Lobbying, Special Interests, and "Buying" Influence

According to this article, "an increasing number of Americans believe that government is run to serve a few large interests rather than for the benefit of all". Many view interest groups with skepticism, believing that the "special interests" often have too much influence in the policy process. What do you think? Do you think that interest groups are beneficial, as pluralism contends, or do you think that the "special interests" have too much power?

The notion of a government "by the people, for the people" is one of the bedrock concepts of American democracy, but the reality is that policy outcomes are often influenced by a wide range of factors, not merely the candidates whom voters select to represent them on Election Day.

"Special interests" and lobbyists are often derided for their perceived distortion of the democratic system, although there is a case to be made that the battle of organized interest groups has always constituted the essence of democracy. Still, certain kinds of representation frequently raise hackles – arms and oil industry lobbying, for example, or former U.S. Senators reportedly representing Russian banks that are the target of sanctions. Further, what critics most object to is the way that money buys access, and here there is ample evidence of new, troubling changes in the U.S. system: In a single decade, between 2000 and 2010, the amount spent on lobbying Congress and the federal agencies more than doubled, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, which curates useful data on the issue. Although the aggregate amount spent on lobbying has technically declined slightly, many believe that the practice of "soft lobbying" has meant that some lobbying money is now going "dark" – and is not being formally reported.

Key findings from the review include:

• Lobbying is widespread throughout the U.S. political system; previous research puts lobbying expenditures at the federal level at approximately five times those of political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. For instance, in 2012, organized interest groups spent $3.5 billion annually lobbying the federal government, compared to approximately$1.55 billion in campaign contributions from PACs and other organizations over the two-year 2011-2012 election cycle.
• Corporations and trade associations comprise the vast majority of lobbying expenditures by interest groups – more than 84% at the federal level – compared with issue-ideology membership groups, which makes up only 2% of these expenditures.
• While lobbying is presumed to be influential, the actual rate of firms engaging in lobbying is relatively low – approximately 10% of all firms.
• Large corporations and groups are more likely to lobby independently than smaller groups, which tend to lobby through trade associations. Some researchers suggest that smaller groups lack the resources to cover the high fixed costs of a lobbying organization.
• Lobbying efforts often increase when (1) the issues in question are considered more salient; (2) there are high stakes for the organized interest based on certain policy outcomes; and (3) the policy issue is related to budgeting or taxation issues.
• There is mixed evidence on the question of whether lobbyists derive more value from what they know (expertise) or whom they know (personal connections). The fact that some lobbying firms specialize in certain policy areas suggests that issue expertise could be valuable. However, other research suggests the connections might be more important; a study examining revenue of former legislative staffers who become lobbyists found that a lobbyist's revenue declined 23% after the legislator for whom the lobbyist worked was defeated in an election or retired from Congress.
• Determining and quantifying the impact of lobbying on policy outcomes can be challenging given the many other factors that can influence decisions (omitted variable bias). Using quasi-experimental methods – including differences-in-differences and instrumental variables – could better isolate these causal mechanisms.
• New data could also improve research on lobbying. In particular, detailed transactional data over longer time periods, combined with current archival datasets and other external datasets could be valuable. In addition, it could be useful to examine data outside of the United States to determine the generalizability of any U.S.-based empirical work.

The authors conclude by noting the many opportunities for future research in the field of lobbying. Some key questions include: Why do so few firms lobby, relatively speaking? (After all, more than $2 trillion is spent each year by the federal government, so even$3.5 billion in lobbying seems a small amount to compete for that.) Can we quantify the usefulness of connections as opposed to subject matter expertise? How effective is lobbying as a policy instrument as opposed to other forms of interest group pressure, such as media campaigning, endorsements, or grassroots organization?

Citation: de Figueiredo, John M. and Richter, Brian Kelleher. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying", Annual Review of Political Science, 2014, doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308.

Source: Alexandra Raphel, https://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/finance-lobbying/influence-interest-groups-public-policy-outcomes/