HIST103: World History (1600–Present)

Washington, D.C., June 1, 1999 – The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China over the 50 years since the PRC was established on October 1, 1949, has been extraordinarily complex. Several years ago, the National Security Archive initiated a project to shed more light on U.S.–China relations. The purpose was to obtain critical documentation on key aspects of the United States–Chinese relationship, with a focus on the years 1969 to the present. Through Freedom of Information Act requests, collection of relevant publications, and archival research, the Archive has amassed a collection of more than 15,000 pages of previously classified documentation on U.S.-China interaction on foreign policy issues, the U.S.-PRC military relationship, the growing economic relationship between the two countries, as well as documents related to the several issues that divide the countries to this day.

In June 1999, the Archive will publish on microfiche with a detailed, item-level printed index these extraordinary documents, which include policy and research studies, intelligence estimates, diplomatic cables, and briefing materials. Titled China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998, this document set is part of the Archive's Special Collection Series, published by Chadwyck-Healey Inc. (Alexandria, Virginia and Cambridge, U.K.), and will ultimately also appear in the Chadwyck-Healey World Wide Web publication of The Digital National Security Archive.

Among the highlights of this collection are the detailed (and previously classified) U.S. government accounts of the infamous military assault by the Chinese government on pro-democracy demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989. This Electronic Briefing Book represents the first publication in any media of these documents, which include remarkable SITREPs from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as well as many of the Secretary of State's "Morning Summaries" from June 1989. In addition to the crackdown itself, the documents also cover the student demonstrations in late 1985 and 1986 that, in hindsight, were signs of the events to come, the period leading up to the PLA's use of force, and post-crackdown assessments of the events and their significance.

This briefing book was prepared by Jeffrey T. Richelson, a Senior Fellow at the Archive, and Michael L. Evans, a project associate. Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson (Ph.D., University of Rochester) is the director of the Archive's China and the United States project and previously directed Archive projects on intelligence, the military uses of space, and presidential national security directives. He is the author of several books on intelligence, including A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1995) and The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview, 1999), as well as articles in a variety of magazines and academic journals.

Michael L. Evans (M.A., George Washington University) assists with the China and the United States project, the Archive's forthcoming Guatemala documentation project, and has also assisted with the Archive's U.S. Espionage and Intelligence project.

Praise for China and the United States:

Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History

The Chinese army crackdown in and around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, had an enormous effect on the course of U.S.-China relations. The deaths of democracy protesters resulted in U.S. sanctions, suspensions of high-level contacts, and a halt in the transfer of military technology. The controversy continues to this day, as demonstrated by the reaction of many concerning President Clinton's decision to appear in the square with Chinese leaders during his June 1998 trip to China.

Documents 1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985 and 1986

The student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 were not the first time in the 1980s that Chinese authorities were faced with organized demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with their rule. In late 1985 and again in late 1986, Beijing and Shanghai were the site of student protests. Students carried banners with slogans such as "Law, Not Authoritarianism" and "Long Live Democracy."

In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, demonstrators have often seized upon politically tolerable causes—such as anti-Japanese sentiment or the commemoration of a popular Chinese leader—as vehicles to gather together and express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the Chinese government. Document 1, a U.S. embassy cable, suggests possible meanings of a tepid anti-Japanese demonstration in Tiananmen Square following a Sino-Japanese volleyball game on November 20, 1985. Embassy officials note that perhaps "someone wanted to stir up trouble to embarrass the authorities" and that "the semi-holiday atmosphere among the students at the square ... points to a lack of fear of retribution."

A subsequent cable (Document 2) reports the arrest of 23 of the students who were suspected "ringleaders" of the November 20 demonstration. "The authorities," the cable notes, "knew whom to look for because they had infiltrated both preparations for the demonstration and the demonstration itself." Furthermore, "one-armed police installation, shortly before last week's demonstration, 'looked like it was preparing for a war.'"

Document 3, a U.S. embassy report from late December 1985, notes that two student demonstrations had occurred in Beijing in the last several days. These demonstrations concerned student issues, the presence of the PLA on campus, as well as nuclear testing in Xinjiang province. The cable comments that "we do find a bit astonishing a demonstration in China ... on nuclear weapons testing."

