Read this section to learn about a potentially counter-intuitive relationship between universal and particular affirmatives – namely, one does not imply the other. This is because universal affirmatives do not contain an "existential commitment": a statement that there is anything in the category the universal affirmative references.
Complete the exercise, keeping in mind that universal affirmatives do not contain existential commitments. Check your validity answers against the key.
Universal statements and existential commitment
Consider the following inference:
- All S are P
- Therefore, some S are P
Is this inference valid or invalid? As it turns out, this is an issue on which there
has been much philosophical debate. On the one hand, it seems that many
times when we make a universal statement, such as "all dogs are mammals," we
imply that there are dogs - i.e., that dogs exist. Thus, if we assert that all dogs
are mammals, that implies that some dogs are mammals (just as if I say that
everyone at the party was drunk, this implies that at least someone at the party
was drunk). In general, it may seem that "all" implies "some" (since some is
encompassed by all). This reasoning would support the idea that the above
inference is valid: universal statements imply certain particular statements. Thus,
statements of the form "all S are P" would imply that statements of the form
"some S are P". This is what is called "existential commitment".
In contrast to the reasoning just laid out, modern logicians reject existential
commitment; they do not take statements of the form "all S are P" to imply that
there exists anything in the "S" category. Why would they think this? One way
of understanding why universal statements are interpreted in this way in modern
logic is by considering laws such as the following:
All trespassers will be fined.
All bodies that are not acted on by any force are at rest.
All passenger cars that can travel 770 mph are supersonic.
The "S" terms in the above categorical statements are "trespassers," "bodies
that are not acted on by any force," and "passenger cars that can travel 770
mph". Now ask yourself: do these statements commit us to the existence of
either trespassers or bodies not acted on by any force? No, they don't. Just
because we assert the rule that all trespassers will be fined, we do not
necessarily commit ourselves to the claim that there are trespassers. Rather,
what we are saying is anything that is a trespasser will be fined. But this can be
true, even if there are no trespassers! Likewise, when Isaac Newton asserted
that all bodies that are not acted on by any force remain at rest, he was not
committing himself to the existence of "bodies not acted on by any force".
Rather, he was saying that anything that is a body not acted on by any force will
remain in motion. But this can be true, even if there are no bodies not acted on
by any force! (And there aren't any such bodies, since even things that are
stationary like your house or your car parked in the driveway are still acted on by
forces such as gravity and friction.) Finally, in asserting that all passenger cars
that can travel 770 mph are supersonic, we are not committing ourselves to the existence of any such car. Rather, we are only saying that were there any such
car, it would be supersonic (i.e., it would travel faster than the speed of sound).
For various reasons (that we will not discuss here), modern logic treats a
universal categorical statement as a kind of conditional statement. Thus, a
statement like,
All passenger cars that can travel 770 mph are supersonic
is interpreted as follows:
For any x, if x is a passenger car that can travel 770 mph then x is
supersonic.
But since conditional statements do not assert either the antecedent or the
consequent, the universal statement is not asserting the existence of passenger
cars that can travel 770 mph. Rather, it is just saying that if there were
passenger cars that could travel that fast, then those things would be
supersonic.
We will follow modern logic in denying existential commitment. That is, we will
not interpret universal affirmative statements of the form "All S are P" as
implying particular affirmative statements of the form "some S are P". Likewise,
we will not interpret universal negative statements of the form "no S are P" as
implying particular negative statements of the form "some S are not P". Thus,
when constructing Venn diagrams, you can always rely on the fact that if there is
no particular represented in the premise Venn (i.e., there is no asterisk), then if
the conclusion Venn represents a particular (i.e., there is an asterisk), the
argument will be invalid. This is so since no universal statement logically implies
the existence of any particular. Conversely, if the premise Venn does represent
a particular statement (i.e., it contains an asterisk), then if the conclusion doesn't
contain particular statement (i.e., doesn't contain an asterisk), the argument will
be invalid.
Source: Matthew J. Van Cleave
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.