HIST103: World History (1600–Present)

The difference between the actions of the Sixth Coalition and those of its predecessors is that the European states acted with a unity of purpose: the defeat of Napoleon. All other matters, such as territorial interests, were subordinated to the military goal. This, above all else, enabled the Sixth Coalition to destroy Napoleon's empire within a year.

The allied leaders agreed to combine their armies, thereby preventing any power from withdrawing from the conflict and threatening the entire coalition, as had happened in 1799. Furthermore, allied leaders agreed to coordinate operations and accept a unified command. The extent of French influence on warfare was limited to army organization, command and control, and the emergence of a highly competent staff system for planning, coordination of movement, and logistics.

Various allied leaders such as Archduke Charles of Austria (1771–1847) and General Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813) in Prussia understood that their defeat by Napoleon in 1805 and 1806, respectively, necessitated significant and dramatic changes to their military systems. Archduke Charles vehemently rejected any notion of popular conscription, but he did work assiduously to improve the army's performance. Between 1806 and 1809, he adopted the French organizational system.

This involved the creation of a permanent army corps' and a staff system capable of directing it. Tactical reforms, too, provided greater flexibility on the battlefield. Charles experienced enormous opposition from elements of the army and imperial government who believed that the adoption of anything French would corrupt the army. After Austria's defeat in 1809, Charles was removed as head of the army, although there was little actual change to his revised system.⁴⁷

In Prussia, the reformers led by Scharnhorst instituted organizational and tactical reform on a scale much greater than in Austria. Nonetheless, the creation of a conscription system on the French model was rejected, and traditional recruitment, supplemented by the expansion of the Landwehr (a national militia of sorts), provided manpower from 1813–1815.⁴⁸

The coalition achieved its victory over Napoleon by backing its firm alliance with armies that operated in unison to achieve a single goal: the destruction of the French army. The view that the coalition achieved victory simply by copying the French military system – previously widely held among historians – is incorrect. It was the grafting of martial reforms considered acceptable by the conservative regimes and the rejection of those concepts, such as universal conscription, that posed a threat to monarchical rule.

The extent of French influence on the armies of allied states depended on the nature of the relationship between that state and Napoleonic France. The satellite states of Westphalia, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Kingdom of Holland fully adopted the French model. Their armies were established by French decree, and revolutionary legions formed in earlier years were absorbed into the new organizations.

French conscription systems and tactics were also copied. The agents of change came in the form of local supporters who received rank and position in the satellite regimes. These men backed the French during the Revolutionary Wars and received rewards after the creation of the satellite republics and later kingdoms. In states allied to France, such as Bavaria and Saxony, the military system was modified where possible. Conscription was introduced, but on a limited scale, and the term of military service was shortened in most cases to 8–10 years. This was almost twice the French term.⁴⁹

The success of the Sixth Coalition manifested itself in the rapid collapse of Napoleon's military and political control in Germany by October 1813. Thereafter, he withdrew behind the Rhine.⁵⁰

Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in October 1813, followed by his abandonment of central Europe, led to disagreements in the Sixth Coalition. The allied leaders met in Frankfurt in November and discussed options. Prince Clemens von Metternich (1773–1859) wanted to offer Napoleon peace with reduced French borders. The allies rejected Metternich's plans, and Napoleon did not, in any event, respond to peace overtures.

The coalition crossed the Rhine and invaded France at the end of December 1813, and by March 1814, Napoleon abdicated the throne. In the course of 1813 and 1814, the weight of Europe fell upon France. Napoleon's allies in Germany either actively defected to the coalition or passively withdrew their troops from the conflict. Of his satellite kingdoms, Westphalia in Germany was overrun, Napoleon's sister and brother-in-law in Naples defected in 1814, and only the kingdom of Italy remained steadfast until the very end.

Ideological opposition to Napoleon did appear in Germany during 1813. In 19th-century German literary and romantic circles, the period is referred to as the Befreiungskrieg or Freiheitskrieg, War of Liberation or War of Freedom. Yet, the students and intellectuals who volunteered for military service in 1813 and who participated in the nationalist and liberal movements in the post-Napoleonic era did not represent the interests and the intentions of the monarchs who led the coalition.⁵¹

The coalition's war against Napoleon was simply understood in terms of power politics. They had all made bargains with Napoleon during the previous 15 years. French domination of Europe, however, threatened their dynastic survival. France reduced to its "natural frontiers" would be acceptable. The initial settlement at Vienna in January 1815 recognized the French borders of 1792. After Napoleon's brief return during the Hundred Days in 1815, the coalition restored France to its frontiers of 1789.

The Congress of Vienna addressed territorial issues that had been tabled during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Austria, Russia, and Prussia vied for influence in Poland, Germany and Italy. In the end, the states reasserted – and, in some cases, asserted for the first time – their influence in regions of Europe that did not necessarily welcome the new order. It has been argued that the Congress of Vienna did not establish a "balance of power" in Europe but a set of principles that enabled imperial powers to pursue their interests without disrupting the "political equilibrium" in Europe, as France had done from 1792.⁵²

The specific agreements at Vienna clearly reflected traditional diplomatic concepts of territorial compensation but were more than a simple 19th-century version of the 18th-century balance of power. Their immediate aim was the containment of France, but competition among the powers in the aftermath of the war and the threat of revolution also caused concern.

The fear of France and of revolution led to the creation of the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance. The former comprised the major European powers and was responsible for watching France. The latter alliance was the creation of Tsar Alexander I of Russia and included Austria and Prussia. The principles of the Holy Alliance determined the course of action of the powers for the next decade.

The Vienna system established a general European peace upon traditional principles but equally affirmed the illegality of revolutionary activity. After France joined the Quadruple Alliance in 1818, raison d'état ceased to be the central factor in domestic and foreign policy, giving way to collective security against revolution.