The following December, a new round of demonstrations, this time explicitly calling for political reforms, sprang up in China's cities. Document 4, a U.S. embassy cable from December 24, 1986, reports on a small student demonstration in Beijing on the evening of December 23, 1986. The cable cites an editorial in the People's Daily, the state news daily, expressing sympathy with the students but making it clear that "the limits of official toleration were being approached." Later in the cable, embassy officials note that "political stability has always been a critical consideration in China. There can be no doubt that the authorities will crack down, and crack down hard if stability seems to be being called into question."

Document 5, an intelligence summary from U.S. Pacific Command, reports that thousands of protesters filled Tiananmen Square on New Year's Day 1987 and that "Some 24 'troublemakers' reportedly were taken away by the police for 'education and examination.'" On January 17, another intelligence summary (Document 6)reports that noted reformer and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang had resigned, apparently "a result of the recent student demonstrations."

This would not be the last time that the fate of Hu Yaobang would be associated with student demonstrations. His death on April 15, 1989, proved to be the catalyst that brought about the massive demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. The demonstration that had begun as an expression of grief over the loss of a popular political figure had, by April 26, taken on a decidedly political character. On that day, People's Daily published an editorial noting that,

Documents 7-11: On the Brink

On May 20, the Chinese leadership imposed martial law on the Beijing Municipality and appeared to be moving toward the use of force to clear the square. Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still hoping to see the standoff between the government and the student demonstrators resolved peacefully. While the documentary record is far from complete, Document 7, a heavily excised summary transcript of a May 23 meeting in Washington between President George Bush and Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did come up at their meeting. Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S. visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the government's martial law order.

As the crowds continued to gather in Tiananmen Square in the days following the death of Hu Yaobang, hard-liners in the party leadership prepared to move against both the students and the more conciliatory leaders within the party itself. Document 8, a State Department intelligence summary submitted to the Secretary on the morning of June 2, notes that hard-liners "remain unable to resolve the leadership crisis or to remove students from Tiananmen Square." The next day's morning intelligence summary (Document 9) reports on the first use of force on both sides—with the police firing tear gas on crowds gathered near Tiananmen and the crowds retaliating by stoning the police.

The next two documents report on developments at Tiananmen shortly before the PRC employed force against the protesters. Document 10 describes the "unorganized retreat" of a first wave of lightly armed soldiers and notes that it might have been intended "to prove that much stronger force will be necessary to regain control." Document 11, reporting the advance of more heavily equipped soldiers toward the city center, concludes by noting that the fact that the troops are helmeted and are armed with automatic weapons "suggest[s] that the force option is real."
 

Documents 12-29: The Crackdown

It would not be long after the U.S. Embassy in Beijing warned that the use of force was an option that it began reporting the PLA's attacks on demonstrators. That reporting, as well as information obtained by other means, is summarized in Document 12, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Beijing. The cable notes that troops, using automatic weapons, had advanced in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks from several directions toward Tiananmen Square. The cable also reports that the American Embassy believed that the 50-70 deaths reported in the foreign media were probably much too low. It also notes that several American reporters "were severely beaten by Chinese troops on Tiananmen Square." As events in Beijing unfolded, the American Embassy provided a near-continuous flow of reporting based on the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations of embassy officials.

The Secretary of State's intelligence summary for the following morning (Document 13) reports that "deaths from the military assault on Tiananmen Square range from 180 to 500; thousands more have been injured." It also describes how "thousands of civilians stood their ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails."

In addition to providing information on the events of June 4, the cables provide dramatic examples of the kinds of intelligence provided by diplomatic reporting. Document 14, an embassy cable from June 4, reports on confrontations between soldiers and protesters, some of which ended in deaths and vandalism by military personnel, who one source claimed were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings. On the same day, another cable from the U.S. Embassy (Document 15) reports, among other things, the statement of a Chinese-American who had witnessed the crackdown who claimed that "The beating to death of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC to enter Tiananmen Square, in full view of the other waiting PLA troops, appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed." In addition to these eyewitness accounts of the crackdown, other cables (Document 16) also provide information on PLA troop positions and casualty estimates.

