HIST103: World History (1600–Present)

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars occupied almost 25 years of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. They represented the first general European war since the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars represented continuity in European alliance systems and ideologies, with the notable exception of the first two years of the French Republic (1792–1794). During this quarter century, six European coalitions challenged French expansion. France, too created alliances to counter these opposing coalitions. Indeed these coalitions and alliances represented continuity, rather than radical change, in the international system.

As the war progressed, the radicalization of the French government meant a radicalization of its policies toward its enemies. In some cases, this translated into an existential threat to German princes on the west bank of the Rhine and to the Austrian Netherlands, which had been in Habsburg possession since 1714. The eventual incorporation of these territories into Revolutionary France often led to French cultural domination in regions that neither possessed a French identity nor ethnicity.

In some cases, such as that of the Dutch revolutionaries in Holland, elements of the local population welcomed the arrival of the French, only to discover that their role was subsequently subordinated to French interests. Italian revolutionaries in Lombardy and Venetia, for example, actively supported the French armies, only to find their cities pillaged in the first months of occupation.

The Enlightenment produced a European discourse on constitutions and rights that emerged in virtually every state. The goals of reformers and later revolutionaries were shaped by their respective customs, cultures, and histories. The arrival of French armies in these diverse parts of western and – subsequently – central Europe brought initial opportunities to reform the administration and laws. Direct and indirect French influence often proved incompatible with local notions of change. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars thus involved changes to European governments and societies, yet these alterations were only made possible by successful diplomatic and military campaigns.

The French Revolutionary Wars encompassed the conflict begun by the French Revolutionary government in 1792 and ended with the peace treaties signed by Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) at Lunéville (1801) and Amiens (1802). The Napoleonic Wars include the series of military campaigns that began in 1803 with the collapse of the Peace of Amiens and ended with Napoleon's second abdication on June 25, 1815, a week after his defeat at Waterloo.

The French Revolutionary Wars included the following:

• War of the First Coalition, 1792–1797
• War of the Second Coalition, 1798–1802/1803

The Napoleonic Wars included the following:

• War with Britain, 1803–1804
• War of the Third Coalition, 1805
• War of the Fourth Coalition, 1806–1807
• The War in Spain, 1808–1814
• Austro-French War (Fifth Coalition), 1809
• The Campaign against Russia, 1812
• War of the Sixth Coalition, 1813–1814
• The Campaign of 1815

From the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession and the death of King Louis XIV (1638–1715), his successor, Louis XV (1710–1774), exported French power through the European system by establishing and developing alliances with other major powers in pursuit of dynastic goals.

This was in contrast to the approach of his great-grandfather, who had faced a European coalition in virtually all of his wars. French participation in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), the War of the Austrian Succession (1742–1748), and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) was part of the general European competition for influence in Italy, the Holy Roman Empire and the colonial world.

After 1763, France fought only one war, the American Revolution, in alliance with Spain and the Netherlands and against Britain. The latter conflict, however, did not result in a general war on the European continent but was limited to campaigns overseas. This period of relative peace resulted largely from the Habsburg-Bourbon condominium, the political alliance between France and Austria, which represented a radical change in European politics beginning in 1756.

Indeed, France stood in a close alliance with Spain from 1700. On three separate occasions, the two kingdoms formalized their dynastic relationship in the form of military agreements referred to as the Bourbon Family Compacts. These were strategic alliances between France and Spain to limit Britain's overseas ambitions and to challenge Austria's Habsburg possessions in Italy.

After 1763, the Family Compacts and the Habsburg-Bourbon relationship maintained peace on the continent. When in 1772, Russia, Austria, and Prussia partitioned Poland, French opposition to the carving up of that kingdom did not result in war. Plagued by financial crisis and a severely reduced army, Louis XV could not transform his vehement hostility into action.¹ War with Britain in 1777 was only embarked upon because it offered the potential to regain lost colonial territories and harm Britain by removing its most productive colonies.

