customs union,
motivated by the prospect of taking advantage of the
larger, more protected market.
Joining a CU may offer a second possibility to consolidate the existing tariff schedule and adopt a more liberal
trade regime. If the establishment of the CU yields a CET
that is lower than the pre-CU tariff (say, in country B), the
potential for trade diversion is reduced, or even reversed,
because there is less potential for switching suppliers. The discriminatory aspect of the FTA is, in a sense, diluted in
this case. Starting from an FTA situation, a decrease in B's
external tariff would have two effects, both working in the
same direction. First, the liberalization will directly
increase B's imports from the rest of the world (trade creation). Second, since it effectively dilutes the existing
preference margin, it will reduce the attractiveness of
sourcing from country A relative to sourcing from the rest
of the world (less trade diversion). By reversing the trade
diversion caused by the FTA (i.e., by inducing consumers
to switch from less efficient suppliers in A to more efficient ones in the rest of the world), country B's tariff
reduction will benefit its consumers. It could also help
increase government revenues. as dutiable imports from
the rest of the world expand (albeit at lower tariffs) and
as country B shifts to dutiable imports and away from
duty-free imports from A. Domestic producers will face
more competition from nonmembers, but this will be
offset by consumer gains resulting from lower prices and,
potentially, by higher tariff revenues. Although adopting
a lower CET may not lead to tariff-jumping investment, the
higher returns associated with the more liberal economic
environment could attract efficiency-seeking investments.
Krueger (1995) has argued that if the CET level is chosen as
the union's average tariff for a given commodity, an FTA
will not lead to more net trade creation than a CU. Furthermore, as long as the CET is set below the tariff level of
the high-cost country, an FTA will not be more welfare
enhancing than a CU.
In the actual implementation of a CET, an individual
CU member will generally have to increase its external
tariffs on certain products while decreasing them on others. The overall impact will depend on the balance. Kemp
and Wan (1976) demonstrate the existence of conditions
that suffice to ensure that a CU is welfare enhancing.
In particular, they show that if the CET is chosen so that
trade with the rest of the world is kept unchanged, then
following the establishment of a CU, welfare could potentially increase for all parties, including nonmembers, contingent on compensatory transfers. This increase occurs
because any additional trade between CU members would
be welfare-enhancing trade creation. Although this is an
important result, it is a "possibility" and does not guarantee
that the existing political-economy equilibrium will be a
welfare-enhancing one.