One section of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5th (Document 17), titled "After the Bloodbath," focuses on developments in Beijing. It reports that "troops continued to fire indiscriminately at citizens in the area near Tiananmen Square." It also notes the destruction of a large number of military vehicles, threats to execute students, and the potential for violent resistance by students. The intelligence report also provides details on the worldwide reaction to the massacre, noting the unanimous condemnation of the "bloody repression" by foreign leaders, "regardless of ideology."

After the square had been cleared, Chinese Army troops continued to occupy the city, with continuing reports of sporadic gunfire and interfactional fighting among PLA units. The possibility that units of the PLA would turn on each other was raised in the June 6th edition of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary as well as embassy cables from June 5-6. An embassy cable from June 5 (Document 18) reports that armored units from the PLA's 27th Army "seem poised for attack by other PLA units" and notes that a "western military attaché" largely blames the 27th for the June 3 massacre, and says that the 27th "is accused of killing even the soldiers of other units when they got in the way." The June 6 edition of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary (Document 19) states that the 27th Army is "being blamed for the worst atrocities against civilians during Saturday night's attack on Tiananmen Square" and also notes that "some clashes between military units reportedly have occurred." Document 20, an embassy cable from June 6, refers to "persistent rumours of splits among the military and fighting among military units."

Meanwhile, as embassy officials continued to report on the events on the ground, the State Department went to work assessing the political ramifications of the crackdown. Document 21, the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 7, discusses the reaction of Asian leaders to the violence and reports rumors "that at least some leaders may have envisioned an outcome that would blame most atrocities on the 27th Army, relieve its top commanders, and remove senior officials who ordered armed action against civilians."

The June 7 summary also reports that PLA troops had fired shots in the direction of U.S. embassy apartments, an incident covered in greater detail in Document 22, an embassy cable from June 7. It reports that as a PLA troop convoy was passing near the embassy residence, "Heavy automatic weapons fire ... was heard ... Emboffs [U.S. Embassy officials] reported bullets shattered the windows of many apartments in the Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound."

An "Uneasy Calm" returned to be by June 8, according to the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9 (Document 23). It reports on missing dissidents, police actions at universities, martial law directives, and the first public appearance of Premier Li Peng since the massacre. Shortly thereafter, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research published an Intelligence Brief titled "Current Situation in China: Background and Prospects" (Document 24). The document observes that "at the heart of the crisis in China is the power struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping." It goes on to analyze the various elements of that struggle.

The first appearance of Deng Xiaoping since the crackdown was reported in Document 25, the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 10, noting that "Deng Xiaoping's public appearance yesterday ... signified his endorsement of martial law and the military's action against the population." The Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14 (Document 27) reports on the efforts of the Chinese leadership to demonstrate unity and portray a return to normal government operations, even while continuing the crackdown on the alleged leaders of the demonstrations, reports of which were then appearing in the Chinese press. By June 21, the Morning Summary (Document 29) was reporting that "More than 1,500 have been arrested ... including at least six of the 21 'most wanted' student leaders."

The June 14 Morning Summary and the one for the following day address one of the many problems in U.S.-Chinese relations that resulted from the Tiananmen crisis—the U.S. Embassy's decision to provide sanctuary for Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi in the days following the crackdown. The June 15 Morning Summary (Document 28) notes that the treatment of the issue in the Chinese media indicates that it represents an important conflict of interest with the United States. Arrest warrants for Fang and his wife had been issued by Chinese security forces on June 11. An embassy cable sent on that day (Document 26) reports that Chinese radio and television announcers had read a "letter" on the air "which accused the US government of supporting rebels and providing refuge for the 'criminal who created this violence.'"
 

