The Napoleonic Wars

The French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to power set off a catastrophic series of wars in Europe that raged until 1815. Read this text, which highlights how a generation of war changed the European map and unleashed political and social forces that impacted the continent long after Napoleon's defeat and permanent exile.

Notes

  1.  Black, Louis XIV to Napoleon 1999, pp. 121–122; Blanning, Pursuit of Glory 2007, pp. 588–590.
  2. See H. M. Scott, Emergence of Eastern Powers 2001, for a detailed discussion.
  3. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 2007, pp. 160–167.
  4. Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars 1986; chapters 2 and 3; and Rothenberg, Origins 1988.
  5. Black, War and the World 1998, chapter 5.
  6. Hochedlinger, Who's Afraid 2003, and idem, Wars of Emergence 2003.
  7. Savage, Favier's Heirs 1998.
  8. A recent overview of 18th-century diplomacy is Thompson, Diplomacy 2008.
  9. See Schroeder, European Politics 1994, chapter 1.
  10. Wilson, Warfare in the Old Regime 1999.
  11. Schneid, Warfare in Europe 2007, pp. XIV–XV.
  12. See Samuel F. Scott, Response of the Royal Army 1978; and idem, Regeneration of the Line Army 1970.
  13. Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic 1996, pp. 4–6.
  14. On the Imperial effort, see Wilson, German Armies 1998; idem, German Military Preparedness 2007; and Hochedlinger, Wars of Emergence 2003, pp. 407–410.
  15. Standard histories of the wars are Hochedlinger, Wars of Emergence 2003; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars 1996; Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic 1926–1939; and Ross, Quest for Victory 1973.
  16. See Sahlins, Natural Frontiers 1990.
  17. See Frey / Frey, Reign of Charlatans 1993.
  18. See Esdaile, The Spanish Army [forthcoming] 2011.
  19. The fate of the French commanders at Blenheim (1704) and Rossbach (1757), two of the greatest French defeats in the eighteenth century, are a case in point. Marshal Tallard (1652–1728), after his release from captivity and return to France in 1711, was elevated to Duke by Louis XIV. Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise (1715–1787), was promoted to Marshal of France in 1758 despite the loss of his army the previous year.
  20. See Wetzler, War and Subsistence 1985.
  21. Corvisier, Histoire militaire 1992, vol. II, pp. 238–244.
  22. Illari / Croaciani / Paoletti, La Guerra della Alpi 2000, pp. 257–311.
  23. See Roider, Baron Thugut 1987, p. 261.
  24. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World 2006, pp. 372–373.
  25. Esdaile, Napoleon's Wars 2007, chapter 3; cf. Black, British Strategy 2008.
  26. Schneid, Kings, Clients and Satellites 2008, p. 571.
  27. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire 2009, chapter 3; idem, Cultural Imperialism 2001; a counter-argument is Grab, Napoleon 2008.
  28. Broers's works address both the inner and outer empire, but Grab argues that the outer empire's dynamic was rather different. Connelly, Satellite Kingdoms 1965; and Schneid, Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy 1995, provide examples of the latter argument.
  29. Leggiere, Fall of Napoleon 2007, chapters 2 and 3; and Dwyer, Self Interest 2008.
  30. Schroeder, European Politics 1994, is replete with detailed examples of coalition disunity in objectives and actions.
  31. Simms, Impact of Napoleon 1997.
  32. Schneid, Napoleon's Conquest 2005.
  33. See Elliott, Empires of Atlantic World 2006, passim, on Spain; Schneid, Kings, Clients and Satellites 2008, for German and Italian states; and for Ottomans, Aksan, Ottoman Wars 2007. Connelly, Satellite Kingdoms 1965, is the classic account.
  34. Esdaile, Napoleon as Anti-Strategist 2008; and Idem, Napoleon's Wars 2007, argue that Napoleon never possessed a strategic framework but was always an opportunist. For a counterargument, see Schneid, Kings, Clients and Satellites 2008; and idem, Napoleon's Conquest 2005.
  35. Cf. Rowe, Reich to State 2003, for German nationalism; and Grab, Transformation of Europe 2003, for Italian nationalism.
  36. Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe 2001, particularly the introduction, chapters 5 and 11.
  37. See Stoker / Schneid / Blanton, Conscription 2009, passim.
  38. Crouzet, Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change 1964 provides the traditional argument. Ellis, Napoleon's Continental Blockade 1981, introduced a revisionist account, and Daly, Merchants, and Maritime Commerce 2001, provides a case study.
  39. Napoleon abandoned his alliance with the latter after the assassination of Sultan Selim III (1761–1808) in a palace coup.
  40. Esdaile, Peninsular War 2003; idem, Fighting Napoleon 2004; idem, The Duke of Wellington 1990; Davies, Wellington's Wars 2012; and idem, Wellington's Political Generalship 2010.
  41. Charles Esdaile leads the revisionists. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon 2004.
  42. Finley, Most Monstrous of Wars 1994; Gill, Thunder 2010, vol. III, chapter 7; Esdaile, Popular Resistance 2005.
  43. The most recent discussion of Habsburg diplomacy and their failure to build a coalition in 1809 is Gill, Thunder 2008, vol. I, chapters 1 & 2, particularly, the textual endnotes for these chapters provide a clear illustration of the difficulties of developing an anti-French coalition. Cf. Gill, Prussian Foreign Policy 2004; and Garland, Russia 1997.
  44. Discussion of the reasons for the stability of the French alliance can be found in Schneid, Kings, Clients and Satellites 2008, passim.
  45. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary 1982, pp. 175–176. Clemens von Metternich, the newly appointed foreign minister and General Count Joseph Radetzky (1766–1858), a respected officer of the Imperial War Council (Hofkriegsrat), encouraged the dynastic union.
  46. On Britain at this time, see Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1996, specifically Part II. The most recent examination of Britain's global military commitments is Black, The War of 1812 2009, specifically chapter 1.
  47. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary 1982, pp. 103–122.
  48. Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin 2007, pp. 89–103.
  49. A new book on the Italian revolutionary legions is Faverzani Il Primo Esercito Italiano 2010.
  50. The most recent and thorough discussion of the Sixth Coalition is Leggiere, Fall of Napoleon 2007, chapters 1–3.
  51. Schneid, Conscription 2009, pp. 195–196, 201–202.
  52. Schroeder, Balance of Power 2004.