There was no military campaign on the European continent because Britain lacked any effective means to project its power across the Channel. Austria and Prussia had no interest in that conflict, and in any event, Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia (1712–1786) and Joseph II of Austria (1741–1790) prepared to square off in 1778 over Bavaria.

The short-lived War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779), also known as the "Potato War", demonstrated that peace and stability in western Europe led to increasing tensions in eastern Europe, beginning with the partition of Poland in 1772 and continuing through to the French Revolutionary Wars.² The Russians mediated the Peace of Teschen, which ended the Austro-Prussian conflict in 1779. It provided for the status-quo ante with the addition of Russian guarantees for the stability of the Holy Roman Empire.

It is clear that the years following the accession of Catherine II (the Great, 1729–1796) to the Russian throne in 1762 were characterized by a central European focus. She succeeded in convincing Prussia and Austria to participate in her plans for Poland and then intervened in German affairs as a peacemaker. Furthermore, she used her relationship with the Austrian monarchy to bring about a coalition war against the Ottoman Empire in 1787. The Russo-Austro-Turkish War (1787–1791) began as a disaster for Austria and a great success for Russia.³

In any event, this war immediately preceded the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars. Several historians have argued that the French Revolutionary Wars were fought within the same general European context as preceding conflicts.⁴

The wars of the 18th century were fought for dynastic interests. Viewed in terms of state power, the continental and colonial wars represented the unfolding of European conflicts on a global scale. In most cases, European wars extended to several continents.⁵

Indeed, the French and Indian War (1754) escalated into the general European conflict of the Seven Years' War. The consequences of increasing European global power meant that resources had to be carefully allocated and alliances cultivated to permit the pursuit of dynastic claims in Europe. Even temporary coalitions, such as between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1772 or between Russia and Austria in 1787, did not create permanent relationships in regions of Europe that offered enormous territorial opportunities.

Coalitions were marriages of convenience in the 18th century. The only alliances that lasted beyond the duration of any particular conflict were the dynastic arrangements between France and Spain at the beginning of the 18th century and between France and Austria at mid-century. Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria only interpreted alliances in the short term, and this subsequently severely hampered their ability to provide a united front against Napoleonic France.

At the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, attention remained focused on events in the Balkans, on the growing tension between Prussia and Austria, and on the recent suppression of revolutions in the Netherlands and Belgium. The States-General overthrew the Dutch monarchy in 1787, leading to Prussian military intervention.

In 1788, a rebellion against Josephinian reforms in the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) led to military repression. This was the extent of the Western focus. In central Europe, however, Prussia had agitated rebels in Belgium and disrupted Austrian interests in Poland. Tensions grew, and war between Austria and Prussia appeared imminent in 1790. The death of Joseph II and the accession of his brother Leopold II (1747–1792) calmed tempers. Nevertheless, it appeared to many that the conclusion of war with the Turks would be followed immediately by a confrontation between the two German powers.⁶

Equally, cracks appeared in the Habsburg-Bourbon pact as a result of Austria's Polish policies, as well as Joseph's desire to trade the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria in 1784. Joseph II's highhanded foreign policy served to disturb Louis XVI (1754–1793) and his ministers. A faction at the court began to push the French monarch toward an anti-Austrian policy by 1790.⁷

The vagaries of diplomatic alignments and tensions give a false sense that the 18th century marked a change in European diplomacy. This is not the case. The emergence of Prussia and Russia as significant players did not alter the way states conducted policy; they merely added variables to the equation.⁸ It has been argued that any concept that 18th-century Europe sought a balance of power is illusionary. States pursued raison d'etat as they had in previous centuries.⁹

All of this provides a wider context for the response of European powers to the French Revolutionary Wars. Indeed, even French territorial objectives from 1792–1807 followed a relatively traditional pattern-seeking to increase direct or indirect influence in central Europe and the Italian states. By 1792, Jacobinism provided an additional justification for French military efforts but did not radically alter French diplomatic and military strategy.