Documents 30-35: The Aftermath

As the day-to-day crisis atmosphere faded, the U.S. sought to come to a precise understanding of the events and determine how they would affect China's future and U.S.-Chinese relations. Reports based on the accounts of eyewitnesses (Document 30 and Document 31) represent an effort by the American Embassy in Beijing to provide a concise description of the events that led up to the deaths at Tiananmen Square and to "set the record straight." Document 31 is based on the eyewitness accounts of embassy officials, western reporters and diplomats, and U.S. students present on or near Tiananmen Square. In its introduction, it notes that while civilian casualties probably did not reach the figure of 3,000 used in some press accounts, "they surely far outnumbered official figures." The body of the cable consists of three parts: a précis of events, an analysis of the extent and causes of military and civilian casualties, and a chronology of developments from 3 p.m. on June 3 to shortly after noon on June 4. A final note states that "Sporadic killing continued at least through Wednesday, June 6."

In the days immediately following the crackdown, U.S. and Chinese officials were already sensitive to how recent events would impact the bilateral relationship. On June 5, President Bush announced the imposition of a package of sanctions on China, including "suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons" and the "suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders." Document 32, an embassy cable sent three weeks later, notes that a military official had lodged a formal complaint that "strongly protested recent U.S. military sanctions" and had canceled the planned visits of U.S. military officials. Embassy officials felt this to be a "measured response to U.S. sanctions," indicating that the official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of the military relationship."

Two days later, on June 29, the State Department prepared "Themes" (Document 33) in support of Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who were to leave the next day on a secret trip to China to meet with Deng Xiaoping. "Themes" provided the framework for the discussions the two emissaries would have with Deng. It focused on the global strategic benefits of the U.S.-PRC relationship for both sides, the impact Chinese "internal affairs" could have on the relationship (characterizing the American people as being "shocked and repelled by much of what they have seen and read about recent events in China"), Bush's view of the importance of the long-term relationship between the US and PRC, and the impact that further repression could have on US relations with China. As Scowcroft later remembered, "The purpose of my trip ... was not negotiations—there was nothing yet to negotiate—but an effort to keep open the lines of communication."

By late July, INR analysts continued to update the situation in China under martial law and also had the opportunity to address the impact of the crisis on China. Document 34, a July 26 status report, discusses developments since the crackdown. An intelligence research report (Document 35) asks, "how did China get to this point?" explores the impact of the crisis on China's domestic and foreign policy and measures the international reaction to the crackdown. Among the judgments reached is that the situation in China would remain unsettled "at least until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders die."

Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989 to brief Chinese leaders on President Bush's summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta and to "explore the possibility of developing a 'road map' toward better relations." In the interim, Bush—in a concession he hoped would elicit a positive response from the Chinese government—had vetoed legislation permitting Chinese exchange students to remain in the United States until the Chinese government improved its human rights record. Despite these concessions, the Bush administration soon realized that their efforts had not borne fruit. Scowcroft later recalled their disappointment:

The Chinese had watched anxiously as communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989 but were apparently unmoved until the bloody end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. "When Ceausescu was toppled," Scowcroft recalled, "I believe the Chinese leaders panicked. It had appeared to me that they had taken great comfort from his apparent impregnability." Chinese Premier Li Peng told his American emissaries at the December meeting that had witnessed similar eruptions during the Cultural Revolution. "Had we not adopted the resolute measures on June 4," he added, "the present situation in China would be even more turbulent today."

Postscript 1999: Ten Years After

In the months preceding the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, the Chinese government and party officials have reexamined and often revised the official version of the military crackdown. In April 1999, Zhu Muzhi, the president of the China Society for Human Rights Studies (a government think tank), observed, "If the way we handled the Tiananmen crisis were incorrect, we would not have today's prosperity. China would be in chaos. The people would have risen and resisted the government." He added, "At that time, the police were poorly equipped ... They had never witnessed such large-scale protests ... They did not have rubber bullets then nor gas masks... The only weapons they had were their guns."

In a slightly more conciliatory gesture during his U.S. tour, President Zhu Rongji told reporters, "The episode in 1989 [happened] because they wanted democracy, but they didn't want the rule of law. That's why it happened." Zhu—who, as mayor of Shanghai in 1989, was credited with peacefully resolving the demonstrations there—thus became the first senior Chinese leader to acknowledge the democratic aspirations of the demonstrators.

Source: National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/
This work is in the Public Domain.